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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis addresses the financing problems faced by firms. Specifically, we test for the 
existence of firms’ financial constraints, as well as we analyse their role upon firm behaviour. 
We argue that: a) Portuguese firms face significant financial constraints; b) the extent to 
which firms are affected by constraints depends on a number of distinct characteristics, 
beyond financial aspects; c) financial constraints clearly influence firm behaviour, namely 
with regard to export and innovation activities; d) suitable policies to mitigate financial 
constraints should be considered, even though subsidies might not be the most effective 
policy instrument. To support these arguments, we conduct several tests, using a large 
representative sample of Portuguese firms and different approaches to measure financial 
constraints. Accordingly, this thesis contributes to the understanding of firms’ behaviour 
under financial problems, while it points directions for future research. Finally, this work has 
serious implications upon future policy actions. 
 
 
JEL Classification: D92; G32; F14; F36; L00; L2; L8; O30. 
Keywords: Financial constraints; Firm-level studies; Portugal; Services; Exports; European 
financial integration; Innovation; R&D investment; Subsidies. 
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RESUMO 
 
A presente tese analisa os problemas de financiamento enfrentados pelas empresas. Em 
particular, investiga a existência de restrições ao financiamento das empresas e o seu impacto 
no comportamento das mesmas. Nesta tese defende-se que: a) as empresas portuguesas 
enfrentam restrições financeiras significativas; b) a existência de restrições ao financiamento 
das empresas depende de um conjunto de características distintas, que vão para além de 
aspectos meramente financeiros; c) as restrições financeiras têm um impacto visível no 
comportamento das empresas, nomeadamente no que respeita às actividades de inovação e 
exportadoras; d) deverão ser consideradas políticas que visem o combate às restrições ao 
financiamento das empresas, ainda que a atribuição de subsídios possa não ser a política mais 
adequada. De modo a sustentar esta tese, são efectuados vários estudos, utilizando uma 
amostra representativa de empresas portuguesas, bem como diferentes medidas de restrições 
financeiras. Como tal, este trabalho não só contribui para uma melhor compreensão do 
comportamento das empresas afectadas por problemas financeiros, como também identifica 
um conjunto de linhas de investigação futura. Por fim, este estudo leva a conclusões 
relevantes para a condução de política. 
 
 
Classificação JEL: D92; G32; F14; F36; L00; L2; L8; O30. 
Palavras-chave: Restrições financeiras; Empresas; Portugal; Serviços; Exportação; 
Integração financeira Europeia; Inovação; Investimento em I&D; Subsídios. 
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PRELIMINARY NOTE 
 
The present thesis is the outcome of an endeavour that started in 2007 with my enrolment in 
the PhD program at the Faculty of Economics. Although at the early start I already had 
intentions to work on firm behaviour, it was not until the beginning of 2008 when, in the 
course of my supervisor’s, Carlos Carreira, lectures that I became genuinely interested on the 
role of financial constraints on firm behaviour. Therefore, even though I do not intend to 
sound selfish, I might dare to say that the recent financial crisis, in full swing since 2008, by 
renewing the interest in the analysis of firms’ financial constraints, gave me further 
motivation for these writings—albeit all the suffering that the crisis has and still does 
provoke. 
 
xii 
 
  
xiii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I can not find the appropriate words to express my gratitude to my mentor Carlos Carreira. 
He has always had the time and the patience to guide me through the several difficulties that I 
encountered throughout the elaboration of this work. His expertise, vision and commitment to 
excellence, have undoubtedly shaped my approach towards research and definitely pushed 
this work a huge step forward. With him, who introduced and taught me the arts of this craft, 
I had the most insightful and inspiring conversations—not only with respect to the confines 
of research work, but also to the multiple aspects of life. Therefore, I would prefer to refer to 
him as a mentor, rather than a supervisor. It has been a privilege and an honour to work under 
his mentoring. 
 I would also like to acknowledge all my teachers and those that contributed to my 
education, who—since the early beginning at primary school and either at Coimbra or at 
Glasgow—guided me and contributed to the development of my critical stance, my work 
ability and my intellect. Special thanks to Adelaide Duarte, my undergraduate tutor, for her 
remarkable guidance and motivation through all these years that I have spent at the 
University of Coimbra and to Paulino Teixeira, the PhD Program Coordinator, for his support 
and excellent guidance during my years as a PhD student. 
 The most deep thank you to all my friends—including former colleagues, as well as 
those at the “Núcleo Duro”, the “Abutres” and my fellow mates at the CNAc waterpolo team 
(even though some would argue that researching is not a proper job)—, who gave me further 
support to accomplish this titanic task and with whom I cleared my temper so many times. I 
am additionally grateful to all PhD colleagues—at Coimbra and abroad—, with whom I 
shared the gloom, anguish and despair inherent to being a PhD student, but who were 
nevertheless there to pull my confidence up allowing me to carry on with research. Special 
thanks to Rodrigo Martins who was always keen to share his vision and experience that 
greatly contributed to my motivation to teach, to research and indeed to these writings. 
 For all their remarkable patience, help and support given at several situations, a warm 
thank you to the staff of the Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra and the staff of the 
Faculty bar. 
 Throughout the elaboration of this thesis, I have participated in several conferences, 
submitted papers to journals and had inspiring and insightful conversations with many 
colleagues and researchers that undoubtedly have contributed to the elaboration of this work.  
xiv 
 
  
xv 
 
Despite risking omitting key names unintentionally (to whom I apologise), I would like to 
thank Andrés Barge-Gil, Giulio Bottazzi, Jesper Christensen, Alex Coad, Dirk Czarnitzki, 
Alessandra Guariglia, Stuart Holland, Paul Kattuman, Óscar Lourenço, Rodrigo Martins, José 
Murteira, Tobias Schmidt, Armando Silva, Frederico Tamagni, Paulino Teixeira and Tania 
Treibich for their most helpful comments, suggestions, as well as insightful discussions. 
Furthermore, I am grateful to the Editor and two anonymous referees of the Journal of 
Economic Surveys, the Editor and an anonymous referee of Notas Económicas, the Editor 
and three anonymous referees of Economics of Innovation and New Technology, for their 
comments and suggestions. I would additionally like to thank seminar participants at: 23rd 
Annual Congress of ASEPELT, 2009; 13th Conference of the International J. A. Schumpeter 
Society, 2010; 5th International Symposium on Economic Theory, Policy and Applications, 
2010; GEMF Seminars “Os artigos digerem-se bem”, October 20, 2010; MICRO-DYN 
Summer School, 2010; DIME workshop on Financial Constraints, Firms and Aggregate 
Dynamics, 2010; DRUID-DIME Academy Winter Conference, 2011; EMAEE 2011 
Conference; 5th Meeting of the Portuguese Economic Journal, 2011. Nevertheless, this 
acknowledgement does not implicate anyone but myself in all remaining errors that may 
exist. 
 I am also thankful to the INE (National Statistical Office) for providing the data 
necessary to the research work. Financial support from FCT (Portuguese Science Foundation) 
through the doctoral grant SFRH/BD/44067/2008 (POPH/FSE program), the GEMF (Grupo 
de Estudos Monetários e Financeiros) and the Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra 
is greatly appreciated. Without it, the elaboration of this thesis would not have been possible. 
Nevertheless, this work represents the views of the authors, and not necessarily those of these 
institutions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 Finally, but most importantly, I would like to note that without the extraordinary 
support of my girlfriend, Raquel Margarido, my sister Inês Silva and my parents Ana Rosa 
and José Silva, this thesis would have never seen the light of day. They were the driving 
force, the safe port and the key motivators that helped me to achieve this goal. They were 
also those who turned the hardest day into a joyful one, always giving me the strength to 
carry on. Special thanks to my grandparents José Nelson Rosa and Rita Angelina for their 
remarkable support through my life and to my uncle Nelson Rosa, who since my earliest 
days, triggered and encouraged my deep interest in Economics. To them and to my family, 
who have helped and guided me, as well as have been remarkably supportive in so many 
times throughout my life, especially during this endeavour, I am eternally indebted.  
xvi 
 
 
 
xvii 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT  vii 
RESUMO  ix 
PRELIMINARY NOTE  xi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  xiii 
FIGURE AND TABLE INDEX   xxv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  xxix 
    
   
INTRODUCTION  1 
   
CHAPTER I  
DEFINITION AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
  
1. The Modigliani-Miller theorem: a departing point  5 
2. Information asymmetries and financial market imperfections  6 
3. Sources of funds  10 
4. Models incorporating financial constraints: Different perspectives  11 
4.1. Dynamic investment models: Q theory and Euler equation  11 
4.1.1. Q-theory  11 
4.1.2. Euler equation  12 
4.2. The liquidity management approach  13 
4.3. The evolutionary perspective  15 
 
  
 
  
xviii 
 
CHAPTER II  
HOW TO MEASURE FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
  
1. Introduction  19 
2. Indirect measures  20 
2.1. Prologue: Primordial tests and the Q-theory of investment  20 
2.2. Cash-Flow Sensitivities  20 
2.2.1. Investment  20 
2.2.2. Growth  22 
2.2.3. Cash  23 
2.2.4. Common pitfalls  24 
2.3. Euler Equation test  25 
2.4. Evolutionary test of selection forces  26 
2.5. Considerations on the data required  28 
3. Direct measures  28 
3.1. Company reports  29 
3.2. Self-evaluation: Survey data  30 
4. Indexes  32 
4.1. With a qualitative dependent variable  32 
4.2. Without a qualitative dependent variable  33 
4.2.1. Euler equation index  33 
4.2.2. MDA index  34 
4.2.3. Class Ranking Index  35 
5. Other approaches  36 
5.1. Firm level cash-flow sensitivities  36 
5.2. Credit ratings  37 
5.3. Proxies  38 
6. Conclusion  38 
xix 
 
Appendix  40 
 
  
 
CHAPTER III 
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS? 
  
 
1. Introduction  45 
2. Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity as a measure of financial 
constraints: An ongoing debate 
 46 
3. Stylized results  48 
Stylized result 1: Financial constraints are more severe for younger and 
smaller firms 
 48 
Stylized result 2: Size distribution of firms is skewed due to financial 
constraints 
 50 
Stylized result 3: Start-ups/new entrepreneurs appear to be financially 
constrained 
 51 
Stylized result 4: Financial constraints are determinant for firm survival  52 
Stylized result 5: R&D investment appears to be more financially 
constrained 
 53 
Stylized result 6: Government policy to alleviate financial constraints 
seems to work 
 55 
Stylized result 7: Financially constrained firms hold more cash  56 
Stylized result 8: Close bank relationships alleviate financial constraints  57 
Stylized result 9: Publicly traded companies face lower financial 
constraints than non-traded ones 
 58 
Stylized result 10: Firms are less financially constrained in economies 
with more developed financial markets 
 58 
Stylized result 11: Financial liberalization seems to alleviate financing 
constraints of firms, especially for smaller ones 
 60 
Stylized result 12: Recessions and financial crisis increase financial 
constraints, and disproportionally affect constrained firms 
 61 
   
xx 
 
Stylized result 13: Firms that belong to a business group have lower 
financial constraints 
62 
Stylized result 14: Foreign-owned firms are less financially constrained 
than domestic ones 
 62 
4. Measure problems and conceptual issues  63 
5. Concluding remarks  64 
 
  
 
CHAPTER IV  
DATA 
 
 
1. Data sources  67 
2. Merging the data sources  70 
2.1. Dataset A  70 
2.2. Dataset B  72 
3. Construction of variables  74 
3.1. Generic information (FUE)  74 
3.2. Balance sheets variables (IEH)  75 
3.3. Innovation variables (CIS)  78 
3.4. Other variables  80 
4. Key for sector and industry disaggregation  81 
 
  
 
CHAPTER V  
MEASURING FIRMS’ FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS  
THROUGH DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES 
  
 
1. Introduction  85 
2. Measuring financial constraints   86 
3. Methodology  88 
3.1. Model 1—Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity  88 
xxi 
 
3.2. Model 2—Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity  89 
3.3. Classification Schemes  91 
3.3.1. Firm Size  91 
3.3.2. Firm Age  92 
3.3.3. The SA index  92 
3.3.4. Dividend policy  93 
4. Empirical Results  93 
4.1. Summary statistics  93 
4.2. Overall sample estimation  98 
4.3. Classification schemes  101 
4.3.1. Size  101 
4.3.2. Age  102 
4.3.3. SA index  102 
4.3.4. Dividend policy  105 
5. Concluding remarks  106 
   
 
CHAPTER VI  
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MANUFACTURING AND  
SERVICES 
 
  
 
1. Introduction  107 
2. Recent developments and main hypothesis  109 
2.1. Services and firms’ financial constraints  109 
2.2. What should we expect?  110 
3. Methodology  111 
3.1. CCFS  111 
xxii 
 
3.2. Size and Age  113 
3.3. CCFS with interacted cash-flow  113 
3.4. The HH index  114 
4. Empirical results  115 
4.1. Summary statistics  115 
4.2. Aggregate Manufacturing and Services  121 
4.3. Differences across industries  126 
4.4. Differences across firms’ size and age  128 
5. Discussion  134 
6. Concluding remarks  135 
Appendix  137 
 
  
 
CHAPTER VII  
OPENNES, EXPORTS AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY 
INTEGRATION 
 
  
 
1. Introduction  145 
2. Financial constraints, trade and monetary integration  146 
3. Methodology  148 
4. Empirical results  151 
4.1. Summary statistics  151 
4.2. Monetary integration  156 
4.3. Exporting and importing  158 
5. Concluding Remarks  165 
Appendix  166 
xxiii 
 
 
  
CHAPTER VIII  
R&D INVESTMENT, INNOVATION AND SUBSIDIES 
 
  
1. Introduction  169 
2. Financing problems of the innovation process  170 
2.1. Financial constraints, R&D investment and innovation  170 
2.2. Pubic financial support  171 
3. Methodology  173 
3.1. Model A: Measuring financial constraints using CCFS  173 
3.2.Model B: Sample selection in R&D investment, with endogenous 
financial constraints 
 175 
3.3.Model C: Impact of financial constraints directly upon innovation  177 
3.4. Model D: Subsidies and financial constraints  178 
4. Empirical Results  179 
4.1. Summary Statistics  179 
4.2 Results for Model A  182 
4.3. Results of Model B  185 
4.4. Results of Model C  188 
4.5. Results of Model D  190 
5. Discussion  192 
6. Conclusion  197 
Appendix  198 
 
  
CONCLUSION  207 
 
  
REFERENCES  211 
 
xxiv 
 
 
xxv 
 
 
FIGURE AND TABLE INDEX 
 
FIGURE INDEX   
 
  
CHAPTER I   
Figure I.1. The mix of applicants for loans  7 
Figure I.2. Informational imperfections and underinvestment   8 
 
  
CHAPTER VI    
Figure VI.1. Quantile-Quantile plot of the HH index for different sectors  125 
   
 
xxvi 
 
 
TABLE INDEX 
 
  
CHAPTER II   
Appendix   
Table II.A1. Methodologies used to assess financial constraints  40 
 
  
CHAPTER IV   
Table IV.1. Data sources  69 
Table IV.2. Structure of Dataset A  72 
Table IV.3. Structure of Dataset B  74 
 
  
CHAPTER V   
Table V.1. Summary statistics of Model (1) variables  94 
Table V.2. Summary statistics of Model (2) variables  95 
Table V.3. Correlation matrix of Model (1) variables  96 
Table V.4. Correlation matrix of Model (2) variables  97 
Table V.5. Model 1-Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation  99 
Table V.6. Model 2-Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation  100 
Table V.7. Model 1-Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation with 
interactions 
  
103 
Table V.8. Model 2-Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation with interactions  104 
 
  
CHAPTER VI   
Table VI.1.1. Summary statistics  116 
Table VI.1.2. Summary statistics for manufacturing firms  117 
Table VI.1.3. Summary statistics for services firms  118 
Table VI.2. Spearman's rank correlation matrixes for manufacturing and 
services 
 120 
Table VI.3. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation for manufacturing and 
services 
  
122 
Table VI.4. HH index distribution  124 
xxvii 
 
 
Table VI.5. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation for manufacturing 
industries 
  
 
127 
Table VI.6. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation for services industries  129 
Table VI.7. CCFS with size and age classes interactions  131 
Table VI.8. CCFS with size and age interactions  132 
Table VI.9. Relationship of size and age with the HH index  133 
Appendix   
Table VI.A1. CCFS with different proxies for investment opportunities  137 
Table VI.A2. Validation of HH index  138 
Table VI.A3. Summary of results on CCFS and HH index by sector and 
industry 
 139 
Table VI.A4: Summary of size and age relationships with financial 
constraints 
  
140 
Table VI.A5. Main variables in Services against Manufacturing  140 
Table VI.A6. Quantile regression for the Overall sample  141 
Table VI.A7. Quantile regression for the Manufacturing sample  142 
Table VI.A8. Quantile regression for the Services sample  143 
 
  
CHAPTER VII   
Table VII.1.1. Summary Statistics 1  152 
Table VII.1.2. Summary Statistics 2  153 
Table VII.1.3. Spearman's rank correlation coefficients for the different 
periods 
  
155 
Table VII.2:CCFS estimation with different controls for money market  157 
Table VII.3:CCFS estimation by openness towards the EU  161 
Table VII.4:CCFS estimation by export intensity-EU  162 
Table VII.5:CCFS estimation by import intensity-EU  163 
Table VII.6:CCFS for shifting firms  164 
Appendix   
Table VII.A1. Non-parametric tests comparing different subsamples  166 
Table VII.A2. Relationship between openness, exports, imports and 
financial constraints using interactions 
  
167 
xxviii 
 
 
Table VII.A3. CCFS changes with monetary integration for firms with low 
degree of openness 
  
 
168 
 
  
CHAPTER VIII   
Table VIII.1. Summary statistics: Model A.  180 
Table VIII.2. Summary statistics: Models B, C and D.  181 
Table VIII.3. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation: Innovators and potential 
innovators 
  
183 
Table VIII.4. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation: R&D and Subsidies.  184 
Table VIII.5. Investment in R&D.  187 
Table VIII.6. Innovation.  189 
Table VIII.7. Financial constraints: The impact of subsidies.  191 
Table VIII.8. Frequencies of FC and SUB  192 
Appendix   
Table VIII.A1. Different specifications of Model A  198 
Table VIII.A2. Investment in R&D: CIS waves  199 
Table VIII.A3. Innovation: CIS waves  200 
Table VIII.A4. Innovation: Product vs Process  201 
Table VIII.A5. Frequencies of FC and SUB: Lagged values  202 
Table VIII.A6. Subsidies: The impact of financial constraints  203 
Table VIII.A7. Spearman's rank correlation matrix: Models A and B  204 
Table VIII.A8. Spearman's rank correlation matrix: Models C.and D  205 
 
  
 
xxix 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACW Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 
BdP Banco de Portugal 
CAE Classificação de Actividade Económica (Industry Classification) 
CCFS Cash to Cash-Flow Sensitivity 
CFS Cash-Flow Sensitivity 
CIS Community Innovation Survey 
ECB European Central Bank 
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities 
EVP D'Espallier, Vandemaele and Peeters 
FHP Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
FUE Ficheiro de Unidades Estatisticas 
GCFS Growth to Cash-Flow Sensitivity 
GDP Gross domestic product 
HH Hovakimian and Hovakimian 
ICFS Investment to Cash-Flow Sensitivity 
IEH Inquérito às Empresas Harmonizado 
INE Instituto Nacional de Estatística 
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification 
KZ Kaplan and Zingales 
MM Mondigliani and Miller 
MDA Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
NUTS Nomenclatura Comum das Unidades Territoriais Estatísticas 
NW Nelson and Winter 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
R&D Research and Development 
SA Size and Age 
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises 
WW Whited and Wu 
 
xxx 
 
 
1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Co-operators who have firstly a high order of business ability and probity, and 
secondly the "personal capital" of a great reputation among their fellows for 
these qualities, will have no difficulty in getting command of enough material 
capital for a considerable undertaking: the real difficulty is to convince a 
sufficient number of those around them that they have these rare qualities. And 
the case is not very different when an individual endeavours to obtain from the 
ordinary sources the loan of the capital required to start him in business.” 
Marshal (1890: Book IV, Chapter XII, pp. 308) 
 
The dissociation, in a capitalist society, of the holders of funds (“lenders”) and the agents that 
produce the goods (“borrowers”)—may them be called firms, industrial capitalists or 
entrepreneurs—introduces an important dimension to be taken into account in the study of 
the economic processes: the extent to which a “capable producer” may lack the necessary 
funds from the “borrower” to start, continue or increase the production of “desirable goods”, 
just because he does not have the required “personal capital”—i.e. reputation in a 
Marshallian view.1 
 In fact, “reputation” or confidence is at the very core of the financing problems that 
firms may face. A “lender” (or a financial intermediary such as a bank), when deciding to 
allocate funds will naturally opt for lending to that who he believes will guarantee a safer or a 
higher return. Since the “lender” may not be able to distinguish between “cherries” (good) 
and “lemons” (bad) “borrowers”, due to asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970), it might be 
the case that the “lemons” prevail and significant “cherries” are not chosen. Implicit in this 
rationale is the possibility that many “borrowers” will not obtain a loan or, if they do, they 
will be required an additional premium (or interest). These two scenarios will ultimately lead 
to what we call “financial constraints”. 
 The existence of these constraints at the firm-level has serious consequences upon 
economic change. In fact, borrowing from a Schumpeterian perspective, if innovation is the 
driver of economic evolution (a term that in the view of Schumpeter should be used in place 
of economic growth) and if, in a capitalist society, “innovations are carried out by means of 
                                                           
1
 We define “desirable goods” as those that are demanded by the society in the present and\or in the future (even 
though we do not currently know what is to be demanded in the future). 
2 
 
borrowed money” (Schumpeter, 1939, pp. 223), then the extent to which money is directed to 
innovators will shape the evolution of the economy. 
 The recent financial crisis and the associated shortage of liquidity have raised new 
interest, among both researchers and policymakers, on the financing of firms. In fact, while 
several researchers devote their time to the investigation of firms’ financial constraints (as we 
will see in Chapter III), the financing problems and public financial support of firms’ activity 
(notoriously SMEs) has been given particular attention from, at least, the Portuguese and 
European media. 
 Even though much is talked and discussed about firms’ financial constraints, the very 
definition of what are financial constraints is still subject to debate. In effect, financial 
constraints is a rather abstract concept since it cannot be directly observable. Accordingly, it 
is quite difficult to come up with a clear-cut definition. As a starting point, in the spirit of 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we can apply a precise, but broader definition by stating that 
financial constraints are present whenever there is a wedge between the costs of obtaining 
internal and external funds. The problem with such definition is that it virtually covers every 
firm. As an alternative, even though quite theoretically, we prefer to define financial 
constraints as the inability of a firm to raise the necessary amounts (due to external finance 
shortage), at acceptable costs, in order to finance its investment and growth. 
 In this thesis, we argue that a significant number of firms face financial constraints, 
that the intensity of these constraints varies across firms with distinct characteristics and that 
financial constraints unfalteringly influence firm behaviour. 
 Even thought this thesis builds on separate, but related research effort (papers and 
articles), we articulated the pieces in order to obtain a coherent body. Consequently, the 
structure of this work is built in a logical sequence that takes the reader from a theoretical 
discussion of what are financial constraints, to a number of empirical findings regarding the 
determinants of constraints and their implications upon firm behaviour. In the meantime, we 
endow the reader with the empirical tools and frameworks used by researchers, while 
blending in the empirical literature of this prolific academic field. Accordingly, this work is 
organized as follows.  
 In Chapter I we deepen our definition of financial constraints and review the major 
theoretical contributions to the field. This theoretical anchorage is crucial for the 
understanding of subsequent Chapters of methodological and empirical nature.  
3 
 
 Chapter II overviews the existing approaches and methodologies used to empirically 
measure firms’ financial constraints. Additionally it compares the different frameworks by 
pinpointing the major advantages and drawbacks of each one. 
 Having discussed the different methodological tools, in Chapter III we summarize the 
empirical literature regarding financial constraints. It is organized as a series of stylized 
results, which mirror what is generally understood about severity of financial constraints and 
the effects that they have upon firms. Accordingly, this Chapter allows us to position this 
work within the prolific literature on such constraints. [Part of the material in this Chapter has 
been published as: Carreira, C., and Silva, F. (2010). “No Deep Pockets: Some stylized 
results on firms' financial constraints”. Journal of Economic Surveys, 24(4):731–753.] 
 We support the arguments made in this thesis with data on Portuguese firms. 
Therefore, in Chapter IV we describe the data sources and different firm-level datasets used 
throughout our empirical analysis based on the Portuguese economic reality.  
 Accordingly, in Chapter V we depart to the empirical analysis. Specifically, we 
implement different approaches in order to verify if, and measure the extent to which, 
Portuguese firms are financially constrained. This exercise also allows us to uncover some 
relationships between constraints and firm characteristics, as well as to compare different 
methodologies. [Previous versions of this Chapter have circulated as Silva, F. and Carreira, 
C. (2010a). “Measuring firms’ financial constraints: Evidence for Portugal through different 
approaches”. GEMF Working Paper No. 15/2010.] 
 Subsequently, Chapter VI deepens the analysis of the previous Chapter by examining 
the extent to which there are significant differences in financial constraints between sectors of 
economic activity (Manufacturing and Services), as well as between firms operating in 
distinct industries. Additionally, we test if the commonly agreed relationships between 
constraints and both size and age (see Chapter III) are robust to economic sector 
disaggregation. [Previous versions of this Chapter have circulated as Silva, F. and Carreira, 
C. (2010b). “Financial constraints: Are there differences between manufacturing and 
services?”. GEMF Working Paper No. 16/2010.] 
 In Chapter VII we explore the impact of the European monetary integration process 
upon firms' financial constraints. Additionally, we analyse the nexus between these 
constraints and firms' engagement in international trade, with a particular emphasis on firm 
exporting behaviour. [Part of the material in this Chapter is based on Silva, F. and Carreira, 
C. (2011). “Financial constraints and exports: An analysis of Portuguese firms during the 
European monetary integration” Notas Económicas 0(34): 35-56.] 
4 
 
 Last, but not least, in Chapter VIII we broadly address the financing problems of the 
innovation process. In particular, we examine the extent to which financial constraints hinder 
firms' investment in R&D and innovation. In addition, we investigate the role of public 
financial support in alleviating such constraints. [Part of the material in this Chapter has been 
published as Silva, F. and Carreira, C. (2012). “Do financial constraints threat the innovation 
process? Evidence from Portuguese firms”. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 
(forthcoming). DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2011.639979.] 
 Finally, the last section of this work overviews and summarizes the major findings 
and implications of this thesis with respect to policymaking as well as future research. 
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CHAPTER I – DEFINITION AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
The term “financial constraints” became, in the past few years, extensively used in the 
literature. However, it is still rather difficult to come up with a clear-cut definition of 
“financial constraints”. In fact, this is a rather abstract concept since it cannot be directly 
observable. Throughout this work we define “financial constraints” as the inability of a firm 
to raise the necessary amounts (due to external finance shortage), at acceptable costs, in order 
to finance its investment and growth. Such a definition still carries a great amount of 
abstraction. Therefore, in this Chapter we will come down to the phenomena that are at the 
root of the existence of such term. Accordingly, this Chapter overviews the theoretical 
anchorage, crucial for a clearer understanding of what are “financial constraints”. 
 
1. The Modigliani-Miller theorem: a departing point 
The Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958), hereafter MM, states that, under certain conditions, 
firms’ financial structure is irrelevant to investment decisions. This result arises because, in 
such scenario, external finance is a perfect substitute for internal funds. Accordingly, changes 
and differences in the cost of capital will be driven by investment demand. Therefore, 
investment decisions will be independent of a firms' financial status. 
 However, the theorem requires a number of assumptions to hold. We summarize these 
conditions as follows: a) corporate taxes are neutral; b) firms and investors borrow at the 
same interest rate (symmetric access to credit); c) a firm’s financial policy is uninformative of 
its economic condition; d) perfect financial markets and perfect information—inexistence of 
frictions due to information asymmetries. 
 Even though the required assumptions are hardly met in reality, this theorem provides 
the departing point for, among others, the literature devoted to the study of financial market 
imperfections. In this Chapter, we focus our attention on the extent to which the MM theorem 
is not verified due to information asymmetries. These asymmetries set a wedge between the 
costs of internal and external finance and ultimately lead to what we define as “financial 
constraints”. Finally, we describe a number of models that derive implications of financial 
constraints on firms financial and investment decisions as well as their dynamic path. 
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2. Information asymmetries and financial market imperfections 
Financial market imperfections arise mostly due to information asymmetries. Among other 
types asymmetric information, adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970; Meyers and Majluf, 1984; 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Townsend, 
1979; Bernanke et al., 1996 for an overview) are at the core of such imperfections. 
 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) describe how, in the presence of imperfect information, 
there may exist an equilibrium in the loan market that entails “credit rationing”. They argue 
that interest rate (and collateral) works as a screening device. Additionally, they point that, 
above a certain interest rate, the expected returns to a bank of a given loan portfolio is, in 
fact, a decreasing function of the interest rate. 
 To see this, suppose that firms only undertake investment projects if they can borrow 
the difference of the cost to their internal funds. Each project has a risk of θ and a profitability 
distribution of returns R given by F(R,θ). The distribution is not altered by the firm and each 
firm as its specific distribution. The bank (lender) only observes different mean returns but 
not different risks—they do not have full information on projects’ payoffs. Additionally, let 
*r  be the interest rate that maximizes bank’s expected returns. In this set up, firms borrow B 
at an interest rate of r  and default if: 
(1 )C R B r+ ≤ + ,          (I. 1) 
where C is collateral. The net profit of the firm is: 
, ) max( ; (1 ) )R r C B r Rpi ( = − + − ,         (I. 2) 
and that of banks is given by: 
, ) min( ; (1 ))R r R C B rρ( = + + .        (I. 3) 
 There is a critical value *θ for which firms only borrow if *θ θ>  because , )R rpi (  is a 
convex function of R. Additionally, the critical value is an increasing function of interest 
rates, i.e.
 
* 0rθ∂ ∂ > . With respect to banks, , )R rρ(  is concave function of R. Therefore, the 
expected return to a bank is a decreasing function of the loan risk. The intuition follows from 
adverse selection. Let us introduce some heterogeneity in the projects (or firms). If there are 2 
types of projects, “safe” and “risky”, that borrow below 1r  and 2 1 2 ; r r r< , respectively. Even 
though risky projects may have higher mean payoffs, above 1r  none of the safe projects will 
borrow (see Figure 1). Such change in the mix of applicants may reduce the mean payoff to a 
bank. In other words, different projects (loans) with different risks θ imply that the mean 
returns to the bank , )R rρ(  are a non monotonic function of r  due to bankruptcy events.
 
This 
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implies that a bank would not increase the interest charged beyond *r  since it reduces its 
mean return. As a result, it is possible that *r  is under a market clearing mr , leading to excess 
demand for loans and consequently credit rationing. 
 
 
Source: Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
Figure I.1. The mix of applicants for loans 
 
 
 
 The existence of financial constraints is particularly relevant if it leads to sub-optimal 
levels of investment and growth. As an example of how financial constraints may lead to 
underinvestment (Figure 2), suppose the following scenario of informational imperfections 
described by Hubbard (1998). 
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Source: Hubbard (1998) 
Figure I.2. Informational imperfections and underinvestment 
 
 The neoclassical credit supply is given by the horizontal line at the interest rate r. 
Without information asymmetry problems, the chosen capital stock is *K —the intersection 
between demand and supply—, where the expected marginal profitability of capital should 
equal the interest rate. For simplicity, ignore depreciation, taxes and adjustment costs. An 
entrepreneur with net worth 0W  identifies an investment opportunity D that requires an 
amount of capital stock given by K. In the presence of information asymmetries, he will be 
required to pay a premium over the amount he wants to borrow. This premium results, for 
example, from the fact that the entrepreneur may divert borrowed funds to personal gains, 
since the lenders can only partially monitor the entrepreneur’s allocation of funds.1 It is 
worthwhile mentioning that the problem of asymmetric information has also motivated a 
large body of literature devoted to the analysis of incomplete contracts (e.g. Aghion and 
Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995 for an overview).2 
As a result, the entrepreneur faces an upward sloping supply of funds for desired 
amounts of capital larger than its personal net worth. Consequently, the entrepreneur will end 
up with an amount of capital *0K K< , leading to underinvestment. Shifts in the wealth of the 
                                                           
1
 As an example Townsend (1979) introduces verification (or monitoring) costs that each lender has to pay to 
verify the returns (i.e. state) of a firm, whereas for firms this information is costless. 
2
 However, this type of analysis is beyond the scope of this work. 
9 
 
entrepreneur, lead to shifts in the supply curve of funds from 0 1( ) to S(W )S W , but the slope 
of the curve remains unchanged as long as the level of informational asymmetry is the same. 
In order to reduce information asymmetry problems, financial intermediaries (e.g. 
banks; rating agencies; funds) collect, monitor and transmit firm (borrower) information to 
investors (lenders). However, such financial institutions are never as informed as the 
borrowing firms. Therefore, the existence of these intermediaries may also lead to 
asymmetric information at two levels—between the lenders and the intermediaries as well as 
between the latter and borrowers (Diamond, 1984). We should also distinguish between “hard 
information” that can be easily transmittable across agents and “soft information” that can not 
be diffused (Berger and Udell, 2002; Stein, 2002). While the former comprises for example 
financial accounts and other reports, the latter includes reputation and relationships built over 
time. The existence of this “soft information” adds to the information asymmetry problem. 
It is not possible to proceed in the clarification of the concept of financial constraints 
without referring to the debate over how firms chose their debt and equity. In fact, the MM 
theorem spawned a vast literature based on two theories. On the one hand, the “pecking order 
theory” (Donaldson, 1961; Myers and Majluf, 1984) builds on the asymmetric information 
problems. According to this view, firms always prefer internal funds to finance their 
investments. In the event that external finance is required, then they opt for the safest security 
(debt), while issuing equity is eventually the last resort. On the other hand, the “trade off 
theory” (e.g. Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) argues that managers evaluate the costs and 
benefits of issuing debt. In other words they focus on bankruptcy costs and tax 
considerations—it is cheaper to finance a project with debt rather than with equity due to 
taxes (see Fama and French, 2002 or Frank and Goyal, 2007 for a comparison of the two 
approaches). 
The connection between asymmetric information theories and the financing hierarchy 
(pecking order) view appears to be very close for small and medium sized firms (see 
Bernanke et al., 1996). However, with respect to traded (larger) firms the link is not trivial. 
The question is whether retained earnings should be treated as internal finance, since they are 
ultimately owned by shareholders. 
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Overall, assuming that information asymmetries lead to a financing hierarchy (pecking order 
theory holds), firms will only resort to external finance whenever their internal funds are not 
sufficient to cover the costs of undertaking valuable investment opportunities. If a firm faces 
a valuable investment opportunity, but has insufficient internal funds and can not obtain 
external finance (or external funds are too expensive), we define it as “financially 
constrained”. 
 
3. Sources of funds 
Even though in this thesis we focus on the dichotomy between internal and external funds, 
rather than on the different types of external funding, we should briefly address the large 
panoply of financing sources. There are several ways through which a firm may raise the 
necessary amounts to finance investment and growth. In terms of internal funds, these are 
usually seen as cash-flows resulting from profits or entrepreneurs’ wealth (in the case of start-
ups).3 With respect to external funds, these can be classified in different categories. First, 
those obtained from capital markets where a firm is able to issue debt or equity. However, we 
should note that only a minority of firms is able to resort to financial markets (namely larger 
and older ones). Second, bank loans are a commonly used source of external finance, 
particularly in economies with less developed financial markets. As an example, in Europe 
bank loans are the predominant source of SMEs finance (Storey, 1994). In a brief parenthesis, 
formal venture capital and business angels should be stressed as a crucial source of external 
finance to start-ups as well as to risky R&D projects (Hall and Lerner, 2010). Third, public 
financial support through grants, tax credits, special credit lines and other incentives, provide 
an additional source of external funding for certain types of firms depending on economic 
policy goals—e.g. innovative, exporting, start-ups (see Chapter III, Stylized result 6). Fourth, 
trade credit is probably the most common form of external credit (e.g. Yang, 2011). It is 
obtained from suppliers through either formal payment contracts with established maturity or 
through rather informal agreements with lower enforceability. Fifth, wage variations may 
work as a way to obtain credit from workers in periods where there is an additional need for 
funds (e.g. Guiso et al., 2009). Therefore, firms compensate inefficiencies in the financial 
markets by resorting to workers. Finally, we classify as informal finance, any sort of lending 
relationships established by a firm and non-typical lenders (other than banks, suppliers, 
public institutions) or through non-typical channels (markets, financial intermediaries). 
                                                           
3
 Retained earnings in stock traded (large) companies may also be seen as internal funds, even though they are 
the property of shareholders. 
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4. Models incorporating financial constraints: Different perspectives 
4.1. Dynamic investment models: Q theory and Euler equation 
Both Q theory and Euler equation investment models (see Chirinko, 1993 for an overview) 
have their roots on a dynamic investment problem with adjustment costs. In this optimization 
setting, were firms are assumed to be rational profit-maximizing agents, we follow Adda and 
Cooper (2003). The profit maximization problem is given by: 
'
( , , ) max[ ( , , ) ( ', , ) ( ' (1 ) )]
K
V A K p A K p C K A K p K Kδ= Π − − − − +  
', '| , ( ', ', ')A p A pV A K pβ+ Ε .  (I. 4) 
Here, the prime ( ') denotes the following period. The relationship ' (1 )K K Iδ= − +  governs 
the accumulation of capital K, that depends on depreciation δ  and investment I. Other factors 
of the production function are represented by A, while p and C represent the costs acquiring 
new capital and the adjustment costs function, respectively. Finally, the profit function and 
the value of the firm are given by ( )Π ⋅  and ( )V ⋅ , respectively. 
 
4.1.1. Q-theory 
Let ( )Π ⋅ be proportional to K, ( )C ⋅  be quadratic and p constant. Introducing these 
assumptions, consistent with the Q theory of investment, yields: 
2
',|
'
' (1 )( , ) max ( ' (1 ) )] ( ', ')
2 A AK
K KV A K AK K p K K V A K
K
γ δ δ β− − = − − − − + Ε   .  (I. 5) 
 Additionally, the investment rate is given by: 
',|
1 ( ', ')A A K
I V A K p
K
β
γ
 = Ε −  ,         (I. 6) 
where 
',| ( ', ')A A KV A KΕ  is the expected value of the derivative of the firm’s value with respect 
to capital. This term is known in the literature as “marginal Q” (Tobin, 1969; Hayashi, 1982). 
In practical terms, “Tobin's Q” measures the increase in the present value of a firm’s profits 
resulting from a unit increase in the firm’s capital stock—Q is the market value of an 
additional unit of capital. Therefore, a firm invests until the cost of acquiring capital equals 
the value of capital (i.e. while Q is greater than the unity). A high level of Q thus indicates the 
presence of an investment opportunity. However, marginal Q is empirically not observable. 
To overcome this problem one further has to assume that the value of a firm is proportional to 
its capital stock ( , ) ( )V A K F A K= . In other words, the expected values of average Q (given 
12 
 
by F(A) and denoted by Q ) and marginal Q are exactly the same. The resulting empirical 
equation (e.g. Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) is therefore given by: 
0 1 2i itit
it it
I XEQ e
K K
α α β α   = + + +   
   
,       (I. 7) 
where in X are included a number of other variables. The prediction of the Q model is that Q 
should summarize all relevant information for a firm’s investment decision. Therefore, if 
other variables are found to be relevant, one should reject the model.  
 Usually, the significance of financial variables, such as cash-flow, in these regressions 
is attributed to financial market imperfections, that lead to a rejection of the model—see 
Blundell et al. (1992) for an example and Gomes (2001) for a critique on this interpretation. 
 
4.1.2. Euler equation 
Alternatively, the Euler equation approach uses the necessary condition for optimality given 
by: 
( ) ( )2' '',|1 ( ', ') '(1 ) (1 )2A A KI I IA K p pK KK γβ δ γ δγ
       
= Ε Π + − + + − −               
. (I. 8) 
 The advantage is the elimination of the 
',| ( ', ')A A KV A KΕ  term. In other words, this 
approach avoids the complications with Q missmeasurements (Chirinko, 1993; Erickson and 
Whited, 2000; Gomes, 2001). The empirical test of financial constraints (e.g. Whited, 1992) 
is then a test of whether this equality holds for realized values of these variables as follows: 
1it
it
I
K
ε +
 
= − 
 
, 
( )( ) ( )21 1 1 1 11 ( , ) (1 ) (1 )2K it it t tit itI IA K p pK Kγβ δ γ δγ + + + + +  − Π + − + + − −     , (I. 9) 
where 1 0itε + =  if the equality holds. A GMM estimator that uses 1 0t itE ε + =  can then be 
employed. 
 We should note however, that the empirical work using these approaches tests the null 
hypothesis of “no financial constraints” against an alternative hypothesis of “financial 
constraints”. However, these models only derive empirical implications for the scenario of 
the null hypothesis. Therefore, it might be daring to assume that the only discrepancy to 
reality of such models is the existence of financial market imperfections and financial 
constraints. If this is not the case, then it is possible that a test rejection of the frictionless 
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model implies that there is something else to be rejected, rather than the absence of financial 
constraints. 
 
 Overall the idea is that, because investment might be financed by current profits, one 
can introduce financial constraints of the form I AK α≤ . This leads to a constraints function 
such as:  
( , ) [0, (1 ) ]A K K AK αδΨ = − +                  (I. 10) 
Accordingly, the firm’s maximization problem becomes: 
2
' ( , )
' (1 )( , ) max [ ' (1 ) )]
2K A K
K KV A K AK K p K K
K
α γ δ δ
∈Ψ
− − 
= − − − − +  
 
',| ( ', ')A AV A Kβ+ Ε  (I. 11) 
The question now lies on the form of the function of constraints ( , )A KΨ . In this thesis we 
will shed some light on a number of factors that probably shape this function. 
 
4.2. The liquidity management approach 
In a somewhat different perspective, Almeida Campello and Weisbach (2004)—hereafter 
ACW—argue that the existence of financial constraints is reflected on firms’ cash policy. 
Even though, the ACW model can be compared to the type of dynamic programming 
problem described above, the view is focused on liquidity management rather than on 
investment itself. One of the advantages of this approach is that it provides a clear null and 
alternative hypothesis setup for empirical investigation. 
 The model has 3 dates { }0;1;2  and a firm initially with a cash-flow of 0c  that faces, at 
date 0, a long-run investment project 0I  that pays ( )0F I  at date 2. The firm also faces 
another investment opportunity at the next period 1I  that pays ( )1G I  also at time 2.4 The 
returns F and G of these projects are not verifiable. 
 At time 1, the firm’s existing assets generate high 1
Hc  or low 1
Lc  cash-flows with 
probabilities p  and (1 )p− , respectively. For simplicity, the discount factor and the cost of 
investment goods are assumed to be 1 (at both time 0 and 1). The investments 0I  and 1I  are 
liquidated at time 2, generating payoffs in a proportion q of the amounts invested. Cash-flows 
                                                           
4
 Both functions are assumed to be increasing, concave and continuously differentiable. Additionally all agents 
are assumed to be risk neutral. 
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of 0 0 0( ) ( )f I F I qI= +  and 1 1 1( ) ( )g I F I qI= +  are therefore generated from these 
investments. In the event of firm liquidation, creditors capture only a fraction τ  of total 
assets (“hard assets”) given by (1 )qIτ− . Therefore, for high values of τ , firms may become 
financially constrained, passing up positive net present value (NPV) projects due to lack of 
external finance. Furthermore, the firm can borrow B and is allowed an hedging policy 
through payments h. 
 In this framework, the firm has to decide the amounts of cash C that that should be 
carried from period 0 to period 1. Accordingly the problem of the firm can be summarized as 
the maximization of expected sum of all dividends d, given by: 
0 1 1 2 2
, ,
max (1 ) (1 )H L H L
C h I
d pd p d pd p d + + − + + −  , subject to:              (I. 12) 
i) The dividend payments that are given by: 
0 0 0 0 0d c B I C= + − − ≥                   (I. 13) 
1 1 1 1 0 ;    S=H,L
S S S S Sd c h B I C= + + − + ≥                 (I. 14) 
2 0 1 0 1( ) ( )S S Sd f I g I B B= + − −                   (I. 15) 
ii) A hedging restriction in the form 
(1 ) 0H Lph p h+ − =                    (I. 16) 
iii) The borrowing constraints given by: 
0 0(1 )B qIτ≤ −                     (I. 17) 
1 1(1 )S SB qIτ≤ −                    (I. 18) 
 If a firm is financially unconstrained, it is able to take advantage of both investment 
opportunities at times 0 and 1, thus investing at first-best levels of *0I  and 
*,
1
SI , respectively. 
Therefore, the financial policy of such firm, given by the vector 0 1[ , , , ]S HB B C h , satisfies all 
dividend, hedging and borrowing constraints. Such firms are those that either have sufficient 
internal funds c to finance the investment projects I, or can easily resort to external finance 
(low τ). In this situation, firms are indifferent between two alternative financial policy vectors 
because they can compensate increases in cash savings C with increases in external funds 0B  
or temporal adjustments in dividend policy d. As long as constraints are not binding, and 
firms investment policy is * *,0 1[ , ]SI I , there is no unique optimal cash policy. 
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 We now turn to the constrained firm solution. A constrained firm investment policy is 
given by * *0 1 0 1[ , ] [ , ]I I I I− − < .5 Since such firm faces financial constraints—either have 
insufficient internal funds c to finance the investment projects I, or face borrowing constraints 
(high τ)—, holding cash is costly because it means passing up investment opportunities. 
Conversely, saving cash will allow taking advantage of future investment opportunities. 
Consequently, the optimal cash policy of a firm will result from the tradeoff between 0( )f I  
and 1( )g I . Additionally, a constrained firm will no longer pay dividends at periods 0 and 1, 
as well as it will borrow to the maximum extent it cans at the period when it invests. The 
problem can now be written as: 
0 1
1
,
1 1
max (1 ) ,  
H
L L
H L
C h
c C c h Cpf pg c h C p g
pλ λ λ
     − + +− 
+ − + + −      
       
            (I.19) 
with 1 q qλ τ≡ − + . 
 Assuming that hedging is fairly priced and optimal hedging is 1 1( )L H Lh p c c= − , 
implying equal cash flows across states (we can write 0 1[ ]E c ), the optimal cash policy *C  
solves: 
* *
0 0 1[ ]c C E c Cf g
C Cλ λ
   − +∂ ∂
=   ∂ ∂   
.                 (I.20) 
 Which tells us that the opportunity cost of increasing cash holdings in the present, 
equals the marginal benefit that result from being able to invest in the future—constraints 
were relaxed due to the cash transfer across periods. As a result, ACW argue that the 
empirically testable implications of the model are: 
i) 
*
0
0   for financially constrained firms;C
c
∂
>
∂
 
ii) 
*
0
 is indeterminate for unconstrained firms.C
c
∂
∂
 
 
4.3. The evolutionary perspective 
Evolutionary models were built to explore the role of the Schumpeterian notion of innovation 
as a central piece of the workings of the economy. Firm heterogeneity persists over time as 
well as it is not a consequence of market imperfections but rather the result of a competitive 
                                                           
5
 We omit the state S because the productivity of investments 1( )Sg I  is assumed not to vary across states 
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process between firms with different capabilities, assuming away equilibrium notions (see 
Carreira, 2006). To illustrate this point we resort to the primordial model of Nelson and 
Winter (1982), chapter 12, hereafter NW, that formalizes Schumpeter’s (1942) evolutionary 
concept. 
 Consider an industry with n firms i for whom each period’s production itQ  is a 
function of capital itK  and their individual productivity itA  (that results from the best 
technology they can employ). While these technologies are characterized by constant returns 
to scale and fixed input coefficients, firms face downward sloping demand with unit price-
elasticity. In order to increase their productivity levels, firms must invest in new technologies 
or in copying existing ones.6 Therefore, firms’ operational profits per unit of capital will be 
given by: 
' '
i i
im in
i iP A c rd rdpi = − − − ,                    (I.21) 
where P is the price and c, imrd , and inrd  are respectively production, imitation and 
innovation costs, by unit of capital. 
 Each period’s firm productivity is given by: 
*
' max , ,
i i
in
i iA A A A =   ,                    (I.22) 
where *
i
A
 is the industry best technology, and 
i
inA
 firm’s newly developed technology. The 
probability of imitating is directly proportional to the imitation expenses. If successful, the 
firm’s new technology is *
i
A . Similarly, the probability of innovating is directly proportional 
to innovation expenses. However, only innovative firms can innovate ( 0inrd > ). If 
successful, 
i
inA
 is drawn from a distribution of a random variable X with E[X] given by the 
industry’s lagged average productivity and a parameterized V[X].7 
 Finally, new levels of capital stock are given by the function: 
'
' , , ( ), (1 )i ii i i i
ii
P A QK I f K K
c Q pi δ δ
 
= + − 
  ∑
,                 (I.23) 
                                                           
6
 Note that NW identify 2 distinct types of R&D policies: “innovators” and “imitators” 
7
 The probabilities of successfully imitating or innovating are given by: Pr( 1)im im imd a RD= =  and 
Pr( 1)in in ind a RD= = , respectively, where a are parameters of the model and represent firms’ ability to 
imitate\innovate, while d are random binary variables. 
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where δ are the depreciation costs of capital. However, in investment function ( )I ⋅ , profit 
enters as a function of operational profits, depreciation costs and a parameter B, that 
represents external finance: 
     ; ( )  ;    B>1
   ; 
f
B
δ pi pi
pi δ pi pi
+ ≤ 0
= 
+ > 0
                  (I.24) 
 Accordingly, B is an exogenous parameter that defines the extent to which firms can 
borrow above their profits. Therefore, in this primordial model, NW already recognize that 
access to external funds is to be taken into account when analysing firm dynamics, even 
though the supply of credit was exogenously set. 
 A significant body of recent evolutionary literature has focused on the role of 
innovation and different technological regimes upon firm dynamics (see Carreira, 2006). 
However, the extent to which financial constraints might affect such dynamics within this 
framework still requires further exploration (Coad, 2010a). Within models of evolutionary 
inspiration that explicitly incorporate endogenous financial constraints we should note the 
recent contributions of Delli Gatti et al. (2005) and Dosi et al. (2011). These models are 
essentially aimed at the study of macroeconomic fluctuations, but rely heavily on 
microeconomic foundations. However, in clear contrast with representative agent models, the 
individual heterogeneity principle prevails (see Hartley, 1997; Dosi, 2007). These models can 
be classified in the family of Agent-based models (Dawid H, 2006; Tesfatsion L, 2006). 
 Delli Gatti et al. (2005) model financial market imperfections through the price of 
loans (interest rate) but assume that there is no “credit rationing” (as defined by Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). Additionally, they also assume that firms can only obtain external finance 
through debt—a hypothesis of full equity-rationing. The interest rate on debt is then defined 
as the sum of an exogenous component and a risk premium: 
( )( ) ( )( )max1 (1 ) ,   0< 1  it itr r f v t g v t vρ ρ ρ = + + − − <                 (I.25) 
 The risk premium itr  is defined as the sum of a decreasing function of the economy’s 
average equity to capital ratio ( v ) and an increasing function of the slack between the 
maximum equity-capital ratio in the economy and that of the firm—associated with 
bankruptcy costs. In this way, they intend to capture the systemic risk of the economy as well 
the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. The latter can rather be seen as an endogenous measure of 
financial constraints, in the sense that firms with lower relative value will be required to pay 
higher interest rates for the same loan. Accordingly, the existence of these constraints 
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contributes to a concentration of growth opportunities in a few financially sound firms that 
have lower costs of capital.  
 The approach used by Dosi et al. (2011) to model financial constraints relies on 
rationing, rather than on interest rates charged—the latter are assumed not to contain an 
idiosyncratic component. Specifically, they introduce heterogeneous financial intermediaries 
(banks), whose supply of credit depends on their individual history and a credit multiplier 
parameter. Banks sort firms according to their net-worth to sales ratio and provide credit until 
exhaustion of their supply (if requested). Therefore, if there is an excess demand for funds, 
firms with lower rankings will be denied credit. 
 However, with respect to financial constraints, these types of models still have a long 
road ahead. Particularly the introduction of a number of other determinants of financial 
constraints (see Chapter III), rather than just firms’ financial soundness, is certainly a feature 
that deserves being explored. Additionally, the quality of an investment project should be 
considered in lender’s decision to supply credit—even though difficult to model without 
rather strong assumptions regarding agent’s rationality. 
 
 
Overall, while clarifying the concept of financial constraints, this Chapter summarizes the 
theoretical foundations (and perspectives) of the literature analysing firms’ constraints. The 
remaining Chapters of the thesis will be devoted to the discussion of the different strategies 
that can be used to measure firms’ financial constraints (Chapter II), as well as to the 
empirical analysis of such constraints for the Portuguese case (Chapters V-VIII). 
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CHAPTER II – HOW TO MEASURE FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent years have been prolific in terms of development of new measures of financial 
constraints. In this Chapter, we summarize the existing approaches and methodologies to 
measure financial constraints. It is organised in a way that facilitates the comparison of the 
different methodologies, taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of each 
approach. This allows us to adequate the most appropriate technique for a research purpose 
and available data. 
 Financial constraints are empirically not observable. In fact, there is no item on the 
balance sheet that tells us if, and the extent to which, a firm is financially constrained. As a 
result, researchers have strived to develop methodologies that consistently allow identifying 
and measuring such constraints. 
 There are, however, a number of specificities associated with financial constraints that 
one should expect to be reflected in a good measure of financial constraints. Firstly, financial 
constraints are firm-specific. Even though interest lies in making inferences regarding a 
certain firm characteristic (e.g. firm size or age) or firm behaviour (e.g. innovation activity), 
one should expect highly heterogeneous levels of access to external finance. Additionally, 
constraints are time-varying, since a firm may move from constrained to unconstrained states 
(or across different degrees of constraint) as, for example, it establishes stronger investor-
lender relationships and gains better visibility. The reverse may also be true if, for example, a 
firm's previously sound economic and financial conditions start to deteriorate (eventually 
defaulting on previous loans), investment opportunities change or idiosyncratic shocks occur. 
In this case, it might happen that this previously unconstrained firm will now find it difficult 
to obtain external finance. Therefore, one might expect different states of constraints along 
the timeline (e.g. Hubbard, 1998; Cleary, 1999). Finally, financial constraints is not a clear-
cut phenomena where a firm is either financially constrained or not, but there are different 
degrees of constraint (Musso and Schiavo, 2008). As a result, each firm, for a given period of 
time, may move along a spectrum of constraints. 
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 These characteristics signify that, beyond eventual theoretical issues, finding an 
appropriate measure of financial constraints may prove to be a rather difficult task. 
Optimally, the perfect measure of financial constraints should be objective, firm-specific, 
continuous and, time varying. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there is no such measure. 
Nevertheless, we will present and discuss the main advantages and disadvantages of existing 
approaches to measure constraints. 
 
2. Indirect measures 
2.1. Prologue: Primordial tests and the Q-theory of investment 
Within the traditional Q model for investment (presented in Chapter I), one should expect 
that Tobin's Q summarizes all future information that is relevant for a firm when deciding to 
invest.1 Consequently, marginal Q should be the only predictor for investment (Chirinko, 
1993). Therefore, we should not expect that additional variables (particularly financial ones) 
have a significant explanatory power in Q investment regressions. However, while financial 
variables such as cash-flow, have been shown to be relevant in firms' investment decisions, 
the contribution of Q was found to be disappointingly low (e.g. Blundell et al., 1992). This 
type of result has driven researchers to argue that (after controlling for Q) investment may not 
be independent from financial decisions due to the presence of financial markets 
imperfections. Specifically, the extent to which financial constraints increase the bias of 
average Q with respect to marginal Q has been given particular attention (see Hayashi, 1982; 
Gomes, 2001). If this is the case, then one should expect that financial variables, and 
specifically those that relate to firms' ability to generate funds, will turn out to be significant 
in an investment regression—see Chapter I for further discussion on Q-based models. 
 
2.2. Cash-Flow Sensitivities 
2.2.1. Investment 
Theoretically, financial constraints have been incorporated in several models in the past (see 
Chapter I). However, the empirical assessment of financial constraints can essentially be 
traced back to the seminal work of Fazzari Hubbard and Petersen (1988)—hereafter FHP— 
that introduced investment to cash-flow sensitivity as a measure of constraints (ICFS). 
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 The theory was introduced by Brainard and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969). 
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 The argument is the following. Financially constrained firms can not obtain external 
finance—at least the full required amounts, or they do obtain them at significantly high costs. 
Therefore, these firms must rely on their internally generated funds once an investment 
opportunity arises. Meanwhile, financially unconstrained firms can easily resort to external 
funds to finance their investments. Accordingly, while constrained firms will exhibit a 
positive propensity to use cash-flows to finance investment (positive and significant ICFS), 
no systematic relationship should be found for unconstrained ones.  
 The approach used consisted in classifying firms a priori as constrained and 
unconstrained, based on their dividend policy. By assuming that constrained firms, in order to 
finance their investment, “retain all of the low-cost internal funds they can generate” and so 
pay lower dividends, FHP proceed to the estimation of ICFS for each class of firms. They 
regress investment on cash-flow, estimated Q (investment opportunities) and year and firm 
dummies, upon a sample consisting of 422 USA firms (1970-84).2 Their findings, that low-
dividend firms (constrained) exhibit higher ICFS than high-dividend ones (unconstrained), 
provided evidence that ICFS could be a useful measure of financial constraints. 
 Since the influential work of FHP, numerous studies focused on the use of ICFS to 
identify and measure firms' financial constraints—the contributions of Hadlock (1998) for the 
US, Chapman et al. (1996) for Australia; Guariglia (2008) for the UK; Audretsch, and Elston 
(2002) for Germany; Kadapakkam et al. (1998) and Bond et al. (2003a) for different 
countries are just examples. Even though this approach is, by far, the most commonly used 
methodology to assess financial constraints (see Chapter III for an overview), it received 
severe criticism both at the theoretical and empirical levels. We summarize them into three 
main critiques that follow. 
 The first study that definitely challenged FHP's approach was Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997)—hereafter KZ. They pointed out that, not only certain assumptions made on the 
curvature of the cost function of external finance may not be verified (e.g. positive third 
derivatives), but also that the classification scheme used by FHP was flawed. In particular, 
due to precautionary savings and potentially risky adverse management, the dividend policy 
is an inaccurate sorting variable. 
  
                                                           
2
 As an alternative to the typical Q theory investment regression augmented with cash flow, some researchers 
also use an accelerator and\or error-correction specifications (e.g. Scellato, 2007; Guariglia, 2008). 
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 The second main critique, concerns problems associated with controlling for 
investment opportunities (FHP use Q). First, it is impossible to measure marginal Q and thus 
the empirical approximation, average Q (Hayashi, 1982), entails potential missmeasurements 
due to the violation of certain assumptions, such as imperfect competition and the 
relationship between firms’ investment and financial decisions in these particular types of 
models (see Chirinko, 1993, and Hubbard, 1998, for a discussion). Second, Cash-Flow might 
itself contain information about investment opportunities, particularly for firms that face high 
uncertainty about their investment projects (usually young and growth firms). In this case, 
cash flow might indicate the direction to go, by revealing additional information on the 
projects’ quality. As a result, one should expect that part of the ICFS is due to investment 
opportunities that were not captured by Q. In fact, Alti (2003), in a financially frictionless 
model, shows that even after Q correction firms still present significant ICFS. (In Chapter III 
we briefly overview empirical findings corroborating this point.) 
 Finally, several authors such as Povel and Raith (2002), Cleary et al. (2007) or 
Lyandres (2007) found the ICFS relationship to be non-monotonic. They argue that ICFS are 
U-shaped with respect to constraints due to the risk associated with firm default and the 
efforts of investors in trying to avoid corresponding liquidation losses—by providing larger 
amounts to mitigate the risk of default—, for sufficiently low levels of internal funds. In this 
case, a decrease in internal funds below a certain threshold would imply an increase in 
investment (see Chapter III for further detail). 
 Overall, these critiques cast serious doubts on the robustness of ICFS as a measure of 
financial constraints. 
 
2.2.2. Growth 
The approach described in the preceding section, has been extended to firm growth. As a 
result, a number of researchers have studied financial constraints by estimating the sensitivity 
of firm growth to cash flow (GCFS). We group these studies into 3 major categories, 
depending on the variable used to measure firm growth. Namely, we distinguish between 
employment growth (e.g. Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006), growth of total assets (e.g. Carpenter 
and Petersen, 2002) and sales growth (e.g. Fagiolo and Luzzi, 2006). 
 In this line of thought, we should note that some of these authors conclude that 
financial constraints (proxied by cash-flow) have a negative impact upon firm growth (e.g. 
Fagiolo and Luzzi, 2006; Oliveira and Fortunado, 2006). This type of conclusion may, 
however, be too impetuous. Cash-flow per se is just a proxy (a better or worst one) for 
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financial constraints (see Section 5.3). Therefore a positive and significant coefficient for 
cash-flow only tells us that firm growth responds positively to increases in cash-flow. 
Accordingly, unless we use a real measure of financial constraints as explanatory variable, or 
observe different sensitivities for different groups of firms (distinguishing their growth 
levels), there is not much we can say about the impact of constraints on firm growth. On the 
other hand, several papers (e.g. Serrasqueiro et al., 2010, Sarno, 2008) fail to control for 
investment opportunities. In this case, interpreting positive and significant sensitivities for a 
group of firms as evidence of financial constraints is flawed, due to investment opportunities 
hidden in cash-flows (see Alti, 2003). 
 
2.2.3. Cash 
Recently, in a different perspective of demand for liquidity, ACW (Almeida et al., 2004) 
suggest that financially constrained firms may alternatively be identified by looking at their 
cash policy (see Chapter I). If a firm is constrained, it has to pass-up present investment 
opportunities and hoard cash, in order to be able to take advantage of profitable future 
investment opportunities and hedge against future shocks. The same is not true when it comes 
to unconstrained firms, since they are able to resort to external finance whenever investment 
opportunities arise (by definition of financial constraints). Therefore, one should expect a 
positive and significant association between cash stocks and cash-flow for constrained firms, 
while no such relationship should be found for unconstrained ones. Finally, the degree to 
which a certain group of firms is financially constrained should be reflected on the cash to 
cash-flow sensitivity estimate (CCFS), as in ICFS—the higher the CCFS, the more 
constrained is such group of firms. ACW test if financially constrained firms exhibit high 
cash-flow sensitivities, while unconstrained firms do not. Results for four out of five 
classification schemes for constrained\unconstrained firms confirm their hypothesis. Only for 
the classification based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997), do the results differ.3 Examples of 
this approach can also be found in Han and Qiu (2007) or Baum et al. (2011). 
 The financial nature of the cash stock variable is a shield against miss-measurements 
in Q and investment opportunities hidden in cash-flow. The reason being that it is not 
expected that firms will increase their cash stocks if cash-flow signals a new\better 
investment opportunity, unless they are financially constrained. However, constrained firms 
may use cash to reduce debt if hedging needs are low (Acharya et al, 2007). Accordingly, one 
                                                           
3
 The classification schemes are based on: payout ratio, asset size, bond rating, commercial paper rating, and KZ 
index. 
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should nevertheless control for debt issuances and investment opportunities. Additionally, as 
pointed by Almeida et al. (2011) in a subsequent paper, investment in relatively liquid assets, 
other than cash, may be used to transfer resources across time.4 Therefore, any liquid types of 
investment should also be taken into consideration. 
 Finally, a few papers have empirically questioned the validity of this measure. They 
find that all firms, regardless of the a-priori classification as (un)constrained, exhibit positive 
and significant CCFS (e.g. Pal and Ferrando, 2009). Nevertheless, the sensitivity is found to 
be higher for firms that are expected to be constrained (Lin, 2007). 
 
2.2.4. Common pitfalls 
The above mentioned approaches share a number of drawbacks, mostly associated with the ex 
ante classification of firms, that are worthwhile mentioning. Sample partition into different 
groups of firms according to a certain segmenting variable that, ex-ante, is expected to 
provide information on the degree to which firms are financially constrained is, in fact, quite 
problematic. 
 First, it is questionable that the segmenting variable correctly distinguishes between 
constrained and unconstrained firms, since a superior proxy is yet to be found (Musso and 
Schiavo, 2008). Accordingly, some classification schemes may be flawed. The leading 
example is provided by Kaplan and Zingales's (2000) critique of FHP's use of dividend policy 
as a segmenting variable. They find that according to FHP (1988; 2000) Microsoft would be 
classified as financially constrained, even if it "had net income of $3.5 billion, capital 
expenditures of $0.5 billion, no investment in inventories, no dividends, and no debt, yet held 
almost $9 billion of cash—or eighteen times capital expenditures".5 
 Second, it is also unclear that this proxy for constraints is not itself affected by 
financial constraints. In this situation, one will end up with an a-priori classification scheme 
based on an endogenous variable with respect to constraints—see for example Bond et al. 
(2003a) for ICFS endogeneity problems and estimation biases. 
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 In the original model they assumed that firms transfer resources only through cash. 
5
 Firms in FHP (1988) and FHP (2000) were a-priori classified as financially constrained if they did not pay 
dividends and had high cash balances, respectively. 
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 Third, to categorize firms into different groups using continuous segmenting 
variables, one has to define cut-off points that are not arbitrary. The reason is that the 
relationship between the segmenting variable and financial constraints may be non-
monotonic. As an example, even if it is generally agreed that larger and older firms are not as 
financially constrained as smaller and younger ones, some studies have shown that this 
relationship may in fact be U-shaped (e.g. Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). 
 Fourth, a firm may move across different states of the segmenting variable. 
Consequently, it might happen that a firm is also moving across different groups. As an 
example, if one uses firm size as proxy, it might happen that a small, but fast growing firm, 
classified as constrained in the present, will be classified as unconstrained in the future just 
because it grew. This entails significant problems in the assignment of firms into such classes 
within a dynamic perspective. 
 Nevertheless, within cash-flow sensitivities (CFS), an alternative to perform a sample 
partition with respect to a given variable, is to test interaction terms of that variable with 
cash-flow. These interaction terms will then provide the sign (but not the magnitude) of the 
relationship between the variable and financial constraints. This slightly different approach 
also allows to test for non-monotonic relationships by introducing interactions of cash-flow 
with power values (e.g. square) of the variable in matter. Additionally, it also permits the 
treatment of such variable as endogenous in the regression. However, one still has to assume 
that CFS correctly identifies and measures financial constraints. 
 
2.3. Euler Equation test 
Based on Q-Theory and within the models for investment with adjustment costs, a strand of 
literature as attempted to identify financially constrained firms by estimating a reduced form 
Euler equation (see Whited, 1992). 
 The underlying Euler equation model (see Chapter I) describes an optimal path for 
investment given certain parametric adjustment costs. Accordingly, the marginal costs of 
investment in the present are set equal to the future's marginal costs of foregone investment. 
This approach prescribes that under perfect capital markets—i.e. under Modigliani-Miller 
theorem—a number of parameter restrictions must be verified (see Table A1, Appendix). 
Failure to verify such restrictions is interpreted as evidence of financial constraints. Note that 
these parameters are themselves functions of the model's structural parameters. 
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 This test is then applied to a given subsample of firms. As with cash-flow sensitivity 
(CFS), researchers classify firms ex-ante as financially constrained based on a given variable 
(proxy) that is believed to clearly distinguish financially constrained from unconstrained 
firms. Accordingly, after deriving an empirical estimating equation from the underlying Euler 
equation model, one should be able to reject the parameter restrictions for groups of firms 
that are financially constrained. Conversely, for groups unconstrained firms, the parameter 
constraints should be met.6 Applications of this methodology can be found, inter alia, in Bond 
and Meghir (1994) or Love (2003). 
 The main advantage of this approach over the traditional ICFS is that it avoids 
measuring Q, that may prove to be substantially difficult and confines the analysis to quoted 
firms. Additionally, the type of data required to the empirical test can be found in many 
datasets, as it is mostly based on information available in firms' balance sheets. However, the 
test is derived upon a large number of assumptions and on highly parametric models (see 
Coad, 2010a for a critique). Furthermore, the framework is based on parameter tests and does 
not directly produce a variable that can be used in subsequent estimations (see Section 3.2 for 
an index based on this approach). Finally, as in CFS approaches, a-priory classification 
schemes may be flawed due to non-monotonic relationships, endogeneity and aggregation 
issues regarding the proxy used. 
 
2.4. Evolutionary test of selection forces 
Recent trends, within Evolutionary theory, question the extent to which GCFS are indicative 
of the presence of financial constraints, rather than just a reflection of the selection process 
mechanism. They challenge the core assumptions of rational optimization and optimal size, 
present in models of Neoclassical inspiration—such as Q theory and Euler equation 
approaches. The rationale is that a firm's growth will depend positively on its "fitness", or in 
other terms, on their financial performance relative to others—which explains the positive 
GCFS found in the literature (see Chapter III). Therefore, it is natural to expect that the 
"fittest" firms will grow faster (see Coad, 2007). 
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 Within these parameters there is usually at least one that relates to the shadow cost of external finance (see 
Whited, 1992). 
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 Firms have "bounded rationality" (e.g. Simon, 1991), in the sense that they make 
decisions based on the information they presently have, rather than based on future states. 
Within this perspective, only highly productive firms are able to identify highly profitable 
investment opportunities due to an higher knowledge stock, better routines and a set of 
capabilities (Coad, 2010a), that lead to a persistence of profit levels (e.g. Geroski and 
Jacquemin, 1988; Dosi , 2007). As a result, it is reasonable to expect a high correlation 
between profitability and investment opportunities—this rationale is in line with the 
argument that cash-flows contain information on investment opportunities (Alti, 2003). 
 Another implication of bounded rationality is that it no longer makes sense thinking in 
terms of "optimal size" or "optimal path of growth". In fact, firms always want to grow. Coad 
(2010a) notes that "evolutionary firms are thus eternally financially constrained, irrespective 
of information asymmetries, simply because they would always prefer to be a little bit bigger 
than they currently are". Accordingly, the extent to which one finds a positive impact of a 
profitability measure (e.g. operating margin) on firm growth (e.g. sales), is only indicative of 
the workings of the selection mechanism. In other words, there is a correct reallocation of 
market share to the most productive firms.7 If on the contrary, growth does not strongly 
respond to profitability (operating margin), then the selection mechanism is not selecting "the 
fitter" firms (e.g. Coad, 2007; Bottazzi et al., 2008). 
 However, we should note that the major force behind evolutionary dynamics is firms' 
ability to innovate (Schumpeter, 1939; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1995), of which 
one should stress radical innovation—where financial constraints are shown to be particularly 
severe (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011b). In this perspective, selection forces "unfit" firms 
to exit, therefore having a "cleansing effect". As a result, if there are external factors that 
inhibit firms innovation capacity (financial constraints), the selection process may drive out 
of the market firms that, even though having the right capabilities, did not have sufficient 
funds to overtake promising innovation projects. The extent to which financial constraints to 
innovation ultimately lead to the survival of inert big and established firms in detriment of 
vibrant new and small innovative firms, therefore distorting the selection process, is certainly 
a question that deserves our attention in the future.8 
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 Usually sales growth is preferred with respect to investment because it captures firms’ intangible capital, 
knowledge and processes. 
8
 Note that several empirical studies find a negative impact of financial constraints on firm survival as well as on 
innovation (see Chapter III). 
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2.5. Considerations on the data required 
The type of data required to apply the methodologies described in this section is, essentially, 
information from firms' balance sheets. Despite the pitfalls of these approaches, it is certainly 
valuable that most National Statistical Offices are able to provide such information for very 
large (and representative) samples of firms operating in a certain region or country.9 
 However, for some of these approaches, one might also need information from 
financial markets (e.g. to compute average Q). In the event that such information is strictly 
necessary, the corresponding sample will only contain publicly traded firms. This has serious 
implications on the measurement of financial constraints. In fact, these firms are expected to 
be less financially constrained than untraded ones (see Chapter III, Stylized result 9). First, 
traded firms can easily issue equity and debt. Second they have more visibility and are 
eventually more credible at the eyes of other types of investors\lenders. Third, information on 
these firms is widely available and circulates in a more efficient way (Fama, 1970). This 
reduces information asymmetries, therefore having a crucial impact upon firms' ability to 
obtain external funding. This distinction between traded and non-traded firms is particularly 
relevant for countries with less developed capital markets such as Portugal. 
 
 Overall, we should reinforce that indirect measures have two main problems. The first 
results from the fact that these measures rely on (sometimes strong) theoretical assumptions 
needed to construct the underlying models for empirical equations. The second is a practical 
problem associated with the type of measure that is obtained from the estimations. In fact, 
none of the measures produces a variable that is firm-specific and time-varying. Conversely 
they only provide a test, based on regression coefficients (or parameters), for the presence of 
financial constraints within a group\subsample of firms. 
 
3. Direct measures 
As an alternative to measuring financial constraints in an indirect way, when available, a 
direct measure of financial constraints can prove to be a useful tool that avoids the theoretical 
and measurement issues described in the preceding section. However, there are specificities 
associated with this type of measures that one must bear in mind. In this section we refer to 
two possible ways of directly measuring financial constraints and discuss the implications of 
using them.  
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 Even for cross-country comparisons, it is possible, although not easy, to obtain such data from supra-national 
bodies (e.g. OECD or The World Bank), or to buy this information from specialized data collecting companies. 
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3.1. Company reports 
Major firms usually provide a report along with their end-of year financial statement—at 
least those firms that are traded in stock markets are obliged to do so in most countries. These 
reports contain rich qualitative information regarding firm's financial position and need for 
external finance. This information allows researchers to assign each firm a level of financial 
constraints (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). 
 Here follows an example given by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) of a report of a firm 
classified as "not financially constrained": “We ended the year in an exceptionally strong 
financial condition for a company of our size. During the year we paid off all long-term debt, 
and our cash and cash-equivalent assets have throughout the year exceeded all current 
liabilities.” 
 In practice, researchers gather a sample of firms with available company reports. The 
first step is to search these statements for keywords and expressions that are symptomatic of 
the presence of financial constraints (see Table A1, Appendix). Secondly, each firm is 
assigned a level of financial constraints according to the information reported. Finally, if 
possible, this qualitative information should be complemented with quantitative information 
(e.g. financial variables) in order to build a final score of financial constraints—in line with 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
 While the major advantage of using this type of approach is the richness of 
information available for the researcher to sort firms according to their levels of constraints, 
the major drawback is related to the sample size and representativeness of corresponding 
samples. If on the one hand company reports provide rich and relatively accurate information, 
on the other hand it is difficult to obtain such information for a large number of firms. 
Reports are only made available by a small number of firms. Therefore, inferences to the 
population regarding financial constraints can not be made due to representativeness 
problems. Among other reasons, these particular firms are usually publicly traded. 
Accordingly, such firms will, in principle, not be as financially constrained as the untraded 
ones (see Chapter III, Stylized result 9). 
 Additionally, analysing company reports entails a significant amount of time and 
effort. In fact, even if reports were available for the whole population of firms, it would be 
extremely difficult (or virtually impossible) for the researcher to examine all of them with the 
necessary level of detail. 
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 Finally, problems associated with managers misreporting may also be relevant in 
countries where managers may not be held liable for disclosure of false information, or 
whenever it is not possible to match the information from reports with quantitative data. 
 
3.2. Self-evaluation: Survey data 
The recent advances in data collection and availability have spawned a new wave of 
empirical literature that relies on business surveys to identify and measure firms' financial 
constraints—e.g. Savignac (2008); Beck et al. (2008). 
 The alternative to using firm reports as direct information on firms' ability to obtain 
external funds, is simply to ask firms whether or not they are financially constrained. This 
can be done either by a single question, directly asking firms about financial constraints (or 
access to external finance), or through a combination of a number of different questions. Such 
questions should regard, among others, the cost of external funds (excessive interest rates), 
credit denials and the availability of external financing sources. The latter approach requires 
the construction of a score based on the variables obtained from the different questions, 
following a given criteria.10 
 The main advantage of using this type of data is the fact that firms are the best 
informed agents with respect to the quality of their investment projects. Therefore one should 
expect that investment opportunities are already taken into account in firms' responses.11 In 
addition to directly knowing firms' perception of constraints, unlike reports, one can measure 
constraints for small and young firms, provided that they are included in the survey's target 
population. 
 However, the subjective nature of the self-assessed variables means that potential 
biases, resulting from individuals' perception, may exist. As an example, we might have 
respondents that feel that their firm is highly financially constrained, when it actually is much 
less constrained than another firm reporting a low level of constraints.12 
 Furthermore, it is worthwhile noticing that, due to the non-linear nature of the 
resulting financial constraints variable, this measure can only be used as a dependent 
variable, with the appropriate non-linear regression technique. Nevertheless, the non-linear 
                                                           
10
 As a mere example, if we have 3 different questions, each one with 3 distinct degrees of response (3 different 
ordinal variables with 3 levels), a plausible criteria is to build a score of constraints with 3 levels. Firms that 
answered the maximum (minimum) degrees in all questions are assigned the level 3 (1). The remaining firms, 
that have mixed responses, are assigned the level 2. 
11
 Note that deliberate missreporting should not be an issue since these types of surveys are usually anonymous. 
12
 Some studies overcome this problem by using data on the credit requested and effectively granted (e.g. Russo 
and Rossi, 2001; Angelini and Generale, 2005). 
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nature of an independent variable can be partially overcome if one previously estimates the 
corresponding non-linear regression and obtains fitted values of the underlying latent 
variable—provided that suitable instruments are available and the regression has a good fit. 
However, in this case we would be working with an index (Section 3.1). 
 With respect to data availability, although in the past this type of information was 
rather scarce and with an insufficient level of detail (Claessens and Tzioumis, 2006), we 
should note that the recent financial crisis has encouraged surveys directly aimed at firms' 
financial constraints. Examples for the European case are the EUROSTAT's "Access to 
Finance" and the ECB's "Survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the euro area". We 
therefore expect availability of this type of data to be more frequent and detailed in the near 
future. 
 A somewhat different approach (when analysing the bank lending channel) is to ask 
financial institutions (notoriously banks), rather than firms, the extent to which firm credit 
was denied and for which reasons—see for example Del Giovane et al., 2010. In this 
approach, one has the advantage of knowing the reasons for credit denial (controls for lenders 
perception of risk and project quality). However, there are a number of reasons for which this 
measure is seldom used. First, it is rather difficult to obtain such data from banks or even 
specialized institutions (a rare example is the ECB's "Bank Lending Survey For The Euro 
Area").13 Second, if one wants to analyse the relationship of financial constraints with other 
aspects of firm behaviour, one has to match bank with firm level information. This is 
virtually impossible due to anonymity legal motives (data disclosure policies). Third, but 
related to the previous points, even if it possible to obtain bank-firm level data, the extent to 
which the sample will be representative of the population is rather questionable.14 
 
 These direct measures of constraints all share the advantage of being firm-specific and 
eventually time-varying—if the reports\surveys are collected periodically. Additionally, in 
contrast with indirect approaches, it is possible to use this type of measure either as a 
dependent or explanatory variable. However, the subjective and qualitative nature of these 
measures often calls for the use of quantitative information. As a result, it is advisable to 
combine these direct measures with firms' financial data. The resulting measures are often 
referred to as indexes.  
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 Note that this is a bank level survey, that does not contain firm-specific information. Therefore, one can only 
observe the evolution of the credit policies, demand and supply of funds within banks' perspective. 
14
 As an example, for this to occur, cooperation with the vast majority of banks with desired levels of regional 
and industry representativeness (branch representativeness) would be necessary. 
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4. Indexes 
In order to avoid some of the disadvantages of direct and indirect measures of financial 
constraints, the combination of different types of information and different variables into 
indexes provides a useful tool in the analysis of firms' constraints. The main motivations for 
the use of indexes is that they allow a firm-specific treatment of financial constraints, as well 
as they can be used either as dependent or explanatory variables, due to their continuous 
nature.15 
 
4.1. With a qualitative dependent variable 
The use of indexes of financial constraints is rather recent. This approach was, to our 
knowledge, first implemented by Lamont et al. (2001). They build on KZ's identification of 
constrained firms and scores of constraints (using company reports, see Section 3.1). Using 
KZ's ordered logit regression of financial constraints scores on relevant financial variables, 
they construct a firm-specific and time-varying index of constraints (known in the literature 
as the KZ index).16 
 The idea is that, given a qualitative variable of financial constraints, one can estimate 
the impact of a number of different determinants of constraints. These determinants are 
usually proxies that are expected to influence firms ability to obtain external finance (see 
Chapter III). Using the appropriate non-linear regression technique, one can estimate 
coefficients for each of the determinants of financial constraints.17 Having these coefficients, 
it is then possible to construct an index that results from a linear combination of the 
determinants, weighted by the estimated coefficients (see Table A1, Appendix). 
 Even though the outcome is a continuous, firm-specific and time-varying measure of 
constraints, there are a number of problems associated with this approach. First, it relies on 
the availability of a qualitative dependent variable. Therefore, it also carries along all the 
sampling and subjectivity issues raised in Section 3  
  
                                                           
15
 Note that the Class Ranking Index (Section 4.2.3) is an exception. 
16
 The index is given by 1.002* 3.139* 39.368*D 1.315* 0.283*it it it it it itKZ CF B C Q=− + − − + ,where 
CF is cash-flow over total assets, B is long-term debt over total assets, D is total dividends over total assets, C is 
liquid assets over total assets and Q is Tobin's q. 
17
 The estimation of the coefficient is based on a latent variable specification (since the dependent variable is 
binary\ordinal). See for example Greene and Hensher (2010) for details. 
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 Second, the index is constructed using a specific sample of firms. Accordingly, it is 
not reasonable to expect that the index coefficients will remain unchanged if one intends to 
apply it to a different sample—see Chapter V for a discussion of the SA index (Hadlock and 
Pierce, 2010). Consequently, the index can not be universally used as a measure of 
constraints. 
 Third, unless the non-linear regression has a very good fit, the corresponding index 
will only provide a noisy signal of financial constraints. This bias will be particularly severe 
if there are a number of unobservable and\or omitted variables in the regression, that strongly 
determine financial constraints. 
 
4.2. Without a qualitative dependent variable 
In order to avoid the problems associated with the availability of qualitative data and sample 
specificity, a number of researchers have devoted their time to construct indexes of 
constraints that do not rely on this type of data. We summarize these indexes into the three 
following categories. 
 
4.2.1. Euler equation index 
Building on the Euler equation approach (Section 2.2), Whited and Wu (2006) construct an 
index of constraints that does not require qualitative information. Instead, they use a 
structural parameter of Whited's (1992) model—the shadow cost of equity finance—that is 
set to be a function of observable firm characteristics. 
 In practice, the strategy comes down to estimate the Euler equation model's resulting 
empirical equation. In this framework, the shadow cost of finance is set, outside of the model, 
to be a function of observable "financial health" variables. As a result, they obtain a vector of 
coefficients, that is then used to build the index (known in the literature as the WW index).18 
  
                                                           
18
 The index is given by: itWW 0.091* 0.021* 0.062*D 0.044* 0.035* 0.102*it it it it it itCF B A Y IY=− + − − − + , 
where CF is cash-flow over total assets, B is long-term debt over total assets, D is an indicator of whether or not 
a firm pays cash dividends, A is the logarithm of total assets, Y is sales growth and IY is 3-digit industry sales 
growth. 
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 Although the data requirements for the construction of this index are not particularly 
difficult to meet—essentially balance sheet data and financial markets information—,the 
major concern when using this approach is the fact that the index results from a highly 
parameterized structural model (as in Section 2.2). Additionally, due to the number of 
parameters involved in the underlying model, this approach is of far more complex 
implementation than any other measure discussed here. Finally, as in the preceding Section, 
we should note that the estimated coefficients (therefore the index) are sample-specific, thus 
they should not be applied to other economic realities. 
 
4.2.2. MDA index 
An alternative strategy that neither requires a qualitative dependent variable, nor a structural 
underlying model was implemented by Cleary (1999). Using multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA), one can examine which variables are likely to influence the characterization of a 
firm as either financially constrained or not—in line with Altman, 1968 for the case of 
bankruptcy. 
 The procedure takes two steps. First, one should use a segmenting variable that 
enables the distinction of firms into two (or more) mutually exclusive groups. Second, use 
MDA to assess the ability of each independent variable (determinants of financial constraints) 
to distinguish a firm between groups. As a result, one can build the index using the 
coefficients estimated through MDA. Within the same rationale, one can use the segmenting 
variable to distinguish two (or more) groups of firms (e.g. financially constrained and non-
financially constrained) and then estimate a probit\logit on the determinants of financial 
constraints. The resulting coefficients will then be used to build the index.19 
 The major drawback of this approach is the need to have a superior segmenting 
variable that correctly discriminate between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. 
Cleary (1999) assumes that dividend policy serves as such variable because firms reducing 
dividends are likely to be constrained, whereas a firm will only increase dividends if it knows 
it can maintain them (financially unconstrained).20 However, if the segmenting variable does 
not consistently discriminate between constrained and unconstrained firms, the resulting 
index will biased. This problem is similar to the choice of a variable for an a-priory firm 
classification (Section 2).  
                                                           
19
 Note that multiple discriminant analysis is the predecessor of non-linear approaches such as the probit and 
logit. One can see the Z score as a latent variable of financial constraints, as in Section 4.1. 
20
 Using this type of segmenting variable usually further requires information from financial markets, which 
may result in sample biases. 
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4.2.3. Class Ranking Index 
An alternative to the traditional indexes of constraints, first introduced by Musso and Schiavo 
(2008), is to rank firms in a certain class (e.g. region or industry) that is believed to be 
reasonably homogeneous. These rankings are computed upon on a number of variables that 
are found to have a given relationship to financial constraints (proxies).21 Therefore, one can 
build a score of constraints based on the relative rankings of a given number of variables for a 
certain firm, within a certain class. The motivation to disaggregate firms into homogeneous 
classes is to account for specificities that may affect the relationship of the proxies and the 
genuine level of constraints. 
 The procedure takes two steps. First, identify a number of variables that can serve as 
proxies of financial constraints—see Section 5.3. For each of these variables, compute the 
relative position of each firm to the corresponding class mean. Second, collapse the rankings 
from all the proxies into a single score of financial constraints. As an example, if a firm is 
very old and large, has a higher dividend payout ratio, it is considered not to be constrained. 
If the reverse it's true, then such firm is assigned as constrained. Intermediate levels may also 
be built based on the ranking—quantiles of these variables. Examples of this approach can 
also be found in Bellone et al. (2010) and Silva (2011b). 
 The first problem arises if we wish to use the score of constraints as a continuous 
variable. In fact, the score variable is of an ordinal nature. Nothing guarantees that the 
difference between a firm scoring 1 and 2 is the same as the difference between the levels 2 
and 3. As a result, the score of constraints must be analysed as an ordinal variable, which has 
significant implications in the choice of the estimation procedure. 
 Secondly, if there are non-linearities in the relationship between the proxy and the 
effective level of constraints, the final score will misrepresent the level of constraints. As an 
example, while it is generally agreed that financial constraints are lower for larger and older 
firms, we point that such relationship might rather be non-monotonic (U-shaped). If this is the 
case, then we will have firms assigned the maximum score, while in fact they face a lower 
level of constraints. 
  
                                                           
21
 Musso and Schiavo (2008) construct their index based on the following variables: size (total assets), 
profitability, liquidity (current asset over current liabilities), cash flow generating ability (the maximum amount 
of resources that a firm can devote to self-financing), solvency (own funds over total liabilities), trade credit 
over total assets, repaying ability (financial debt over cash flow). 
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 Finally, we should point that the disaggregation in relatively homogeneous classes of 
firms might entail considerable difficulties when comparing firms across classes. As an 
example, if the index is built on relative rankings for each industry, and if the less constrained 
firms in industry A is more constrained than the most constrained firm in industry B, one can 
not compare the scores of firms in industries A and B because of different benchmarks.22  
 
5. Other approaches 
5.1. Firm level cash-flow sensitivities 
A recent strand of literature, based on the CFS rationale, tries to overcome the problems 
associated with aggregation, as well as a priori classification schemes that CFS approaches 
usually face. This approach consists in introducing firm-level heterogeneity in the measure of 
financial constraints, without the necessity to use qualitative data or heavily parameterized 
underlying models. Within this framework, two different methodologies should be 
mentioned. On the one hand Hovakimien and Hovakimien (2009), hereafter HH, suggested 
based on time averages weighted by cash-flow. On the other D'Espallier, Vandemaele and 
Peeters (2008), hereafter EVP, recommend the estimation of heterogeneous cash-flow slopes 
of a CFS regression. 
 The measure introduced by HH compares the time average of investment weighted by 
cash-flow, against the simple average investment. Accordingly, investment in years when 
cash-flow is higher receives a higher weight, which means that if a firm invests more (less) in 
years with higher cash flow, the HH index will turn our positive (negative). The reverse is 
also true. As a result, this measure is expected to capture the sensitivity of investment with 
respect to variations of cash-flow. The approach can also be extended to other types of CFS 
(Section 2.1). 
 However simple, this methodology fails to control for investment opportunities and 
other variables affecting investment. As an example, the ICFS test relies on the on the 
assumption that, holding investment opportunities constant, investment responds positively to 
cash-flow if a firms is financially constrained (no sensitivity should be found for 
unconstrained firms). Additionally this measure does not explore marginal effects (see 
D'Espallier et al., 2009 for a critique). 
  
                                                           
22
 Note that firms operating in some industries are, on average, more constrained than firms in other industries 
(Chapter VI). 
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 A different perspective, introduced by EVP, is to estimate heterogeneous cash-flow 
slopes of a CFS regression. Using the same rationale of a CFS regression, one obtains a 
coefficient vector instead of a scalar. As result, we will have a cash-flow sensitivity for each 
firm. Accordingly, in contrast with the HH index, this methodology allows to control for a 
number of other relevant variables affecting the dependent variable (e.g. investment 
opportunities). However, the estimation of firm-level slopes requires refined estimation 
techniques that may introduce some complexity in the implementation.23 
 Nevertheless, both these methodologies share a couple of shortcomings. Even though 
they are firm-specific, the extent to which firms move from financially unconstrained to 
constrained states and vice-versa is not captured by these time averages. Additionally, they 
require that the underlying CFS methodology consistently identifies and measures 
constraints. 
 
5.2. Credit ratings 
Credit ratings are the evaluation given by certain agencies to firms. These ratings are the 
basis for establishing the cost of external funding of a given credit rated firm—either by 
private investors in capital markets or by financial institutions. 
 The main benefits from using credit ratings relate to the fact that they summarize a 
vast set of firms' characteristics, are firm-specific and vary over time, as well as they 
represent the opinion of the markets (e.g Bottazzi et al., 2008 for an application). Even 
though using this measure partially picks the credibility of a given firm in the market for 
funds, it has three major pitfalls. 
 First, it relies on the quality of the assessment of credit rating agencies. In other 
words, one must believe that these agencies correctly screen credible companies.24 Second, 
these ratings are based on the credibility of a given firm at a certain time (mostly relying on 
past economic and financial information, as well as default events), therefore they may fail to 
capture the true quality of investment projects to be overtaken in the near future. Third, there 
are sample representativeness problems. Normally, firms that ask to be rated are usually 
large, mature and traded—we would expect them to be unconstrained, or at least, less 
constrained than other firms (see Chapter III). This problem can be partially addressed if, in 
the analysis of a larger sample that covers non-rated firms, we classify firms as constrained or 
                                                           
23
 EVP use a Generalized Maximum Entropy estimator after Golam et al. (2006), while D'Espallier and 
Guariglia (2009) use Bayesian econometrics (Lancaster, 2004, Koop, 2003 and Hansen et al., 2004). 
24
 Note that the rating itself results from a multivariate score summarizing firms’ characteristics. 
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not, depending on being rated or not, rather than on the rating itself. Once again, we might 
incur in significant biases if there exist unconstrained firms that avoid being rated simply 
because they do not want to depend on such ratings for obtaining external finance. 
 
5.3. Proxies 
The use of proxies is the simplest and most practical way to measure constraints. By 
definition, if a given variable is highly correlated with financial constraints, it may prove to 
be a good proxy. If a superior proxy is available, then it can easily be used as either a 
dependent or explanatory variable that is firm-specific and time-varying. 
 The large majority (if not all) of the empirical literature on financial constraints relies 
on a different variety of proxies either as explanatory or segmenting variables. Examples of 
commonly used proxies are the following: Cash-flow, Cash stocks, Size, Age, Export, R&D 
intensity, Leverage, Dividend payout ratio, Group membership and Ownership. (For a survey 
of the empirical findings regarding the relationship of financial constraints with other 
variables, please see Chapter III.) 
 Even though there exist different variables that correlate with financial constraints, a 
good proxy for financial constraints is rather hard to find (Cleary et al., 2007). Additionally, 
the use of proxies relies on previously devised relationships between financial constraints and 
the respective variable. Finally, if these relationships are non-monotonic, then the 
corresponding variable will only work as a good proxy for a subset of its space (see Section 
2.2.4). 
 
6. Conclusion 
This Chapter overviews the existing methodologies used to identify and measure financial 
constraints. It is clear that the researcher has a wide range of different measures, with perhaps 
complementary advantages and disadvantages. Therefore it is hard to clearly point a superior 
approach. In fact, we would risk saying that there is no perfect measure of financial 
constraints. This scenario has serious implications on economic research and certainly on 
policymaking. First, while future research should definitely make an effort to develop better 
methodologies to assess firms' financial constraints, empirical work on this field should be 
cautious when providing conclusions and suggesting policy actions. Second, policymakers 
should not to take single studies as the sole basis for policy actions—such as subsidies, 
special lines of credit and credit guarantee schemes. Particularly, if such policies require 
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redirecting public funds from other public goals and may even lead to market distortions in 
the event that funds are not allocated correctly to constrained firms. 
 Finally, this Chapter bridges the theoretical anchorage provided in Chapter I with the 
recent empirical findings described in Chapter III and our contributions to the literature, as 
detailed in Chapters V-VIII. We make use of different measures to identify and assess the 
level of financial constraints faced by Portuguese firms. Specifically, while in Chapter V we 
explore the ICFS and CCFS approaches, as well as the SA index, in Chapter VI we also 
resort to the HH index. Furthermore, while in Chapter VII we make use of CCFS, in Chapter 
VIII, using a specific survey, we are able to analyse financial constraints using both CCFS 
and a direct self-assessed measure of such constraints.  
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Appendix 
Table II.A1. Methodologies used to assess financial constraints 
Measures Data  Strategy Typical regression\question used Advantages Disadvantages Example 
Indirect        
ICFS 
 
(Coefficient) 
BS, 
preferably 
matched 
with FM. 
Split-sample or interact 
CF with variable of 
interest. ICFS provide 
the magnitude of 
constraints. 
it it
it it
I CFQ
K K
α β ε
     = + +       
 
Alternative specifications, even though 
following the same ICFS principle, are also 
used. Examples are the accelerator and error 
correction models. 
Easy to 
compute\estimate; 
Availability of data. 
Consistency of theory 
behind empirical test; 
Is an average over time and 
firms (endogeneity and 
aggregation biases); 
Cannot use as dependent or 
explanatory variable; 
Not firm-specific; 
Not time-varying; 
Use of segmenting variable 
and endogeneity of a priori 
classification scheme. 
FHP (1988) 
 
Scellato (2007) 
 
Guariglia (2008) 
 
GCFS: 
Employment 
Sales 
Assets 
 
(Coefficient) 
BS, 
preferably 
matched 
with FM. 
Split-sample or interact 
CF with variable of 
interest. GCFS provide 
the magnitude of 
constraints. 
it it
it it
G CFQ
G G
α β ε
   ∆   = + +       
 
Where G is the variable whose growth is 
analysed (e.g. total assets). 
Some authors drop Q (investment opportunities) 
and use CF as a proxy for financial constraints. 
Any sensitivity to CF is then interpreted as 
evidence of financial constraints. These are 
often referred to as reduced-form models. 
Easy to 
compute\estimate; 
Availability of data. 
Consistency of theory 
behind empirical test; 
Is an average over time and 
firms (endogeneity and 
aggregation biases); 
Cannot use as dependent or 
explanatory variable; 
Not firm-specific; 
Not time-varying; 
Use of segmenting variable 
and endogeneity of a priori 
classification scheme. 
Carpenter and 
Petersen (2002) 
 
Oliveira and 
Fortunato (2006) 
 
Fagiolo and Luzzi 
(2006) 
CCFS 
 
(Coefficient) 
BS, 
preferably 
matched 
with FM. 
Split-sample or interact 
CF with variable of 
interest. CCFS provide 
the magnitude of 
constraints. 
2 i,t
i,t i,t
3 i,t
i,t
CS CF
= +
X
+
Q
A A
A
β β
β ε
1
   ∆          
  +  
 
Where X contains controls for firm's size as well 
as sources, demands and substitutes of cash. 
Easy to 
compute\estimate; 
Availability of data. 
Consistency of theory 
behind empirical test; 
Is an average over time and 
firms (endogeneity and 
aggregation biases); 
Cannot use as dependent or 
explanatory variable; 
Not firm-specific; 
Use of segmenting variable 
and endogeneity of a priori 
classification scheme. 
ACW (2004) 
(Continued)   
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       Measures Data  Strategy Typical regression\question used Advantages Disadvantages Example 
Euler 
equation test 
 
(Parameters) 
BS, 
preferably 
matched 
with FM. 
Using an Euler equation 
model: 
For a given sample\ 
sub-sample check if 
parameter restrictions 
hold. 
2
1 2
, 1
2
3 4 5
i t it it
it
it it it
I I I
K K K
C Y B
K K K
β β
β β β ε
+
         = + +             
         + + +             
 
Under the null hypothesis of absence of 
financial constraints, the following parameter 
restrictions should be met: 
1 2 3
4
5
>1;   <-1;   <0;
=0 under perfect competition; >0 otherwise;
=0 under Mondigliani-Miller; <0 otherwise;
β β β
β
β
 
These parameters are functions of the 
underlying model's structural parameters. We 
should note that the specification and 
corresponding parameter decision depend on the 
derivation of the specific Euler equation. 
Availability of data; 
Avoids the necessity to 
estimate Q. 
Consistency of theory 
behind empirical test; 
Cannot use as dependent or 
explanatory variable; 
Complexity; 
Not firm-specific; 
Not time-varying; 
Use of segmenting variable 
and endogeneity of a priori 
classification scheme. 
Bond and Meghir 
(1994) 
Evolutionary 
test of 
selection 
 
(Coefficient) 
BS If selection is present, 
growth should be 
associated with 
profitability ("growth of 
the fitter"). If not, the 
economy may not be 
reallocating market 
shares to the most 
productive firms. 
, 1
it
it i t
Y OM
Y Y
β ε
−
   ∆   = +       
 
Availability of data. Does not test financial 
constraints but rather the 
selection mechanism; 
Cannot be used as 
dependent or explanatory 
variable; 
Not firm-specific; 
Not time-varying; 
Coad (2007) 
(Continued)   
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       Measures Data  Strategy Typical regression\question used Advantages Disadvantages Example 
Direct       
Company 
reports 
 
(Ordinal) 
Reports Build a score based on 
information from 
qualitative financial 
reports. Qualitative may 
be complemented with 
quantitative information 
as in KZ (1997). 
Search reports for keywords such as: 
"financing, finance, investing, invest, capital, 
liquid, liquidity, note, covenant, amend, waive, 
violate, and credit" (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) 
 
Assign firms a classification of constraints 
according to reports. 
Richness of 
information; 
Can be used as 
dependent variable; 
Firm-specific, and time-
varying; 
Requires exhaustive 
analysis of reports; 
Small and biased samples; 
Managers may misreport; 
Qualitative nature of data. 
KZ (1997) 
 
Self-
evaluation 
 
(Ordinal) 
Survey Directly use the variable 
from the survey 
question or build a 
score from different 
survey questions 
regarding financial 
constraints. 
Survey questions such as: 
Classify the degree to which the lack of external 
finance hampered your projects. 
Classify the degree to which high interest rates 
on external finance hampered your projects. 
At the current interest rate do you want 
additional credit? 
Are you willing to obtain additional credit at 
higher interest rates? 
Have you seen credit requests being denied? 
Can be used as 
dependent variable; 
Firm-specific, and time-
varying. 
Subjective; 
Qualitative nature of data; 
Availability data. 
Guiso (1998) 
 
Indexes       
Qualitative 
index 
 
(Continuous) 
BS 
matched 
with 
qualitative 
data 
(Reports 
or Survey) 
Use qualitative 
information as 
dependent variable; 
Estimate parameters of 
the index using a non-
linear regression of the 
qualitative variable on 
FC determinants. 
Use a qualitative variable of financial 
constraints (normally a score\ordinal) and 
estimate a logit\probit. 
The underlying latent variable of financial 
constraints is given by: 
*
2 i,tit it itFC L Mβ β ε1= + +  
Therefore, financial constraints will depend on 
the variables L and M. The coefficients are then 
used to build the index of the form: 
2it it itIndex L Mβ β1= +  
Can be used as 
dependent or 
explanatory variable; 
Firm-specific, and time-
varying. 
Availability data; 
Sample-specific; 
Non-linear regression must 
have a good fit. 
Lamont et al. (2001) 
Euler 
equation 
index 
 
(Continuous) 
BS Using an Euler equation 
approach: estimate the 
impact of observable 
financial variables on 
the model parameter of 
the unobserved shadow 
cost of finance ( itλ ). 
The unobserved shadow cost of finance ( itλ ) of 
the Euler equation model is set to be a function 
of observable firm characteristics (used as 
instruments) such that: 
2it it itL Mλ β β1= +  
Therefore, financial constraints will depend on 
the variables L and M. The index is built with 
the coefficients: 2it it itIndex L Mβ β1= +  
Can be used as 
dependent or 
explanatory variable; 
Firm-specific, and time-
varying. 
Sample-specific; 
Consistency of underlying 
structural model; 
Complexity. 
Whited and Wu 
(2006) 
(Continued)   
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       Measures Data  Strategy Typical regression\question used Advantages Disadvantages Example 
MDA index 
 
(Continuous) 
BS Use a segmenting 
variable to perform 
MDA and assign firms 
into mutually exclusive 
groups; 
Estimate parameters of 
the index through the 
impact of variables that 
influence the 
assignment of firms into 
the different groups. 
Determinants of financial constraints affect the 
score Z, that is used to discriminate groups: 
2 i,tit it itZ L Mβ β ε1= + +  
The variables L and M discriminate firms 
between mutually exclusive groups; 
The coefficients are used to build the index of 
the form: 
2it it itIndex L Mβ β1= +  
Can be used as 
dependent or 
explanatory variable; 
Firm-specific, and time-
varying. 
Availability data; 
Use of segmenting 
variable. 
Cleary (1999) 
Class 
Ranking 
index 
 
(Ordinal) 
BS Build a score of a 
number of proxies, 
based on the relative 
position of a firm within 
a class (e.g. industry). 
For each proxy L and M, the relative values to 
the class k average is 
 ; itk tk itk tkL L M M  
The quantiles of order p of the resulting 
distributions are respectively ; ; ; L MF p G pξ ξ  
Build scores ;i LS and ;i MS with 1/p classes for 
each proxy and each firm. 
Combine the proxy scores to obtain a final score 
of financial constraints (different types 
combinations are possible). The simplest is just 
the sum of scores: 
; ;i i L i MS S S= +  
Availability of data; 
Can be used as 
dependent or 
explanatory variable; 
Firm-specific, and time-
varying. 
Comparability across 
classes; 
Non-monotonic 
relationships between 
proxies and financial 
constraints. 
Musso and Schiavo 
(2008) 
 
Silva (2011b) 
(Continued)   
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       Measures Data  Strategy Typical regression\question used Advantages Disadvantages Example 
Other       
Firm CFS 
 
(Continuous) 
BS Mimic CFS types of 
measures through: 
i) time averages 
weighted by CF; 
ii) estimating firm-
specific slopes of a 
typical CFS regression. 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
n
i,t
i
t=1 1i,t i,t
1 i,t
1
=  -
n
n
t
t
CF
I IK
HH
CF K n K
K
=
=
∗
          
∑ ∑
∑
OR 
i it i it
it it
I CFQ EVP
K K
α ε
     = + +       
 
Where iβ  is the firm-specific index of financial 
constraints. 
Easy to compute (HH); 
Availability of data; 
Can be used as 
dependent or 
explanatory variable; 
Firm-specific. 
Not time-varying; 
Assumes CFS effectively 
measures constraints; 
Fails to control for 
investment opportunities 
and other relevant variables 
(HH); 
Requires different 
estimation techniques 
(EVP). 
HH (2009) 
 
EVP (2008) 
Credit 
Ratings 
 
(Ordinal) 
Ratings Match firm information 
with rating. 
Use the credit rating available for each firm 
 
The rating represents the markets' perception of 
a firm's risk. Lower ratings signal higher 
financial constraints. 
Availability data; 
Represents the market's 
perception; 
Can easily be used as 
dependent or 
explanatory variable; 
Firm-specific, and time-
varying. 
Relies on credit agencies; 
Small and biased samples 
(only few firms are rated). 
Bottazzi et al. (2008) 
Proxies 
 
(Continuous) 
BS Use one of established 
proxies in the 
estimation. 
Common proxies: CF; Cash stocks; Size; Age; 
Export; R&D intensity; Leverage; Dividend 
policy; Group membership, Ownership, among 
others (Chapter III). 
Simplicity; 
Availability of data; 
Can easily be used as 
dependent or 
explanatory variable; 
Firm-specific and time-
varying. 
Weak correlation; 
Relies on previously 
devised relationships; 
Non-monotonic 
relationships between the 
proxy and financial 
constraints; 
 
Notes: BS stands for firms' balance sheet information, FM for financial markets information, MDA for multiple discriminant analysis and CFS for cash-flow sensitivity. CF is 
cash-flow, K is capital, I is investment, Q is Tobin's Q or an appropriate proxy (such as average Q), C is real cash-flow, B is debt, A is total assets, Y is sales, OM is operating 
margin, i and t under scripts stand for individual (firm) and time,  is an error term 
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CHAPTER III – WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS? 
 
1. Introduction 
What do we know about financial constraints? As shown in Chapter I, theory on the impact 
of financial constraints upon investment is old, but only recently it did experience a 
widespread of empirical applications. Moreover, with respect to the impact of financial 
constraints on firm performance, theoretical models incorporating such constraints—some 
incorporate financial market frictions, although financial constraints are a result of these 
frictions—are rather scarce. This may be due to the difficulties in objectifying the term 
“financial constraints” (see Chapter I). 
 Although the existing theoretical literature on the effects of financial constraints is 
extensive, in particular with respect to the investment literature, there is a large body of 
recent empirical literature that deserves our attention. This new wave of empirical studies has 
been mainly the result of increasing micro data available (in particular panel data) along with 
developments in the field of (micro)econometrics—not to mention the obvious renewed 
interest on the topic brought by the recent financial crisis. Additionally, one of the particular 
features of literature on financial constraints is the contribution from diverse fields of 
economics. Examples can be found in areas such as finance, business, economic growth or 
industrial dynamics. 
 The aim of this Chapter is to review the increasing empirical contributions on 
financial constraints, focusing on recent contributions that are expected to foster the 
formulation of theory on the field. Despite not being the ultimate goal of the Chapter to focus 
on theoretical contributions, we will provide theoretical explanations, whenever needed to 
understand a particular stylized result. 
 The framework chosen to tackle this task has been to pinpoint and discuss stylized 
results that have gathered consensus among empirical researchers. The Chapter will be 
organized as follows. Section 2 will prepare the ground for empirical evidence by providing a 
discussion over investment-cash flow sensitivities and other measures of financial 
constraints. Section 3 presents fourteen stylized results, while Section 4 raises some practical 
concerns that researchers in the field might find. Section 5 will pull the pieces together and 
concludes. 
  
 46
2. Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints: An ongoing 
debate  
The first issue raised when analysing financial constraints is the definition and measurement. 
While it is difficult to clearly define what is understood by financial constraints (see Chapter 
I), the rather abstract nature of the concept has challenged researchers to find consistent 
measures of the degree of financial constraints (see Chapter II). 
 Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity (ICFS) higher for financial constrained or 
unconstrained firms? This is the same as asking whether or not is high ICFS a good measure 
of the presence of firm’s financing constraints. The large body of empirical literature on 
firms’ financial constraints, essentially came after the influential paper by FHP (Fazzari et al., 
1988), who investigate the impact of cash-flow sensitivities on investment by classifying 
firms according to their dividend policy.1 The reason for this classification lies on the 
argument that “firms might pay low dividends [because] they require investment finance that 
exceeds their internal cash flow and retain all of the low-cost internal funds they can 
generate”—see Chapter II. Using a pooled regression of investment/capital stock on the 
cash-flow/capital stock ratio, estimated Q—controls for investment opportunities (see 
Chapter I)—and dummies for each firm and year, upon a sample consisting of 422 USA firms 
(1970-1984), they found that the coefficient of cash-flow for the low-dividend group is higher 
and statistically different than the coefficient for the high-dividend group. This suggests that 
low-dividend firms invest more of their extra cash-flow than high-dividend firms. Building 
on this study, a large body of literature investigates the presence and the impact of financing 
constraints through ICFS. Carpenter et al. (1998), who compare three measures of financial 
constraints (cash-flow sensitivity, cash stocks and coverage ratio), find evidence confirming 
cash-flow as the preferred variable to test for the presence of financing constraints. Chapman 
et al. (1996) also find, for Australian firms, that investment is less sensitive to cash-flow 
when firms are financially unconstrained, while Bo et al. (2003), for a sample of Dutch listed 
firms, find that riskier firms face more severe financial constraints and argue that ICFS is a 
good proxy for financial constraints if “firms are classified by the degree of uncertainty they 
face and if the uncertainty originates from cost uncertainty”.2 
  
                                                 
1
 Firms that pay low dividends are classified as financially constrained, while high-dividend firms are classified 
as unconstrained. 
2
 Chapman et al. (1996) classify firms as financially unconstrained when a firm’s net acquisition of financial 
assets exceeds its net incurrence of equity and debt liabilities. 
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 On the other hand, KZ (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) argue that cash-flow is not a good 
measure of the existence of financing constraints (see Chapter II). As an alternative, they 
classify firms according to information obtained from company annual reports and find 
evidence that constrained firms are the less sensitive to cash-flow.3 This argument is also 
supported by Kadapakkam et al. (1998) and Cleary (1999). Almeida and Campello (2001) 
draw similar conclusions. Recently, Dasgupta and Sengupta (2007), for Japan, find that the 
response of investment to cash-flow shocks is non-monotonic, supporting Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999). However, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) present an 
explanation for Cleary (1999) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argument that investment is 
more sensitive to cash-flow for less constrained firms—influential observations for Kaplan 
and Zingales and negative cash-flow observations for Cleary. 
 As pointed in Chapter II, recent literature has found the Investment-Cash Flow 
relationship to be U-shaped, further adding to the controversy about the interpretation of cash 
flow sensitivities. The rationale is that below a certain level of internal funds the risk of the 
firm defaulting is present and, as long as the revenues of the investment are large enough to 
allow the lender to be willing to provide larger amounts in order to mitigate the risk of the 
firm defaulting, a decrease in internal funds will lead to an increase in investment. 
Meanwhile, at higher levels of internal funds it is straightforward that such a decrease in 
internal funds will lead to a decrease of investment in order to avoid the costs of resorting to 
larger amounts external finance due to higher expected liquidation losses. Examples of these 
findings are Povel and Raith (2002), Cleary et al. (2007), Lyandres (2007), within a dynamic 
framework, and Guariglia (2008) for the UK (1993-2003 period, with 99% firms not traded) 
finds this relationship to hold for a wide range of industrial sectors.4 
 Finally, as noted in Chapter II, another group of literature points that cash-flows might 
contain information about firm’s investment opportunities, meaning that Q should be 
corrected—e.g., Chirinko, 1997; Erickson and Whited, 2000; Gomes, 2001; Alti, 2003; 
Cummings et al., 2006; and Abel and Eberly, 2004.5 This group of authors argues that firms 
have a high level of uncertainty about their investment projects quality and so cash-flow 
realizations reduce the level of uncertainty by providing new information and revealing the 
quality of such projects. Specifically, if this relation holds for certain groups of firms (which 
                                                 
3
 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) re-examine the low-dividend Fazzari et al. (1988) firms and categorize the firms 
as unconstrained, possibly constrained and constrained. 
4
 Agriculture, forestry and mining, manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale, hotels and restaurants and 
business and other services; excludes regulated and financial sectors. 
5
 In particular for small firms, cash-flows reveal them the direction to go in presence of growth prospects 
uncertainty. Bond and van Reenen (1999) point that ICFS might also indicate other sources of misspecification. 
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appears to be the case for young and growth firms), then it is natural to expect high 
sensitivities of investment to cash-flow even if firms are not financially constrained. In 
particular, Alti (2003), in a model where financial frictions are absent, shows that, even after 
Q correction, firms present sensitivity to cash-flow. In addition, Bhagat et al. (2005) find 
evidence that financially distressed firms exhibit positive investment-cash flow sensitivities if 
they operate at a profit, low sensitivity if operate at a loss and invest less than in the previous 
year and strong negative sensitivity if operate at a loss and invest more than in the previous 
year, while Chang et al. (2007) find supportive evidence for the case of Australia. 
 Overall, since Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) the debate over 
the consistency of ICFS in measuring the degree of financial constraints has been intense and 
is still open for discussion (see Chapter II for recent approaches to measure constraints). Not 
only it led to a debate between the original authors (see Fazzari et al., 2000, and Kaplan and 
Zingales, 2000), but it also raised a number of both theoretical and empirical issues related to 
the topic—see for example the recent work of Hadlock and Pierce, 2010. 
 On the whole, the results and conclusions that several empirical studies have reached 
are always questionable on the very nature of the proxies and measures of financial 
constraints—see Chapter II for an overview of existing methodologies. Surprisingly, despite 
its limitations, ICFS still is the most commonly used measure. Accordingly, in the next 
section, when no reference is made to a different measure, the mentioned empirical 
contributions will be assumed to be using such measure. Keeping these caveats in mind, we 
were able to pinpoint 14 main results that reflect the topics that suffered major contribution 
during recent years. 
 
3. Stylized results 
 
Stylized result 1. Financial constraints are more severe for younger and smaller firms. 
 
 The problems with asymmetric information in capital markets are more severe for 
small and young firms. This will happen either because there is still not much information on 
these firms available to most potential lenders, or because of “weight” and visibility of such 
firms. Potential lenders are not able to observe the “quality” of the risk or do not have control 
over the firm’s investment. Under these conditions, smaller and younger firms are expected 
to be more credit rationed, according to the models of Jaffe and Russell (1976) and Petersen 
and Rajan (1995), for example.  
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 In fact, Hyytinen and Vaananen (2006), using firm self perception, find evidence that 
Finnish SMEs face severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems and that the former is 
empirically more prevalent than the latter. These problems, particularly the former, are found 
to restrict firms’ ability to raise external funds needed to take advantage of investment 
opportunities. Although Kadapakkam et al. (1998), anchoring their results in investment-cash 
flow and investment-cash stock sensitivities, and Clearly (1999), for developed countries, 
find the opposite relationship (i.e. cash flow-investment sensitivity is highest in the large firm 
size group and smallest in the small firm size group), this result can possibly arise because 
“larger firms have greater flexibility in timing their investments and have more managerial 
agency problems” (Kadapakkam et al., 1998). Pratap (2003), resorting to dividend payout 
ratio, advances the hypothesis that adjustment costs explain possible insensitivity of small 
firms’ investment-cash flow, as firms do not take major investments before they attain a 
threshold level of liquidity.  
 Egeln et al. (1997), classifying firms into financially constrained and unconstrained 
along with firm self evaluation and credit ratings, find evidence for Germany (1989-1994) 
supporting greater constraints for smaller and younger firms.6 In addition, using a panel of 
small USA firms for the period 1980-1992, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) find that the 
typical firm retains all of its income and raises relatively little external finance and that, for 
firms that rely mostly on internal finance (90% of their sample), the impact of cash-flow on 
growth is greater than the unity, meaning that the growth of most small firms is constrained 
by internal finance. Even if for constrained firms cash-flow is independent of size, then 
growth will be independent of size, but the variance of growth rates will decline with size as 
larger firms appear to be less constrained to internal finance. Further supporting evidence is 
found in Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) who, using an unbalanced panel of Portuguese 
manufacturing firms (1990-2001), also find that smaller firms’ growth is more sensitive to 
cash-flow implying the existence of financing constraints for such firms. Additionally, this 
finding also applies for younger firms. As to the overall sample, this sensitivity continues to 
be significant but lower.7 
  
                                                 
6
 Two classification schemes are used by the authors: self-evaluation and CREDITREFORM (largest credit 
agency by the time) 
7
 Small firms are defined as those with less than 50 employees and young firms defined as with less than 10 
years. 
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 Although Audretsch and Elston (2002), for the German case from 1970 to 1986, find 
that the firms which report higher ICFS are medium sized, they argue that SMEs in Germany 
appear to benefit from a bank-oriented financial system and an institutional set that prevents 
smaller firms to face greater liquidity constraints.8 Their study also confirms that very large 
firms do not appear to be liquidity constrained. In the case of Italian manufacturing firms 
(1989-1997), Becchetti and Trovato (2002), using a mix of proxies to measure financial 
constraints (namely leverage, subsidised investment, self evaluation, and credit rationing), 
find that while for small firms (<50 employees) the access to external finance is a key 
limiting determinant of growth, for larger firms (>100 employees) the financial factor appears 
to be neutral. Bhaduri (2008), resorting to ICFS and long term debt, also reaches the same 
conclusions for the Indian manufacturing case. Finally, Budina et al. (2000) find evidence 
suggesting that firms in Bulgaria (over the period 1993-1995) are financially constrained and 
in particular for smaller firms the constraints are more severe, while Honjo and Harada 
(2006), using cash-flow, leverage and the approval in a public incentives program to identify 
constraints, for a sample of Japanese manufacturing firms during the period 1995-1999, find 
higher growth-cash flow sensitivity for younger SMEs, confirming Ogawa et al. (1996) 
earlier findings. 
 As we will see in Chapter VII, we show that the relationships of size and age to 
financial constraints might in fact be non-monotonic (U-shaped) and not robust to economic 
sector disaggregation. 
 
Stylized Result 2. Size distribution of firms is skewed due to financial constraints. 
 
 A set of studies concerning the evolution of firm size distribution focus on the idea 
that, contrary to the theorized by Gibrat’s Law, growth rates and growth volatility are 
negatively associated with firm size (and age). One of the explanations lies on the financial 
constraints argument—one should expect that the presence of financing constraints leads to a 
skewed distribution of firm size. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) develop a model of financial 
market frictions in line with the models of optimal lending contracts (see Albuquerque and 
Hopenhayn, 2004) and find that smaller firms face higher probability of default, take on more 
                                                 
8
 Note that the authors divide firms into 4 classes according to their size (<500 employees; 500-1300 employees; 
1300-5500 employees; >5500 employees) and thus the first class might be seen as small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). Higher and most significant sensitivities are found for classes 2 and 3. 
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debt, issue more shares and pay fewer dividends, and have higher growth rates and volatility. 
So, they argue, imperfect markets will lead to a skewed size distribution of firms. 
 Using another framework, Cabral and Mata (2003) develop a model of heterogeneous 
constraints at the entrepreneur level and analyse the evolution of the distribution of firm size.9 
Their findings suggest that age has a significant influence upon the size distribution and, in 
particular, the younger firms/entrepreneurs are, the greater is the skewness of the distribution 
explained by the financial constraints.10 Faggiolo and Luzzi (2006) reach the same 
conclusions using a sample of Italian manufacturing firms during the period 1995-2000, 
while Desai et al. (2003), following the rationale of Cabral and Mata (2003), for European 
economies in 1998 also support these results. 
 
Stylized Result 3. Start-ups/new entrepreneurs appear to be financially constrained. 
 
 The founders of new firms, as being unable to raise the desired capital through their 
own wealth, have to apply for external finance. In order to finance such projects, banks, due 
to information asymmetry problems, require collateral as well as minimum equity-debt ratio 
levels that in their turn are difficult to be achieved by founders. This credit rationing 
eventually hinders the creation of such firms, possibly firms whose expected returns on 
investment are higher than interest rates charged on remaining capital required. For example, 
Heino (2006) finds that, in the Mexican case, there is evidence that start-ups are financially 
constrained, as there is a strong positive relationship between probability of entering the 
market and entrepreneurs using their own personal savings to finance the initial investment. 
Meanwhile, Blumberg and Letterie (2008), through an entrepreneur perspective in an 
application to the Dutch reality, find that there are a set of characteristics that banks take into 
account when providing credit to start-ups. In particular, personal wealth, home ownership, 
use of own capital in the initial investment and earning capacity, all reduce the probability of 
a bank credit being denied. They also point out that banks tend to prefer commitments and 
signals when deciding to lend and that decisions to apply, even with potentially very 
profitable projects, might not occur due to the fact that entrepreneurs might know in advance 
that their project will be denied, according to the characteristics that banks value most 
(financial aspects). In another perspective, Bohacek (2006) finds that business families have 
                                                 
9
 Note that they only allow for 2 periods and use entrepreneur’s age as proxy for financial capacity. They argue 
that younger firms/entrepreneurs have higher probability of being financially constrained 
10
 Their empirical results are obtained using a sample of Portuguese manufacturing firms in 1984 and 1991 
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high levels of savings that are explained by the incentive to overcome the financing constraint 
that prevents them from operating their firms at the optimal size. In recent papers, Magri 
(2009) and Nykvist (2008) find a positive relationship between personal wealth and 
entrepreneurship, respectively, in Italy and Sweden. 
 There is a body of empirical literature that points in the opposite direction. However, 
such conclusions might be flawed due to correlations between personal wealth and human 
capital. If human capital is shown to be highly correlated with personal wealth, then including 
both variables in the model might lead to the loss of explanatory power of one of them. This 
is what happened, for example, with Cressy (1996) and Kim et al. (2006), respectively for the 
UK and the USA cases. Grilo and Irigoyen (2006) also find that the perception of the lack of 
financial support has no power to explain latent entrepreneurship. Van Gelderen et al. (2006) 
find that one of the factors that affect negatively start-up success in Netherlands (1998-2001) 
is intended start-up capital. The interpretation in this case flows from the fact that is easier to 
raise smaller amounts to start a business, whilst potential successful entrants who require 
larger amounts of initial capital and have to resort to external financing, end up 
compromising their success. 
 Finally, van Auken, (1999) and Aghion et al. (2007) find financing constraints to 
work as a barrier to entry, even after controlling for other entry barriers. The reasoning is that 
capital requirements deter entry of new firms that have limited access to funds, in particular 
small firms. 
 
Stylized Result 4. Financial constraints are determinant for firm survival. 
 
 The financial constraints faced by firms can obviously have important effects on the 
firm’s ability to stay in the market. For example, Musso and Schiavo (2008), introducing a 
new index to measure financial constraints, find that, for French manufacturing firms over the 
period 1996-2004, the greater the financial constraints firms face, the higher the probability 
that they do not survive and then exit the market. With respect to the probability of default, 
using a sample of Italian firms during 1996-2003, Bottazzi et al. (2011), find that the lower it 
is the credit rating of a firm, the higher is the likelihood of defaulting. Additionaly, Cowling 
and Mitchell (2003), for the UK (1984-1998), find that failure is related to the cost of capital, 
with higher severity for smaller firms. 
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 It is also widely accepted that the survival rate of entrants is low, which can be at least 
partially caused by financial constraints. Fotopoulos and Louri (2000) find evidence for 
Greek manufacturing firms established in 1982-1984 that initial financial capital and the ratio 
of fixed to total assets significantly lowers the probability of a firm dying, while leverage 
increases the probability of death. For the Portuguese case (in the period 1985-1998), in turn, 
Farinha (2005) finds that the probability of survival is lower for new firms that face financial 
constraints, have smaller initial capital, are more leveraged and have a higher number of 
credit relationships (as opposite to a stable relationship). She also points that the effects of 
financing constraints appear to be persistent in time. Petrunia (2007) draw similar 
conclusions for the Canadian case (firms birth between 1985 and 1995). 
 Pfaffermayr (2007) uses a sample selection model (generalized Heckman) to analyze 
σ-convergence in firm size. If no sample selection is taken into account there will exist a 
selection bias towards the surviving firms, so the growth rates of young and small firms 
would be overestimated. Controlling for this bias, he finds that σ-convergence only occurs for 
younger firms, survival is positively related to initial size, though the impact is small and not 
significant, and that “financial constraints and revealed underperformance reduce the 
probability of survival, as expected”. 
 Finally, it might be reasonable to argue that financial constraints also have a 
(negative) indirect impact on firm survival. In fact, start-up size is generally accepted to have 
a positive impact on survival (smaller entrants face higher probabilities of failure; see for 
example Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995, for the USA, and Mata and Portugal, 1994, for 
Portugal) and one of the main determinants of start-up size is external financing (see 
Colombo and Grilli, 2005, for the Italian case and Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007, for the USA 
case). However, further research considering this hypothesis is warranted. 
 
Stylized Result 5. R&D investment appears to be more financially constrained. 
 
 The existence of financial constraints appears to be particularly severe for firms that 
decide to invest in R&D because of the high risks associated with the investment (typically 
longer term projects with uncertain outcomes). As argued before, credit markets will no 
longer be efficient, generating a wedge between internal and external financing faced by 
firms as well as a financing hierarchy. This problem is usually associated with Akerlof’s 
(1970) adverse selection in the “market for lemons” (see also Leland and Pyle, 1977, and 
Myers and Majluf, 1984, for information asymmetries in R&D financing). The informational 
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problems in this type of investment are further amplified because firms are reluctant to 
provide information about their projects, as it might entail a loss of a potential comparative 
advantage to their competitors. Moreover, the intangible assets generated by R&D investment 
are difficult to be used as collateral. In particular, Almeida and Campello (2004), argue that 
firm's investment will usually increase their borrowing capacity, which is higher for firms 
who create assets with higher tangibility. As a result, investment in intangible assets, which is 
the case of R&D, will not entail a multiplier effect, as do investments in more tangible 
assets—see Chapter VIII for a more detailed discussion. 
 Empirical contributions comprise Hall (1992), Hao and Jaffe (1993) and Himmelberg 
and Petersen (1994) that for the USA firms, find support for the hypothesis that R&D 
investment is financially constrained in particular for small firms. Hall et al. (1999) in a 
comparative study of French, Japanese and the USA firms also sustain these findings, while 
Kukuk and Stadler (2001), analysing the lack of equity funds, find that financial constraints 
adversely affect the timing of innovations for German services firms. Czarnitzki (2006), 
despite being a cross-sectional study and resorting to measures such as price-cost margin (a 
proxy for cash-flow), credit ratings and public funding, also finds that, in the West Germany 
case, SMEs’ R&D investment is financially constrained. Mohnen et al. (2008) for Dutch 
firms in the period 2000-2002 and Savignac (2009) for French firms in the period 1997-1999, 
both using firm self assessment of financial constraints, find that such constraints 
significantly reduce the likelihood of firms having innovative activities. In the Italian case, 
both Scellato (2007) and Colombo and Grilli (2007) find that most new technology-based 
firms finance their initial activities through founder’s wealth.  
 When compared with physical capital, R&D appears to be more financially 
constrained. As pointed by Hall (1992), due to the risky nature of R&D, firms prefer to 
finance their projects with internally generated funds. Using the same unbalanced panel of the 
USA firms (1959-1991), Chiao (2002) tests this hypothesis dividing firms into two classes: 
science based and non-science based. He finds that, in fact, while there is a positive 
relationship of current debt and current physical capital investment, the relationship between 
current debt and current R&D depends on the type of industry where the firm is operating. In 
particular, for science based industries, current R&D has a negative relationship with debt. 
Bougheas et al. (2003), analysing net profits and long-term debt, also find evidence of 
financing constraints in R&D investment in Ireland, while they do not find evidence of 
constraints for investment in physical capital. 
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Stylized Result 6. Government policy to alleviate financial constraints seems to work.  
 
 Despite the inefficiencies that public intervention might cause, subsidies through tax 
credits or grants and credit guarantees appear to reduce the severity of financial constraints 
faced by firms.11 Becchetti and Trovato (2002), for Italian SMEs, for example, suggest a 
positive impact of subsidies on alleviating firms’ financial constraints, while Li (2002) 
reaches the same conclusions analysing the USA Government credit subsidies to poor and 
capable entrepreneurs. Honjo and Harada (2006), for Japanese manufacturing firms during 
the period 1995-1999, also observe that public programs to foster SMEs have a high and 
positive impact in their growth. Following Hall’s (2002) suggestion that public incentives to 
R&D might have an alleviating effect on constraints, Czarnitzki (2006) investigates SMEs in 
Germany (1994, 1995 and 1998) and finds that, while in West Germany SMEs’ R&D 
investment is financially constrained, in East Germany where public subsidies seems to be 
the driving force behind R&D investment, firms appear not to suffer from external finance 
constraints. In the case of the USA and Canadian firms, Klassen et al. (2004) observe that tax 
incentives to foster R&D have a positive impact in the R&D spending. With respect to R&D 
and innovation subsidies, in Chapter VIII we provide a more detailed overview of the 
literature. 
 With respect to credit guarantees, Cowling and Mitchell (2003), analysing the impact 
of backed debt contracts on default probabilities for the UK firms, find that the policy 
undertaken by the Government was successful in alleviating a very real capital constraint for 
the majority of small business, while Kang and Heshmati (2008) observe that a Korean public 
policy providing credit guarantee to SMEs had significant impact on survival of the latter. 
Guaranteed firms had clear higher survival rates and better performance. Zecchini and 
Ventura (2009) also find that Italy’s credit guarantees on credit to SMEs has reached to 
reduce their borrowing cost and easing their financing constraints. 
 
  
                                                 
11
 Public financial support can be regarded as an additional source of external funding—see Chapter I. 
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 However, the major pitfall in the majority of these studies (noticeably those regarding 
innovation), results from the fact that the impact of subsidies (and other forms of public 
financial support) on financial constraints is not directly measured—perhaps due to 
difficulties in measuring constraints (Chapter II). Instead, the conclusion that subsidies 
mitigate financial constraints is drawn from the observation of the positive impact of 
subsidies on other variables such as firm growth (e.g. Becchetti and Trovato, 2002), survival 
(e.g. Kang and Heshmati, 2008), or R&D investment (e.g. Klassen et al. 2004). As we will 
see in Chapter VIII, our results cast some doubts on the validity of this Stylized Result, when 
it comes to innovation subsidies 
 
Stylized Result 7. Financially constrained firms hold more cash. 
 
 Almeida et al. (2004) suggested that financially constrained firms save cash for 
precautionary motives and to be able to take advantage of future investment opportunities 
(see Chapter I). Additionally, in the presence of financial constraints, cash should not be a 
perfect substitute of debt due to a premium in the costs of the latter—that results from 
information asymmetries. As Acharya et al. (2007) point, cash can only be seen as negative 
debt in the absence of financial market frictions.  
 Because holding cash entails an opportunity cost associated with foregone investment 
opportunities, firms should undertake financial policies consisting of low cash holdings 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006). Conversely, there is substantial evidence from the 
literature that analyses the determinants of cash holdings (e.g. Opler et al., 1999), that firms 
holding more cash are financially constrained. Examples can be found in Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) and Denis and Sibilkov (2010) for U.S. public firms, Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal 
(2012) for Italian private firms, Arslan et al (2006) for publicly traded Turkish firms, as well 
as Ferreira and Vilela (2004) for firms in European Monetary Union countries.  
 Furthermore, evidence that firms hold more cash for precautionary motives can be 
found, for example in Han and Qiu (2007) or McLean (2011), while Hahn (2010) supports 
that holding liquid assets may work as a good hedging policy for firms, when there are 
imperfections in financial markets. Finally, Kusnadi and Wei (2011), find that in countries 
with strong legal protection of investors (that reduce financial constraints) firms hoard less 
cash than in countries with weaker legal protection. 
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Stylized Result 8. Close bank relationships alleviate financial constraints. 
 
 Close bank relationships facilitate the contact between firms and banks, reducing the 
information asymmetries, which means lower financing constraints for firms with close but 
few relationships (in particular if such relationships are stable). As Diamond (1991) argues, 
the risk associated with any particular loan is not neutral with respect to the duration of the 
relationship. Additionally, Petersen and Rajan (1994) argue that close ties with an 
institutional creditor increases the availability of financing and find that multiple bank 
relationships significantly increase the interest rate charged on loans. This evidence is 
corroborated, for example, by Farinha (2005). Further adding to the argument, banks play a 
central role in the management of some firms by being shareholders, especially for the case 
of larger firms.  
 In another perspective, because of the role that close bank relationships play in 
alleviating financial constraints, one can expect differences in constraints between market-
oriented economies (such as the USA and the UK) and bank-oriented ones (Germany for 
example). In fact, Fohlin (1998), in an historic perspective (1903-1911), finds that Germany's 
close bank relationships had a significant impact in reducing financing constraints. Bond et 
al. (2003a) analyse ICFS of firms in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK and they find 
that, while for Belgian firms there is no evidence of firms facing financial constraints, there is 
strong evidence suggesting that firms in the UK face severe financial constraints.12 For the 
French and German case, there still exist significant financial constraints but to a lesser extent 
than the UK case. This finding adds to the hypothesis that a bank-oriented financial system 
(continental case) lightens constrains on (usually small) firms, when compared to a market-
oriented system. The same rationale is used by Audretsch and Elston (2002), who find that 
the firms that report higher ICFS are medium sized.13 They argue that this results from the 
fact that SMEs in Germany appear to benefit from a financial system that is bank-oriented 
and an institutional set that prevents smaller firms to face greater liquidity constraints. 
Recently, in a study comparing 11 OECD Countries covering the years 1993 to 2000, 
Semenov (2006) also gives supportive evidence of the presence of greater financial 
constraints in market-oriented economies.  
                                                 
12
 Have high significant cash-flow sensitivities and strongly rejects the Euler’s equation null hypothesis of no 
financial constraints. 
13
 Note that the authors divide firms into 4 classes according to their size (<500 employees; 500-1300 
employees; 1300-5500 employees; >5500 employees) and thus the first class might be seen as small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Higher and most significant sensitivities are found for classes 2 and 3. 
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Stylized Result 9. Publicly traded companies face lower financial constraints than non-
traded ones 
 
 Even though this result is highly related to financial development (stylized result 10), 
we highlight it because of its important practical implications. The reasons underlying lower 
financial constraints for traded firms are quite straightforward. First, traded firms can easily 
issue equity and debt. Second they have more visibility and credibility to investors (lenders). 
Third, information on these firms is widely available and circulates in a more efficient way 
(Fama, 1970). This reduces information asymmetries and information costs, therefore having 
a crucial impact upon firms' ability to obtain external funding.  
 In fact, Pagano et al. (1995), for Italian firms, analyse the impact of the decision to go 
public and find that borrowing costs decline after firms go public. Examples of corroborating 
evidence can also be found in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Schenone (2010) for the 
U.S., Kim (1999) for small Korean manufacturing firms, Zia (2008) for Pakistanis exporting 
firms, or Saunders and Steffen (2011) for U.K. firms. The latter also argue that the result 
drives from higher costs in information production for private firms. This result is particularly 
relevant because it tell us that whenever using solely traded firms—which is quite common in 
this field—one should not make inferences with respect to the population of firms due to 
selection bias. 
 
Stylized Result 10. Firms are less financially constrained in economies with more 
developed financial markets 
 
 It has been argued that financial constraints arise with imperfect financial markets 
owing to asymmetric information between firms and finance suppliers, leading to adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems and thus to a wedge between the costs associated with 
internal funds and those associated with external finance. As a result, one can expect that 
firms operating in countries with less developed financial markets will be more exposed to 
the constraints as there will be a greater amount of frictions in the market.  
 Before we continue with the analysis we must firstly clarify what is meant by the 
development of financial markets. Assuming Mondigliani-Miller's perfect capital markets as 
a benchmark, financial market development would comprise every efforts made in order to 
achieve it. As examples we have financial innovation (new instruments and new mechanisms 
within the financial sector), development of financial institutions or increasing market 
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efficiency (the speed at which the market reacts to new information). It is also important to 
distinguish financial market development from financial liberalization. Despite being two 
related processes, financial liberalization is usually associated with the governance of the 
country in analysis (Auerbach and Siddiki, 2004) and the existence of different degrees of 
development is distinct from a policy of liberalization. The effects of the latter are quite 
controversial and thus interesting per se, so they will be discussed separately in stylized result 
11. 
 With respect to financial market development, Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) point 
out that one of the reasons why Portuguese manufacturing firms are financially constrained, 
particularly small and young ones, might be due to a relative underdevelopment of capital 
markets in Portugal when compared to the USA or the UK (firms in Portugal rely mostly on 
banks for external finance). In the same line, Hutchinson and Xavier (2006) compare the role 
of internal finance in Slovenia (a leading transition country with still less developed financial 
markets) with the mature market economy of Belgium. They find that Slovenian firms’ 
growth is more sensitive to cash-flow than Belgian, with the sensitivity being greater for the 
case of small firms in either country. Also for Eastern European countries, Budina et al. 
(2000) for Bulgaria and Konings et al. (2003) for Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and 
Romania, identify high ICFS, possibly indicating the presence of relevant financial 
constraints.14 Desai et al. (2003), comparing the skewness of distributions between Western, 
Central and Eastern Europe, as well as particularising for the UK case, also support these 
results. Hartarska and Vega (2006) and Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008), respectively, for 
Russia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, find higher ICFS for firms that had no access to 
microfinance, vital in less financially developed economies. 
 In addition, for a sample of harmonized firm-level data for 16 industrialized and 
emerging countries, Aghion et al. (2007) also reinforce the importance of the development of 
financial markets in allowing the access to external finance for small firms. 15 They also stress 
the impact that financial constraints do have for entry of small firms, working as an entry 
barrier. Meanwhile, Islam and Mozumdar (2007), for a sample of 31 countries covering the 
period 1987-1997, provide evidence consistence across different measures of financial 
development and different measures of financial constraints and cash-flow that confirms that 
                                                 
14
 Konings et al. (2003) also find that firms in Poland and Czech Republic experience higher ICFS than in 
Bulgaria and Romania (explained by soft-budget constraints). 
15
 Specifically Argentina, Denmark, Chile, Colombia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, the UK and the USA. 
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investment is more sensitive to cash-flow for firms in economies with less developed 
financial markets.16 Love (2003) also supports this evidence for a sample of 40 countries. 
 On another perspective, Haas and Peeters (2006) show that, for ten transition 
economies,17 firms increased their leverage during the transition period in order to reach their 
optimum target leverage level, despite many firms still prefer internal funding due to 
information asymmetries in the market for cash. These results imply that, before transition, 
firms were operating below optimal leverage levels and thus suffered from external finance 
constraints.  
 With respect to regional financial development, in a comparison between southern 
and northern regions of Italy, Sarno (2005) finds that SMEs in the less financially developed 
southern Italian regions are more severely affected by credit constraints. Guiso et al. (2004) 
also for the Italian case, analysing the impact of local financial development, confirm that the 
development of local financial markets has a major impact in relieving financial constraints 
in particular for smaller firms that have no access to broader capital markets. 
 
Stylized Result 11. Financial liberalization seems to alleviate financing constraints of 
firms, especially for smaller ones. 
 
 In the economies where financial markets are overregulated, several inefficiencies 
arise due to information hampering along with heavy bureaucratic procedures. Usually, 
financial liberalization facilitates the access of firms to credit, especially small ones, by 
reducing the institutional barriers and transaction costs in the market for credit. However, one 
must also take into consideration that financial liberalization might allow the lender to “hide” 
the real risk of the assets, allowing them to accept projects with higher risk.  
 On one hand, Gelos and Werner (2002), analysing the Mexican manufacturing sector 
for the period 1984-1994, find that investment was generally financially constrained and that 
liberalization eased the access of small firms to external funds (note that large firms 
previously had a preferential treatment). Bhaduri (2005) and Ghosh (2006), both using cash-
flow and leverage measures, also show that financial liberalization in India during the 1990s 
alleviated financial constraints faced by manufacturing firms, in particular for small ones. 
                                                 
16
 Islam and Mozumdar (2007) use three different measures of financial development: the first is based on the 
stock market capitalization to GDP held by minorities (not owned by the top 3 shareholders), the second is 
based on the aggregate size of equity and credit markets to GDP and the last makes use of accounting standards. 
17
 Namely Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania 
and Poland. 
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Several other studies, that resort to different measures of financial constraints, all report that 
financial reform caused a reduction in financial constraints, for instance: Harris et al. (1994) 
for Indonesia, Guncavdi et al. (1998) for Turkey, Laeven (2002) and Koo and Maeng (2005) 
for Korea and Wang (2003) for Taiwan. In an opposing direction of liberalization, Forbes 
(2007), recently showed that Chilean capital controls increased financial constraints for small 
firms. 
 There is, however, some mixed empirical evidence on the effect of financial 
liberalization on firms’ investment. Laeven (2003), for a large sample of firms in 13 
developing countries, finds that financial liberalization affects firms differently: while it 
relaxes financial constraints faced by small firms, it results on the opposite for larger ones. 
 Finally, with respect to securities regulation, MacIntoch (1994) identified legal and 
institutional barriers to financing innovative companies in the USA and Canada. Chiu (2003) 
for Canada and Europe and Cohn (1999) for the USA also find supporting evidence of the 
negative effects of regulation in aggravating firms’ financial constraints. 
 
Stylized Result 12. Recessions and financial crisis increase financial constraints, and 
disproportionally affect constrained firms 
 
 The recent financial crisis has brought a wave of new empirical evidence on the 
effects of financial constraints on firm behaviour. Recessions, associated with a lack of 
liquidity, disproportionally affect financially constrained firms. As leading example, 
Campello et al. (2010), using survey data on chief financial officers in the U.S., Europe and 
Asia, find that constrained firms significantly cut more dividends and reduce their cash 
savings in order to face the tightening financial conditions. Additionally, they find evidence 
that these firms’ investment, innovation and employment policies were severely affected, 
when compared to unconstrained firms. As another example, Ang and Smedema (2011) use 
an U.S. sample to investigate firms’ financial flexibility during recessions and find that cash 
poor and financially constrained firms are unable to prepare for recessions, in contrast with 
unconstrained firms. This finding is complemented by evidence that industries more 
dependent on external finance grow at a slower pace than firms in other industries (Kannan, 
2011). 
Within the lender perspective, Chava and Purnanandam (2011) for the U.S. and 
Minamihashi (2011) for Japan, stress the role of bank failures in potentiating the effects of 
financial crisis. On the other hand, Santos (2011) points that, after the recent crises, banks 
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disproportionally increased their interest rates on bank-dependent borrowers—when 
compared to other firms. 
 
Stylized Result 13. Firms that belong to a business group have lower financial constraints 
 
 While on the one hand, conglomerates allow their affiliates to have higher visibility in 
the credit market (e.g. Dewenter et al., 2001), they also form an internal capital market (e.g. 
Stein, 1997; Khanna and Palepu, 2000). This internal market for funds within the group, even 
though not totally efficient (Shin and Stulz, 1998), allows to shift funds to wherever 
investment opportunities arise, or to overcome negative shocks in an easier manner 
(Hovakimien, 2011). Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) finds that business groups in Germany 
reduce financial constraints especially for small firms. Lensink et al. (2003) find the same 
results for Indian firms, while Manos et al (2012) analyzing Indian firms’ and business 
groups’ dividend policy find that business groups reduce financial constraints, even though 
not completely. This recent evidence complements previous findings such as those of Lamont 
(1997) for US oil companies, Shin and Park (1999) for Korea or Hoshi et al. (1991) for Japan. 
 
Stylized Result 14. Foreign-owned firms are less financially constrained than domestic 
ones. 
 
 Firms that have access to foreign capital markets are expected to be less financially 
constrained than those that have to resort solely to national capital markets, thus facing 
information asymmetries and severe financial constraints. Ownership (national versus 
foreign) is believed to create a wedge between firms that have access to outside markets 
(foreign-owned) and those that do not. Resorting to leverage, Blalock et al. (2008), for 
example, find evidence for Indonesia (following the 1997 East Asian financial crisis) 
suggesting that firm ownership is an important determinant of investment as foreign 
ownership is associated with firms not being financially constrained. Colombo and Stanca 
(2006) also observe this wedge in budget constraints for firms in Hungary over the period 
1989-1999. The introduction of financial reforms in the country leads domestic firms to face 
stronger constraints with respect to foreign-owned firms. Public firms (particularly small 
ones), however, were unaffected and remained under soft budget constraints. Hutchinson and 
Xavier (2006) show that foreign owned firms in Slovenia are less constrained and Ruiz-
Vargas (2000) corroborate these results for the case of Puerto Rico. 
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 In another perspective, Desai et al. (2007), compare multinational affiliates and local 
firms in the U.S. during currency depreciations (over the period 1991-1999) and find that 
multinational affiliates are better off than local firms by being able to exploit investment 
opportunities raised by currency depreciations as they are not limited to the internal market 
for funds. In some cases, the parent multinational may even provide equity to its affiliates. 
Finally, Beck et al. (2006), using a firm-level survey conducted in 1999 and 2000 over 80 
countries, find that domestic firms report higher financing obstacles. 
 
4. Measure problems and conceptual issues 
We shall briefly address some empirical problems and conceptual issues, mostly related to 
data and sampling that are often raised when analysing financial constraints faced by firms. 
Firstly, when analysing small firms or SMEs, because of diverse definitions, it is important to 
precise what does “small” mean. Just to illustrate, a small firm might mean a firm with less 
than 5, 20 or 50 employees and a “small firm” in the USA is different from a “small firm” in 
Europe. 
 Secondly, one must be aware of the data source and the dismal sample. Most studies 
focus solely on firms in the manufacturing sector or firms that are publicly traded (both are 
the easiest samples to obtain). This reduced samples, might generate biases if one expects to 
draw conclusions for the whole economy. As an example, if one investigates if financial 
constraints are more severe for smaller firms using traded firms it is reasonable to expect that 
the observed firms will not be as constrained as if the sample included non-traded firms. 
 Thirdly, when analysing start-ups, it is difficult to identify potential entrants and 
obtaining their financial status information. One only observes firms that indeed overcome 
entry barriers (stressing the financial barrier). As a result, firms that did not overcome the 
entry barriers are not taken into account.  
 Fourthly, several problems emerge in survival analysis: (a) length biased sampling – if 
using stock sampling, one may not observe firm dynamics in between sample periods, thus 
survival rates tend to be larger; (b) repeated entry – one must consider de novo entry as not 
independent of previous failures (usually this is not taken into account); (c) death definition – 
firms may exit the sample even if they have not died (using two missing observations in a 
row to define death, as it is usually done, probably will not expurgate all other exits).18 
                                                 
18
 For more on exit definition see Carreira and Teixeira (2011). 
 64
 Fifthly, significant problems arise when we use ICFS to test the presence of financial 
constraints faced by firms. In particular, we must reinforce that using Q theory derived 
models might entail significant mismeasurement errors due to the estimation of Q—see 
Poterba, 1988, Erickson and Whited, 2000, and Alti, 2003, for a discussion. 
 Finally, consistent financial constraints classification is a major issue of investigation. 
Financial constraints are an abstraction, so researchers use proxies and indexes that allow 
them to identify and measure the degree of constraints. Most of this measures result from 
previous empirical findings suggesting a strong association between variables. Additionally, 
research in the field has continuously been casting serious doubts on the validity of previous 
measures. As a striking example we have the newish Hadlock and Pierce (2010) paper that 
tests the KZ and WW indexes, ICFS and ACW measures by developing an appellative new 
index that focus on firm size and age—that are usually correlated with financial constraints 
and, as they argue, are “more exogenous” than other components considered—and compare it 
with previous indexes. They find that that the correlation between their SA index and the KZ 
index is almost nil, while the correlation between the SA index and the WW index is mainly 
due to the inclusion of size in the former index. With respect to the ACW measure, they 
corroborate the consistency of such measure. Accordingly, the diversity of measures that one 
can find in the literature, as it was discussed in Section 2, is perhaps a signal of the 
difficulties that researchers face to find consistent measures of constraints. Therefore, the 
field is still open to discussion. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Financial constraints are a widespread key concern for firms, hindering their ability to carry 
out their investment and growth. In particular, the difficulties in obtaining external funds 
seem to be highly dependent upon firm's ownership (national versus foreign), age and size, as 
well as in a set of institutional characteristics such as the structure and development of the 
financial system. Nevertheless, the recent financial crisis has provided evidence that 
financially constrained firms are particularly affected by downturns. In addition, financial 
constraints appear to have a determinant impact upon firm dynamics of entry (through start-
ups/entrepreneurial activity) and exit (through firm survival), as well as on R&D investment. 
In order to alleviate these constraints, public policy, either by subsidies and credit guarantees 
or by improving financial market efficiency seems to be effective. Furthermore, financially 
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constrained firms usually hold more cash, while belonging to business groups and becoming 
publicly traded may reduce such constraints.  
 Nevertheless, financial constraint analysis is still subject to much debate as most 
empirical studies of these effects not only deal with a set of measurement and conceptual 
issues, but also rely upon a fragile relationship built to identify the presence and severity of 
financial constraints (see Chapter II).  
 Overall, given the theoretical (Chapter I) and methodological (Chapter II) discussions, 
this Chapter overviews the state of the art developments in financial constraints literature. 
Therefore it is crucial for the understanding of Chapters V-VIII. These Chapters will depart 
from existing literature and contribute with new empirical evidence on the relationship 
between financial constraints and firms’ characteristics, as well as on the impact of 
constraints on firm behaviour. 
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CHAPTER IV – DATA 
 
1. Data sources 
The data used in this thesis was drawn from different data sources made available by the 
Portuguese National Statistical Office (INE), to whom we are very grateful. 
Specifically, we make use of the following three main sources: 
 
i) Ficheiro de Unidades Estatísticas (FUE) is a database that registers information on all 
firms operating in Portugal. It is updated annually and provides specific information to 
characterize firms—e.g. year of constitution, location, industry classification, status of 
activity. Since this database covers the universe of Portuguese firms on an annually 
basis, and comprises a coded number (provided by INE) that uniquely identifies firms, it 
allows us to track firms through time. Therefore, this source not only provides crucial 
information on firms' generic characteristics, but, most importantly, allows us to match 
the different annual surveys as well as information from different sources. 
 
ii) Inquérito às Empresas Harmonizado (IEH) is a business survey (since 1991) to 
active Portuguese firms conducted annually by INE. This survey is of compulsory 
response to all enquired firms. It contains information for all firms with more than 99 
employees, and a random sample of firms with less than 100 employees. Sample 
stratification is based on location (at the NUTS II level), industry (CAE rev. 2.1 at the 
4-digit level) and size (employment).1 This source provides financial information from 
firms' balance sheets that is crucial to the identification of financial constraints. We 
should note that at the beginning of this study only data until 2004 was available. 
Additionally, the survey suffered major methodological changes made by INE in 1996 
and 2004. Therefore we restrict our sample to this period. We intend to extend our 
analysis, once information on recent years is made available.2 
  
                                                           
1
 For the representativeness of firms by industry to be assured, in some cases stratification is done at a 
higher level (e.g. 3-digit), due to a reduced number of firms in such industries. Additionally, for firms 
with less than 100 employees, the sample is further stratified into two classes of [0;20[ and [20;100[. 
2
 Currently we only have access to data until 2007, which does not provide a desirable length for 
estimation techniques. 
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iii) Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is a European-wide harmonized survey on 
firms' innovation activity. Even though we only have access to the Portuguese surveys, 
the questionnaire is relatively homogeneous across countries—results are comparable. 
The survey is conducted on a wave basis and, in Portugal, is of the responsibility of 
Gabinete de Planeamento, Estratégia, Avaliação e Relações Internacionais, even 
though data is made available through the INE office. For the Portuguese case, we have 
access to 3 waves: 1995-1997 (CIS2), 1998-2000 (CIS3) and 2002-2004 (CIS4). The 
sampling scheme is stratified for firms with less than 250 employees, while it covers all 
firms with more than 249 employees. Sample stratification is based on location (at the 
NUTS II level), industry (CAE rev. 2.1 at the 2-digit level) and size (employment).3 
This source provides useful information on firms’ innovation activity, such has R&D 
investment, cooperation, subsidies and obstacles to innovate—among which financial 
constraints. 
 
 Finally, we should note that neither survey covers "extra-territorial organizations 
and bodies" and, in the CIS, "agriculture, hunting and forestry" and "fishing" are 
disregarded.4  
 
                                                           
3
 For the representativeness of firms by industry to be assured, in some cases stratification is done at a 
lower level (e.g. 3-digit), due to a reduced number categories at the 2-digit level. Additionally, for firms 
with less than 250 employees, the sample is further stratified into two classes of [0;50[ and [50;250[. 
4
 The legal industrial classification suffered a revision in 2003 (CAE Rev. 2.1) and in 2007 (CAE Rev. 3). 
For the purpose of this study we use the revised version of 2003 (CAE Rev. 2.1) and make the 
corresponding changes from the previous classification (CAE Rev. 2). Finally, the classification is 
adapted to the system provided by the United Nations Statistics Division (ISIC Rev.3). Please see Section 
4 for the industry codes. 
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Table IV.1. Data sources 
Source Unit Periodicity Time span Target population Sampling scheme Information 
FUE Firm Annually 1996-2004 Portuguese firms Population Firm characteristics 
IEH Firm Annually 1996-2004 Portuguese firms <100 employees: Stratified by location (NUTS II), 
industry (CAE rev 2.1) and firm size (employment). 
 
>99 employees: Population 
Balance sheets 
CIS Firm Waves: 
1997 (II) 
2000 (III) 
2004 (IV) 
Wave span: 
1996-1997 
1998-2000 
2002-2004 
Portuguese firms <250 employees: Stratified by location (NUTS II), 
industry (CAE rev 2.1) and firm size (employment). 
 
>249 employees: Population 
Innovation activity 
Notes: The data is representative at the regional, sectoral and industrial levels, of the Portuguese economy. 
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2. Merging the data sources 
Using the FUE, we are able to match information from the different data sources. The data 
sources were matched using a code number, also provided by INE, that uniquely identifies 
each firm for the different surveys along the successive years. In what follows, we distinguish 
two datasets: Dataset A formed by the combination of FUE and IEH; Dataset B obtained 
from the combination of all the available information—FUE, IEH and CIS. The reason for 
this distinction results from the fact that there are a significant number firms not covered by 
the CIS survey, while the reverse is also true—7.079 in the CIS against 22.651 in the IEH. 
This results from the fact that in both survey, firms with less than 100 employees are drawn 
randomly. Additionally, while we have annual data for IEH and FUE, the CIS survey is 
carried out in waves (CIS2, 3 and 4), which brings additional complications. 
 
2.1. Dataset A 
For the purpose of this work the following cleaning procedures were necessary. First, we 
eliminated firms with less than 20 employees due to the lack of quality of information 
reported by such firms. Second, we focus only on manufacturing and most of the services 
sector, thus eliminating the agricultural (also includes husbandry, forestry, fishing, inter alia) 
and financial sectors—inclusion of this sector would naturally bias the estimation favouring 
unconstrained firms. Observations that were reported either missing or with unreasonable 
values were dropped. In some specific circumstances, unreasonable values suffered a 
treatment in order to achieve coherent values—observations whose correct values were 
possible to obtain from other accounting variables or resulting from changes in signal 
mistyping errors. As a result we have a large unbalanced panel of 22.651 firms for the period 
1996-2002 resulting in 86.455 observations. Please see the Section 3 for a detailed 
description of the variables used. 
 With respect to the analysis in Chapter VI, specifically aimed at comparing 
manufacturing and services firms, we also exclude construction, public administration and 
private households with employed persons. Additionally, due to a reduced number of 
observations, we were forced to exclude the manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel industry (DF) as well as extraction of fossil fuels, uranium and thorium 
(CA), electricity, gas and water supply (E)—please see the Section 4 for the industry codes. 
As a result we end up with an unbalanced panel of 19.874 firms for the period 1996-2004 
resulting in 77.291 observations. 
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 The advantage of using this dataset is that it comprises detailed financial information 
from firm's balance sheets thus providing some insights on their status regarding financial 
constraints. In particular, it allows us to develop classification schemes that group firms into 
different levels of financial constraints. Additionally, resorting to FUE allows us to construct 
an unique and comprehensive dataset covering the universe of firms operating in Portugal 
with more than 100 employees and a large representative sample of Portuguese firms with 
more than 20 employees. Furthermore, the dataset comprises the broad range of economic 
activity sectors, including both manufacturing and services at desirable levels of 
disaggregation. Moreover, we have a representative sample of Portuguese services that is 
large enough (38.751 firm-year observations) to allow inferences to be made and to apply the 
proposed methodologies—this is particularly relevant for the analysis in Chapter VI. Finally, 
the large sample period (1996-2002) is adequate to take into account macroeconomic cyclical 
variations, as well as it covers the monetary integration process—this is particularly relevant 
for the analysis in Chapter VII. Inferences using this sample, representative of Portuguese 
firms, may be made with respect to, at least, the EU economy (cf. Cabral, 2007). 
 However, a major pitfall of this dataset is the inexistence of market information about 
firms. Since we only have access to a code number of each firm, we are not able to match the 
dataset with information from, for example, stock markets. Still, only a few firms in Portugal 
are publicly traded and so the benefits of such extension of the dataset would be negligible. 
Additionally, information on firms is limited to a relatively low level of disaggregation of 
balance sheets. Finally, by dropping from the database all firms with less than 20 employees, 
we are cutting off a significant number of observations. In addition, smaller firms would, a 
priori, be more financially constrained (e.g. Cabral and Mata, 2003 or Oliveira and 
Fortunado, 2006, both for the Portuguese case), thus our results might be slightly downward 
biased when it comes to the level of firms' financial distress. Nevertheless, information on 
these firms lacks in quality and further increases the unbalancedness of the panel. 
  
72 
 
Table IV.2. Structure of Dataset A 
FUE and IEH 
Pattern Frequency Percent 
111111111 2399 10.59 
000000001 1178 5.20 
100000000 1140 5.03 
000001000 681 3.01 
010000000 639 2.82 
001000000 585 2.58 
000000010 560 2.47 
110000000 552 2.44 
000000011 550 2.43 
Other 14367 63.43 
   
Total 22651 100 
 
2.2. Dataset B 
Building on the information from Dataset A, we construct an unique dataset from the 
combination of the three different data sources—FUE, IEH and CIS. As a result, we are able 
to construct a panel comprising variables on firms' financial status (IEH) and generic 
characteristics (FUE), further enriching the information on CISs surveyed firms. 
Accordingly, our final dataset is composed by 8,132 CIS observations (CIS 2, 3 and 4) 
appended by an unbalanced panel (Dataset A) of the respective 7.079 firms for the period 
1996-2004, corresponding to 30,177 observations. This sample also covers the period 1996-
2004 and is representative of the Portuguese economic sector disaggregation. The use of CIS 
is crucial to the analysis of firms’ innovation activity (Chapter VIII) because it contains, 
among others, valuable information on R&D expenses, product and process innovation, 
cooperation, innovation subsidies and, remarkably, a direct measure of financial constraints 
to innovate—see Section 3 for a detailed description of the variables used. However, the use 
of CIS entails a number of problems that the reader should be aware of. 
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 The main caveat of this dataset is the great loss of observations when we try to make 
use of both the panel structure and the CIS waves simultaneously (we use 1997, 2000 and 
2004 as reference years), since not all firms in the CIS data are present in the panel data and 
vice versa—note that the panel, for firms with less than 100 employees, is composed by a 
random sample. Moreover, the 3 different CISs surveys are not exactly identical, so we had to 
abandon some variables in order to homogenise the CISs information (e.g. the use of 
information technologies). 
 Additionally, the waves of CIS refer to a certain time span (1995-97, 1998-2000 and 
2002-04) meaning that, only for the case of CCFS estimation (see Chapter VIII), we must 
either assign a reference year for each wave, or assume that the reported information 
represents the average during the time span. Initially we opted for the former, however, the 
greatly reduced number of observations forced us to implement the later, so to have 
consistent estimates and to be able to use more appropriate estimation techniques.5 Still, we 
expect that access to the corresponding datasets for 2004 onwards, once available, will allow 
us to improve these results. 
 Furthermore, the subjective nature of the self-assessed variables, means that there 
exist potential biases resulting from individuals perception. As an extreme example, while for 
some changing the colour of a product might be a significant improvement of the product 
(accounted for product innovation), for others it is not the case. This will also apply to 
variables such as reported financial constraints, where we might have respondents that feel 
that their firm is highly financially constrained, when it actually is much less constrained than 
another firm reporting low constraints. Please see Chapter II for a discussion of this type of 
measures of financial constraints. 
 Finally, the inclusion of the partially qualitative, subjective and censored CIS 
databases, in our panel of balance sheets and firms' characteristics, raises an additional 
number of methodological issues that must be carefully dealt with (see Mairesse and 
Mohnen, 2010). Examples can be found in the binary variables that identify if a firm has 
introduced innovations, in the ordinal categorical and subjective nature of the variable that 
identifies the availability of external finance as a factor hampering innovation or in the 
censored variable of R&D expenses (only reported for those firms that decide to invest). For 
detailed description of the variables used and their construction, please see Section 3. 
                                                           
5
 The assumption on average values during the corresponding wave period is fairly strong, however, it is a 
necessary evil in order to achieve consistent estimation when we split the sample to estimate CCFS in a GMM 
style. For robustness checks we also calculate the wave period averages of the variables in IEH and FUE, when 
applicable, and construct a panel of the 3 corresponding waves. 
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Table IV.3. Structure of Dataset B 
FUE and IEH CIS waves 
Pattern Frequency Percent Pattern Frequency Percent 
000000001 731 10.33 001 3986 56.31 
101101111 726 10.26 100 1102 15.57 
101111110 225 3.18 010 1080 15.26 
000000011 205 2.90 011 358 5.06 
000001111 192 2.71 101 219 3.09 
111101110 185 2.61 110 192 2.71 
000010000 174 2.46 111 142 2.01 
001101111 169 2.39    
101111111 157 2.22    
Other 4315 60.95    
      
Total 7079 100 Total 7079 100 
 
 
3. Construction of variables 
From the data at our disposal we were able to create the following variables: 
 
3.1. Generic information (FUE) 
Age 
(AGE) 
 Computed as the difference between the current year and the 
year of establishment of the firm plus one, in logs;  
Industry 
(CAE) 
 Portuguese industrial classification—using CAE rev 2.1 as 
reference. Different industry codes are converted into dummy 
indicators; 
Location 
(NUT) 
 European regional classification. Different region codes are 
converted into dummy indicators; 
Status 
(STA) 
 Variable that identifies if a firm is active, new, ceased activity, 
was merged or acquired. Different status codes are converted 
into dummy indicators; 
Legal form 
(LF) 
 Variable that identifies the legal format of firms. Different legal 
form codes are converted into dummy indicators; 
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Public capital 
(PUB_K) 
 Percentage of capital owned by the public sector;  
Foreign capital 
(FOR_K) 
 Percentage of capital owned by non-nationals;  
 
3.2. Balance sheets variables (IEH) 
Size 
(SIZE) 
 Measured as log of the number of employees; 
Size 
(S) 
 Computed as log of inflation-adjusted assets; 
Investment 
(I) 
 Measured as additions to plant, property and equipment- gross 
investment, scaled by total assets; 
Output 
(Y) 
 Measured as total sales and services, scaled by total assets. We 
use the sum of both sales and services as total output and 
distinguish firms only by their sector of activity legal 
classification. If distinction was to be made on an output basis, 
it would be impossible to discern most firms between 
manufacturing and services. As an example, some 
manufacturing firms also provide post-sales services; 
Cash- flow 
(CF) 
 Computed as net income before taxes plus depreciation, scaled 
by total assets; 
Cash stock 
(CS) 
 Measured as total cash holdings, scaled by total assets; 
Investment 
Opportunities 
(∆) 
 In most empirical studies, investment opportunities are 
measured using average Tobin's Q (the ratio between the total 
market value and asset value of a firm). However, we refrain 
from using this measure for two different reasons. The first is 
due to the fact that we are not able to calculate it since we do 
not have information on financial markets. Even if it was 
possible, we would obtain a biased sample with respect to 
financial constraints, not only because it is generally agreed that 
smaller and younger firms face severer constraints—only a few 
are publicly traded—, but also due to the fact that information 
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on quoted firms is legally required and so, information 
asymmetry problems are diluted for such firms, potentially 
reducing financing problems. The second reason is more of a 
theoretical one. Firstly, marginal Q is unobservable, so 
researchers use average Q as a proxy—see Hayashi, 1982, for 
the derivation of average Q. Secondly, the introduction of cash-
flow in the estimation of investment models for the purpose of 
analysing financial constraints may cause the sensitivities to 
cash-flows to be overestimated, as they might contain 
information about investment opportunities that were not 
captured by Q—Alti, 2003, in a model where financial frictions 
are absent, shows that, even after Q correction, firms exhibit 
ICFS. Sales growth is often used in empirical work on countries 
with less developed financial markets where information on 
firm's market value is scarcer (e.g. Budina et al., 2000 or 
Konings et al., 2003). In some cases lagged sales may even 
outperform Q (see FHP, 1988: p.173-74). 
Debt and equity 
issuances 
(ISS) 
 Sum of debt and equity issuances, scaled by total assets. For 
the year 2001 equity issuances are reported as missing. The 
reason lies in legal changes that took place with the introduction 
of Euro (most firms adjusted their equity, not necessarily 
meaning issuing equity); 
Non-cash net working 
capital (NWK) 
 Difference between non-cash current assets and current 
liabilities, scaled by total assets; 
Interest payments 
(INT) 
 Interest payments of a firm, scaled by total assets. It can be 
argued to proxy for the credit rating of the firms; 
Leverage 
(LEV) 
 Measured as the ration of liabilities to the total value of a firm; 
Financial investments
(FinI) 
 Financial investments of firms, scaled by assets. It can be seen 
as relatively liquid assets that allow firms to transfer resources 
across time; 
Returns on financial 
investments (R_FinI) 
 Returns on financial investments of firms, scaled by assets;  
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Intangible assets 
(INTANG) 
 Computed as intangible assets, scaled by total assets. In the 
absence of a better alternative, this variable is intended to proxy 
the knowledge stock, through R&D stock and the patent stock 
of firms (we do not have detailed information neither on 
patents, nor on highly disaggregated firm accounts); 
Labour productivity 
(LPROD) 
 We compute a standard ratio of value-add to number of 
employees; 
Exports 
(EXP) 
 Firm exports, scaled by assets; 
Market share 
(MKTS) 
 This variable is constructed as a firm's sales over total sales of 
the corresponding firm's industry—at maximum level of 
industrial classification disaggregation (5-digit). 
Dividend Payment 
(DIV) 
Computed as an indicator due to the lack of quality in the 
original survey variable “reserves”. The variable will take value 
0 if the firm does not pay dividends and the value 1 if a firm 
pays dividends. 
Degree of openness 
to foreign markets 
(OPEN) 
 Score that captures the degree of openness of firms to foreign 
markets, that in its turn is obtained by the sum of export and 
import intensity (normalized by sales) divided by 2. A firm 
scores 1 (no) if it is closed and 4 (yes) if open. Scores 2 (low) 
and 3 (high) are obtained by dividing open firms (score 4) at the 
mean degree of openness. Initially we divided firms into terciles 
by their degree of openness, however the use of terciles implies 
that a significant number of non exporting\importing firms are 
included in the second tercile (about 40% of firms rely solely on 
the domestic market). 
Export intensity 
(EXP) 
Total exports to the EU divided by total sales. Export intensity 
scores are obtained in the same manner as openness scores 
(described above). 
Import intensity 
(IMP): 
Total imports from the EU divided by total sales. Import 
intensity scores are obtained in the same manner as openness 
scores (described above). 
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3.3. Innovation variables (CIS) 
Decision to invest in 
R&D 
(RD) 
 Binary variable for firms that engaged in innovation activities 
and those that did not; 
R&D investment 
(I_RD) 
 Total expenditure in R&D activities in logs. The logarithm is 
computed as (1+investment) because of zero expenditures; 
R&D investment 
(RD_I) 
 Volume of expenditure in R&D activities in logs; 
Innovation 
(INNOV) 
 Binary variable that indicates if a firm has innovated or not. It 
is measured in the broad sense and encompasses both product 
and process innovation; 
 
Public Finance 
(SUB) 
 Binary variable for firms that received public funding and those 
that did not. For the sake of this paper and simplicity we will 
refer it as "subsidies"; 
Share of subsidized 
firms-Industry 
(SUB%I) 
 Computed as the ratio of number of subsidized firms in each 
industry (2-digit, CAE rev 2.1) to the total number of subsidized 
firms; 
Share of subsidized 
firms-Region 
(SUB%R) 
 Computed as SUB%I but for each region (NUT2). Both of 
these variables serve as instruments for subsidies. The rationale 
is that, in the absence of information on public policy budgets, 
the share of subsidies by industry and region will reflect policy 
targets that favour certain industries or regions (see Schneider 
and Veugelers, 2010); 
Cooperation 
(COOP) 
 Binary variable that indicates if a firms cooperated with other 
firms or institutions for the purpose of innovation activities; 
Innovation 
opportunities 
(Y_IN) 
 Percentage of innovated products in total sales (Y); 
Patent 
(PATENT) 
 Binary indicator of whether a firm registered any patent during 
the wave period. 
R&D workers 
(RD_WORK) 
 Percentage of employers in the firm that work on R&D; 
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Financial constraints 
(FC) 
 Ordinal variable that measures the degree to which firms 
reported that the lack of external finance hampered innovation 
activity (self-evaluation). We do not include in this variable the 
"perception of excessive economic risks" and "high costs of 
innovation" information reported in CIS. The former can not 
objectively be seen as financial constraints, while the latter 
might carry a significant size effect ("high costs" should be 
normalized by a firm's assets but this is not possible since this 
the variable of interest is ordinal); 
Financial constraints 
() 
 FC is collapsed into a binary variable of whether or not firms 
report financial constraints; 
 
Other barriers to 
innovate, namely: 
 
Employee 
qualification 
(B_TRAB) 
Binary variable that indicates lack of qualified personnel as a 
barrier to innovate; 
Technology 
information 
(B_TECH) 
 Binary variable that indicates lack of technological information 
as a barrier to innovate; 
 
Market information 
(B_MARK) 
 Binary variable that indicates lack of market information or 
other market-related barriers as a barrier to innovate; 
Potential innovators 
(POT_INNOV) 
 We identify potential innovators, in order to distinguish firms 
that do not innovate (even though they are willing to so) from 
firms that have no intentions to innovate. Potential innovators 
are those firms that innovated (INNOV=1), or attempted to 
innovate (either with an abandoned or ongoing project), or 
reported some kind of obstacle to innovate (either FC or other 
barriers). Conversely, firms that did not innovate and did not 
attempt to do so and reported no obstacles to innovation are 
classified as firms unwilling to innovate. Finally, of the non-
innovating firms (INNOV=0), potential innovators are classified 
as hampered firms. 
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3.4. Other variables 
Real GDP  
growth rate 
(GDP) 
 Obtained from the EUROSTAT. 
Unemployment 
rate 
(U) 
 Obtained from the EUROSTAT. 
Benchmark  
interest rate 
(R) 
 Annualised Euribor and Lisbor at 3 months with adjusted 
Lisbor by the mean difference in common years. We needed to 
compute our own series by joining two series made available by 
the BdP (Euribor for the period after the introduction of the 
Euro and Lisbor for the period before). The same change in 
monetary policy decision making, that accompanied the 
introduction of the Euro led to significant difficulties in finding 
comparable benchmark interest rates for the periods before and 
after 2000. Accordingly we focus on the interbank interest rate. 
Additionally we focus on the 3 months rate in order to avoid 
capturing the expectations incorporated in longer period rates. 
such as 1 year. 
 
 All continuous variables of interest were winsorized at 1% level in order to avoid 
problems with outliers in the estimation procedures. Deflators used include the Industrial 
Production Price Index and Labour Cost Index, both drawn from INE, and the GDP deflator, 
drawn from the Portuguese Central Bank (BdP). Nevertheless, no deflators were used when a 
variable was constructed as a ratio of two nominal values (normalized). In such cases we 
assume that the price growth rates are homogeneous. 
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4. Key for sector and industry disaggregation 
This Section provides the key for the sector and industry disaggregation codes. The 
classification results from the adaptation of the Portuguese classification system appropriate 
for the time span of analysis (CAE- Rev. 2.1) to the international classification system 
provided by the United Nations Statistics Division. We excluded agriculture, hunting and 
forestry, fishing and financial intermediation on purpose. The disaggregation level also takes 
into account the number of available observations, since in some cases further disaggregation 
would cause serious estimation problems. 
 
C - Mining and quarrying  
CA  
 
10 - Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 
 
11 - Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service 
activities incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding 
surveying 
 
12 - Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
CB  
 
13 - Mining of metal ores 
 
14 - Other mining and quarrying 
 
 
D - Manufacturing   
DA  
 
15 - Manufacture of food products and beverages 
 
16 - Manufacture of tobacco products 
DB  
 
17 - Manufacture of textiles 
 
18 - Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of 
fur 
DC  
 
19 - Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of 
luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
DD  
 
20 - Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and 
cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 
DE  
 
21 - Manufacture of paper and paper products 
 
22 - Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
DF  
 
23 - Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 
DG  
 
24 - Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
DH  
 
25 - Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 
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DI  
 
26 - Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
DJ  
 
27 - Manufacture of basic metals 
 
28 - Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
DK  
 
29 - Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
DL  
 
30 - Manufacture of office, accounting and computing 
machinery 
 
31 - Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 
n.e.c. 
 
32 - Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
 
33 - Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 
DM  
 
34 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
 
35 - Manufacture of other transport equipment 
DN  
 
36 - Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
 
37 - Recycling 
E - Electricity, gas and 
water supply  
 
 
40 - Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
 
41 - Collection, purification and distribution of water 
 
 
F - Construction   
 
45 - Construction 
 
 
Services  
G - Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household 
goods  
 
 
50 - Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
 
51 - Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
 
52 - Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
repair of personal and household goods 
H - Hotels and restaurants   
 
55 - Hotels and restaurants 
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I - Transport, storage and 
communications  
 
 
60 - Land transport; transport via pipelines 
 
61 - Water transport 
 
62 - Air transport 
 
63 - Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities 
of travel agencies 
 
64 - Post and telecommunications 
K - Real estate, renting 
and business activities  
 
 
70 - Real estate activities 
 
71 - Renting of machinery and equipment without operator 
and of personal and household goods 
 
72 - Computer and related activities 
 
73 - Research and development 
 
74 - Other business activities 
M - Education   
 
80 - Education 
N - Health and social work   
 
85 - Health and social work 
O - Other community, 
social and personal service 
activities  
 
 
90 - Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar 
activities 
 
91 - Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. 
 
92 - Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 
 
93 - Other service activities 
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CHAPTER V – MEASURING FIRMS’ FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS THROUGH 
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis, the severest since 1920's Great Depression, has showed that the 
study of the impact of financial constraints upon firm dynamics needs further attention of 
researchers. In fact, despite economic theory provides some insights on the causes and effects 
of financial constraints, empirical literature has struggled to find consistent measures of these 
constraints (c.f. Chapters I and II). Firms have both internal and external forms of financing 
their operational and investment activities. Even if we abstain from thinking in terms of 
opportunity costs, obtaining funds externally requires a premium to be paid, which is 
associated with the risk that external investors have to bear when they decide to lend. Thus, 
the existence of information asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984) 
sets a wedge between the costs of internal and external sources of finance, creating a financial 
hierarchy and aggravating the constraints faced by firms (Chapter I). 
 The purpose of this Chapter is threefold: (i) identify and measure the level of financial 
distress faced by firms; (ii) identify the group(s) of firms that suffer the most with financial 
constraints by distinguishing them according to their characteristics; (iii) compare and 
evaluate the results obtained using two distinct frameworks to analyse financial constraints. 
To accomplish this task, and in line with the methodologies described in Chapter II, we 
proceed in two steps. First we perform an a priori classification of firms into financially 
constrained and unconstrained based on their characteristics and financial information 
available from our dataset. Second, we estimate two empirical models from different 
approaches, in order evaluate the level of such constraints across groups of firms. The use of 
different approaches will also allow us to draw conclusions on the consistency, advantages 
and disadvantages of some of the methodologies described in Chapter II. To conduct our 
empirical test we use an unbalanced panel of Portuguese firms covering the period 1996-2004 
(see Chapter V for details). 
 Making use of investment literature, we will resort to an investment accelerator 
model, within Bond et al. (2003a) framework, in order to estimate the sensitivity of 
investment to cash-flow (ICFS), the traditional measure of financial constraints. Meanwhile, 
we borrow some insights from recent literature on liquidity demand to estimate the sensitivity 
of cash stocks to cash-flow (hereafter CCFS), a relatively new approach to measure financial 
86 
 
constraints proposed by ACW (Almeida et al., 2004). Additionally, we also evaluate the 
interesting Size and Age index (hereafter SA index) of financial constraints suggested by 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Our results, while supporting previous literature on the inverse 
relationship between size, dividend policy and financial constraints, they cast some doubts on 
previously devised relationships between age and the level of constraints. Finally, we 
question the direct use of the SA index to sort firms according to their constraints. 
 This Chapter is rather original in the sense that: (i) it explores a recent methodology to 
measure financial constraints (CCFS) that, although appearing useful and consistent, to our 
knowledge has barely been used yet; (ii) it tests a new way of classifying firms by their level 
of financial distress (SA index), that, as far as we know, has not yet tested; (iii) it is the first 
to explore this dataset to analyse financial constraints for the Portuguese economy—only a 
few works have investigated financial constraints in Portugal, but with different datasets and 
methodologies (Cabral and Mata, 2003; Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006; Silva, 2011b). 
 The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 will summarize the existent literature 
on financial constraints. In Section 4 we describe the empirical methodology followed, while 
Section 5 presents the main results. Finally, Section 6 pulls the pieces together and concludes.  
 
2. Measuring financial constraints  
As mentioned in Chapter I, financial constraints is a rather abstract concept since it cannot be 
directly observable. In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a clear-cut definition. Perhaps 
due to this abstract nature of the concept, there is no clear methodology to determine financial 
constraints. Many researchers still devote their time in trying to find a method to identify and 
quantify this directly unobservable relationship (see Chapter II for an overview). However, 
such measures are usually built on fragile relationships and proxies for financial constraints 
(see Chapter III). 
 Considerable debate surrounds the best measure to use in the analysis of financial 
constraints. Since the seminal work of FHP (Fazzari et al., 1988), that introduced Investment-
Cash Flow Sensitivities (ICFS) as way to measure such constraints, several researchers have 
tried to develop consistent measures of financial constraints (Chapter II). Some derive a 
reduced form Euler equation from a structural model and check if parameter restrictions are 
met. If not, then for a certain sample, there is evidence for the presence of constraints (e.g. 
Whited, 1992, Harhoff, 1998). However, this methodology does not allow to measure the 
degree to which firms are financially constrained, therefore we will abstain from using it. 
Within the Schumpeterian perspective, tests on the existence of financial constraints—do not 
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dissociate current financial performance from current investment opportunities since they 
might be highly correlated—are rather scarce (Coad, 2010a) and rely mostly on associations 
between growth and a profitability measure (e.g. Bottazzi et al., 2008). Nevertheless, their 
interpretation is made with respect to selection forces and based on the principle of “growth 
of the fitter”—see Chapter II. 
 Recently, analyzing firm’s demand for cash, ACW advance that the level of financial 
constraints can be measured by the sensitivity of cash stock to cash flow. As we have seen 
from the overview of their model in Chapter I and the discussion of the methodology in 
Chapter III, they argue that only constrained firms will manage liquidity to maximize their 
value. The rationale behind is that while constrained firms need to save cash out of cash 
flows in order to take advantage of future investment opportunities, unconstrained firms do 
not, as they are able to resort to external finance. Meanwhile, firms that hold cash incur in 
opportunity costs associated with present investment opportunities. As a result, only 
constrained firms will need to optimize their cash stocks over time, in order to maximize their 
profits and hedge against future shocks. Therefore, one can expect that estimates on the 
sensitivity of cash stocks to cash-flow would be positive and significant for constrained firms, 
while no such relation should be expected for unconstrained ones.  
 To our knowledge, only a few works have used this approach so far. Specifically, Han 
and Qiu (2007) for US publicly traded companies from 1997 to 2002, corroborate this 
finding. However other recent works do not support this view. Pál and Ferrando (2010) found 
that, for Euro-area firms between 1994 and 2003, all firms presented positive and significant 
CCFS. Meanwhile, Lin (2007), for publicly traded Taiwanese firms between 1990 and 2004, 
also finds that, contrary to ACW, both constrained and unconstrained firms present 
significant CCFS but, as expected, such sensitivity is higher for constrained firms. Finally, 
while some authors find that financial development alleviates financial constraints (see 
Chapter III, stylized result 10), Khurana et al. (2005), analyzing firm-level data for 35 
countries between 1994-2002, find that there is a negative association between financial 
development and CCFS providing further evidence that this methodology is a useful measure 
of firm’s financial constraints. 
 With respect to classification schemes (see Chapter III), several authors point out 
different variables that can be used to sort and distinguish firms according to their level of 
constraints. Examples of these are (i) dividend payout ratio; (i) firm self evaluation; (iii) cash 
stocks; (iv) degree of leverage; (v) age; (vi) size; (vii) institutional affiliation; (viii) credit 
ratings.  
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 Also building on previous relations found in empirical literature, indexes of financial 
constraints have been advanced. Examples can be found in the KZ index of Lamont et al. 
(2001), the WW index of Whited and Wu (2006) and the index proposed by Musso and 
Schiavo (2008). In particular, the SA (Size and Age) index proposed by Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010) seems to be appealing since it draws on two variables that are “more exogenous” than 
the ones typically used. Additionally, not only it allows for a quadratic (thus non-monotonic) 
relationship to constraints, but it is also of simple implementation. 
 In this Chapter we will use different measures proposed by previous literature in an 
attempt to consistently distinguish financially constrained and unconstrained firms while 
assessing the severity of such constraints. It is clear that no consistent measure of financial 
constraints has yet been developed and the difficulty associated with the abstract concept of 
financial makes it harder to find such a perfect measure. Keeping this caveat in mind, we 
attempt to clarify the financing problems of Portuguese firms and compare different 
approaches to measure constraints. Inferences using this sample, representative of Portuguese 
firms, may be made with respect to, at least, the EU economy (cf. Cabral, 2007). However, 
some specific characteristics of the Portuguese economy must be taken into account. In 
particular, if indeed firms in economies with less developed financial markets suffer from 
more severe financial constraints, then, with respect to, for example the UK economy, firms 
in Portugal are expected to present high levels of financial constraints.  
 
3. Methodology 
In order to investigate the financial constraints faced by Portuguese firms we borrow insights 
from two different approaches: (i) investment demand based on an investment accelerator 
model; (ii) liquidity demand, modelling cash holdings as a function of the sources and uses of 
funds (see Chapter II for more details). 
 
3.1. Model 1—Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
Since the primordial FHP's regression of investment on cash-flow, controlling for investment 
opportunities, researchers have used derivate specifications to estimate ICFS (see Chapter II). 
In particular, Harhoff (1998) following Bond and Meghir (1994) derives an empirical 
equation for the estimation of ICFS based on an accelerator specification: 
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+  +  + , (V. 1) 
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where 	,	is investment for firm i in period t, , beginning of period  total assets, ∆, is 
output growth (measured as sales growth),  , is cash-flow,  are time dummies,  
controls for unobserved firm heterogeneity and , is the error term. 
 This particular accelerator specification has the advantageous feature of not requiring 
the computation of Tobin’s Q (see Chapter IV, Section 3 for a justification of the use of sales 
growth instead of Q). 
 For the estimation of this model we resort to the Arellano-Bond first differences 
estimator that allows us to eliminate firm specific effects, takes into account 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, while allowing for the presence of endogenous 
variables.1 As a result, suitable instruments have to be devised. We use the twice and further 
lagged values of the right handside variables in the equation (until a maximum of 4 lags), 
two-digit industry indicators (CAE.Rev 2.1), variation of interest paid, age, size, a dummy for 
firms that invest in R&D, exports and imports—see Arellano and Bond (1991) for a detailed 
discussion of the estimator and Roodman (2009) for STATA implementation.2 
 
3.2. Model 2—Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
Almeida et al. (2004) construct an alternative model of liquidity demand and derive an 
empirical equation to estimate the sensitivity of cash to cash-flows. In a few words, the model 
is based on constrained versus unconstrained firms’ cash management. If a firm is 
constrained—its internal funds are insufficient to finance all positive net present value 
projects—it has to pass up some investments in the current period in order to be able to 
finance potentially better projects in the future. By being forced to manage liquidity, 
constrained firms will save cash out of cash-flows, while no systematic relationship should be 
found for unconstrained firms (see Chapter I for further detail). The financial nature of the 
cash stock variable is a shield against missmeasurements in Q (sales growth in our case) and 
investment opportunities hidden in cash-flow because it is not expected that firms will 
increase their cash stocks if cash-flow signals a new/better investment opportunity, unless 
they are financially constrained. As a result, we have the following empirical specification: 
∆!, = " +  , + ∆, + !, + , + #∆$%, + 
  +&∆!'()*', +  + ,      (V. 2) 
                                                           
1
 We also use Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix 
2
 Some instruments may vary or be dropped, depending on the classification scheme used. 
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where ∆!, is the variation in cash stocks, !, is a control for firm size (log of total assets), 
∆$%, is the variation of noncash net working capital, ∆!'()*', is the variation of short 
term-debt and , the error term. For the very same reasons stated above, we shall use sales 
growth (∆,) instead of Q as a proxy for investment opportunities. 
 However, we will implement a slight modification to the model. In the spirit of Lin 
(2007), we substitute the variation of short term-debt by the sum of net debt and equity 
issuances (!!,) and interest rate variation (∆$',). The former modification is due to the 
fact that debt and equity issuances, while being a signal of easier access to external funds, 
might have a significant impact upon cash stocks (by accounting procedures), so we control 
for such effect. Additionally, debt issuances might work as a substitute for cash holdings for 
hedging purposes, even though this relation may well depend on the expected intensity of 
cash-flows in the future (Acharya et al., 2007). With respect to the latter, firms may decide to 
reduce their borrowings or pay back debt according to expected interest expenses. However, 
instead of benchmark interest rates variations, we use variations of interest paid, which 
allows for firm variation and thus can also be seen as a form of credit rating. In both 
specifications, all variables are scaled by total assets. Finally, since holding cash may not the 
only form of inter-temporal allocation of capital due to relatively liquid investments (Almeida 
et al., 2011) we also introduce financial investment ( +,,). The augmented empirical 
equation is as follows: 
∆!, = " +  , + ∆, + !, + , + #∆$%, + &!!, 
																																																																																																			+	-∆$', +  +,, +  + ,.(V. 3) 
 The financial and investment covariates are endogenous, so there is a need to estimate 
the model using instrumental variables (GMM) along with fixed effects to take account of 
unobserved firm-level heterogeneity and panel-robust standard errors. The set of instruments 
includes twice lagged cash flow, twice lagged sales growth, lagged investment, lagged 
variation of noncash net working capital, two-digit industry indicators (for overall samples), 
size (measured as number of employees), lagged bond issuance and lagged variation in 
interest payments.3 
  
                                                           
3
 Some instruments may vary or be dropped, depending on the classification scheme used. 
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3.3. Classification Schemes 
For the purpose of comparing both ICFS and CCFS across different groups of firms, we 
perform an a priori classification of firms by their “degree" of financial distress. For this 
purpose we create subsamples by the following firm characteristics that are either generally 
agreed or believed to proxy for financial constraints: size, age (and both, SA index) and 
dividend payment (see Chapter III). However, we refrain from using financial variables to 
sort firms and focus on relatively exogenous variables in order not to incur in regression 
problems resulting from the simultaneous presence of a variable in the estimated equation 
and classification scheme. Still, for the case of CCFS estimation, this simultaneity might be 
present due to the high correlation between S and SIZE, though we take the appropriate 
precautions in order to provide robust results. Finally, the reason to include dividend policy 
as a sorting variable draws from the fact that it is, by large, the most common classification 
scheme used since the seminal work of FHP. 
 
3.3.1. Firm Size 
It is reasonable to expect that smaller firms face more severe financial constraints since such 
firms do not have the reach or visibility that larger firms have, so investors have difficulties 
in screening the quality of projects. As a result, smaller firms tend to be more credit rationed 
(e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1995). As an example, if a firm is large enough to be quoted, 
information with respect to this firm will be widely available. We measure firm size as 
number of employees instead of either sales or assets, since it is expected to be less correlated 
with short-term firm performance, due to the stickiness of the labour force. Accordingly, we 
create an indicator variable DIM that takes values between 1 and 4. The partitions were set at 
50, 100 and 250 employees. These thresholds result from an adjustment of the European 
Commission firm size classification to the specificity of our dataset.4 First, since the 
information reported by firms with less than 20 employees is not reliable, we consider that, 
for the purpose of this Chapter, small firms have between 20-49 employees. Second, the 
threshold 100 employees (in line with OECD standards) allows to distinguish, within the 50-
250 heterogeneous class, medium-small from medium-large firms. Additionally, it deals with 
possible representativeness problems associated with the fact that, in our dataset, firms with 
less than 100 employees are drawn randomly, while for firms with more than 100 employees 
the universe is represented. Finally, we have considered setting the last threshold at 500 
                                                           
4
 European Commission sets upper thresholds at 10, 50 and 250 employees for micro, small and medium 
enterprises, respectively. 
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employees (OECD benchmark), but this would be of no interest since there are only a few 
firms that would enter this upper category in Portugal. Finally, note that this sample partition 
is quite problematic as it is done directly using the variable SIZE (employees) which is highly 
correlated with the covariate S (total assets) in the CCFS regression. 
 
3.3.2. Firm Age 
If a firm has just been created, not much information is available to potential investors. Over 
time, firms tend to build relationships with creditors, banks and investors in general, allowing 
them to obtain external funds in an easier manner as lenders gain some insight in both firms’ 
characteristics and quality. As a result, one should expect that younger firms face more severe 
financial constraints. Accordingly we create an indicator variable AGEq that takes the values 
1, 2, and 3 if a firm is under 10, 10-40, and over 40 years old, respectively. The first threshold 
allows to accommodate the dynamics of entry and exit observed at early years (see for e.g. 
Bellone et al., 2008 for the intensity of the selection process, or Coad, 2010b for departures 
from an exponential distribution of age), thus distinguishing young from mature firms. 
However, a possible relative inertia of older firms (Hannan, 2005) or even a change in firm 
objectives, led us to define an upper class of old firms.5 Still, different specifications were 
tested in order to provide robust results. 
 
3.3.3. The SA index 
The previous two variables (size and age) seem particularly appealing since they are 
somewhat “more exogenous” than other variables. In fact, in a recent work, Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010) develop an index of constraints based on these two proxies. The index is 
constructed as follows: 
	SA = −0.737 ∗ Size + 0.043 ∗ Size − 	0.040 ∗ Age (V. 4) 
where, Size is firm’s size measured as log of inflation-adjusted assets and Age is the number 
of years with stock price listed on their Compustat database. However, we will measure Age 
by the number of years in activity in order to avoid sample selection bias—firms that are 
publicly traded face lower constraints. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) report a flattening of the 
relation above the 95th percentile and cap those observations. We opt to winsorize them at 
the top 5% in order to get an approximation to their measure while not losing too much 
                                                           
5
 Coad (2010b) argues that old firms are older than expected by the exponential benchmark possibly due to a 
shift from a profit-maximization behaviour to a risk-averse policy of long lasting survival. 
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information.6 Note that they use quoted firms which are usually larger/older. Finally we split 
the sample according to terciles, as suggested, classifying the top (bottom) firms as 
financially constrained (unconstrained). However, one must bear in mind that this index is 
constructed upon a variable S that is a covariate in the CCFS regression.7 
 
3.3.4. Dividend policy 
We will also resort to the primordial classification scheme in FHP based on dividend 
payment since, despite arguable, firms that pay dividends are expected not to be constrained. 
Thus, we compute dummies that equal 1 if a firm has pays dividends and 0 otherwise. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the selected variables, used in the estimation of Model 
(1), for the global sample and by classification scheme subsamples. Both means and standard 
deviations are reported. An interesting pattern that can be observed is that mean investment 
decreases with firm age. In other words, older firms tend to invest less than younger firms. A 
symptom of financial constraints might emerge from the comparison of firm's dividend 
policy, since firms that pay dividends have, on average, lower cash-flows than firms that do 
not pay dividends and so, the former are possibly retaining less funds than the latter. 
Furthermore, smaller firms exhibit lower output growth while younger firms' output growth is 
larger than older firms'. Table 2 reports the same statistics for the estimation of Model (2). In 
addition to the patterns previously discerned, younger firms, on average, have larger cash-
flows, while both smaller and younger firms have lower financial investments, as expected. 
 
                                                           
6
 We tested the construction of the index with capped variables above the 95th centile but results do not differ 
significantly. 
7
 Note that since size and age are usually highly correlated, size might capture part of the relation between age 
and constraints and vice versa. The inclusion of both (which is the case of Hadlock and Pierce's, 2010 index) 
might result in one of the variables "killing" the explanatory power of the other. The Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient between the two is 0.1629, significant at 1%. 
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Table V.1. Summary statistics of Model (1) variables 
Variables 
Total Size classes Age classes SA index Dividend payment 
[20;50[ [50;100[ [100;250[ [250;+ [ [0;10[ [10;40[ [40;+ [ 1st tercile 2nd terciles 3rd tercile No Yes 
,/, 0.0750 0.0731 0.0743 0.0740 0.0726 0.0940 0.0735 0.0705 0.0721 0.0730 0.0722 0.0810 0.0732 
 (0.108) (0.114) (0.107) (0.100) (0.095) (0.136) (0.104) (0.107) (0.111) (0.098) (0.101) (0.106) (0.118) 
,/, 0.0867 0.0826 0.0865 0.0877 0.0900 0.1052 0.0858 0.0797 0.0798 0.0851 0.0894 0.0985 0.0817 
 (0.119) (0.124) (0.118) (0.111) (0.112) (0.141) (0.115) (0.115) (0.117) (0.113) (0.120) (0.121) (0.124) 
∆, 0.0410 0.0237 0.0355 0.0372 0.0775 0.0864 0.0357 0.0283 0.0134 0.0368 0.0601 0.0512 0.0409 
 (0.280) (0.297) (0.260) (0.258) (0.259) (0.374) (0.274) (0.231) (0.284) (0.282) (0.255) (0.258) (0.309) 
∆, 0.0627 0.0436 0.0616 0.0621 0.1081 0.1269 0.0581 0.0439 0.0282 0.0593 0.0839 0.0983 0.0527 
 (0.285) (0.302) (0.275) (0.262) (0.279) (0.367) (0.280) (0.234) (0.295) (0.291) (0.263) (0.249) (0.321) 
 ,/, 0.0947 0.0914 0.0952 0.0945 0.1015 0.1088 0.0948 0.0835 0.0835 0.0969 0.0985 0.1085 0.0719 
 (0.094) (0.096) (0.089) (0.090) (0.095) (0.116) (0.089) (0.093) (0.103) (0.086) (0.090) (0.078) (0.122) 
 ,/, 0.1020 0.0995 0.1026 0.1029 0.1078 0.1140 0.1031 0.0897 0.0912 0.1055 0.1049 0.1211 0.0715 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.089) (0.090) (0.097) (0.112) (0.090) (0.091) (0.100) (0.087) (0.091) (0.076) (0.121) 
              
Observations 18,359 5,206 4,382 4,831 2,402 1,611 12,830 3,212 4,434 5,088 7,278 7,483 4,562 
Number of firms 6,242 2,308 1,726 1,597 751 854 4,481 1,158 1,709 2,056 2,443 3,423 2,399 
Notes: Both total sample and subsamples’ mean values of the main variables used to estimate equation (1) are reported. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. 
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Table V.2. Summary statistics of Model (2) variables 
Variables 
Total Size classes Age classes SA index Dividend payment 
[20;50[ [50;100[ [100;250[ [250;+ [ [0;10[ [10;40[ [40;+ [ 1st tercile 2nd terciles 3rd tercile No Yes 
∆!, 0.0025 0.0029 0.0019 0.0018 0.0042 0.0053 0.0017 0.0032 0.0007 0.0017 0.0038 0.0023 0.0027 
 (0.062) (0.068) (0.059) (0.057) (0.062) (0.074) (0.061) (0.056) (0.070) (0.061) (0.056) (0.062) (0.062) 
 , 0.0850 0.0840 0.0861 0.0840 0.0876 0.0939 0.0851 0.0773 0.0733 0.0883 0.0888 0.0975 0.0703 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) (0.091) (0.106) (0.084) (0.089) (0.103) (0.082) (0.082) (0.071) (0.104) 
∆, 0.0368 0.0264 0.0363 0.0347 0.0689 0.0706 0.0329 0.0239 0.0023 0.0324 0.0622 0.0539 0.0166 
 (0.288) (0.304) (0.277) (0.279) (0.283) (0.370) (0.279) (0.236) (0.305) (0.299) (0.264) (0.270) (0.306) 
!, 15.5388 14.6337 15.3970 15.9331 17.2862 15.5348 15.4930 15.7251 14.3472 15.2424 16.5721 15.5811 15.4890 
 (1.448) (1.119) (1.036) (1.151) (1.578) (1.789) (1.338) (1.532) (1.068) (1.021) (1.170) (1.377) (1.526) 
, 0.0629 0.0617 0.0637 0.0639 0.0621 0.0719 0.0617 0.0601 0.0601 0.0635 0.0625 0.0674 0.0575 
 (0.081) (0.085) (0.082) (0.079) (0.075) (0.094) (0.078) (0.081) (0.084) (0.080) (0.080) (0.082) (0.080) 
∆$%, -0.0478 -0.0415 -0.0465 -0.0530 -0.0551 -0.0535 -0.0459 -0.0506 -0.0537 -0.0444 -0.0440 -0.0430 -0.0534 
 (0.166) (0.178) (0.164) (0.159) (0.155) (0.195) (0.162) (0.154) (0.187) (0.164) (0.151) (0.148) (0.185) 
!!, 0.0349 0.0326 0.0362 0.0325 0.0431 0.0304 0.0366 0.0317 0.0237 0.0309 0.0453 0.0412 0.0274 
 (0.209) (0.214) (0.206) (0.209) (0.203) (0.246) (0.205) (0.193) (0.206) (0.204) (0.214) (0.192) (0.228) 
∆$', -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0009 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
 +,, 0.0391 0.0262 0.0344 0.0442 0.0705 0.0277 0.0387 0.0502 0.0262 0.0324 0.0542 0.0418 0.0359 
 (0.088) (0.076) (0.082) (0.089) (0.116) (0.081) (0.087) (0.100) (0.071) (0.081) (0.102) (0.090) (0.086) 
              
Observations 17,283 5,688 4,549 4,817 2,229 2,480 11,837 2,966 4,537 5,359 7,003 9,351 7,932 
Number of firms 4,771 1,591 1,289 1,292 599 689 3,259 823 1,254 1,509 1,949 2,670 1,864 
Notes: Both total sample and subsamples’ mean values of the main variables used to estimate equation (2) are reported. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. 
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 Tables 3 and 4 present the correlations and its significance levels across the main 
variables used for the ICFS and CCFS estimations, respectively. It is possible to observe that 
correlations are significant for most variables used in both Model (1) and (2). Exceptions are 
the small and non-significant correlations between cash stock variation and both size (total 
assets) and variation of interest paid for Model (2). Still for the same model, negative 
correlations between cash stock variation and both investment and non-cash net working 
capital are as expected as they are demands and not sources of cash. Finally, the correlation 
between cash-flow and debt and equity issuances is negative possibly indicating that either 
when there is a shortage in internal funds, firms resort to issuances or, on the contrary, when 
firms have large cash flows they use them to reduce debt. 
 
 
Table V.3. Correlation matrix of Model (1) variables 
Variables ,/, ,/, ∆, ∆,  ,/,  ,/, 
,/, 1.0000      
,/, 0.4763*** 1.0000     
∆, 0.1558*** 0.1138*** 1.0000    
∆, 0.1373*** 0.1434*** 0.1537*** 1.0000   
 ,/, 0.3234*** 0.3066*** 0.2420*** 0.1941*** 1.0000  
 ,
/, 
0.3347*** 0.3160*** 0.0676*** 0.2172*** 0.7632*** 1.0000 
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients with Sidak-adjusted significance level. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table V.4. Correlation matrix of Model (2) variables 
Variables ∆!,  , ∆, !, , ∆$%, !!, ∆$',  +,, 
∆!, 1.0000         
 , 0.0829*** 1.0000        
∆, 0.1181*** 0.2393*** 1.0000       
!, -0.0017 -0.0546*** 0.0389*** 1.0000      
, -0.0276*** 0.3203*** 0.1594*** -0.0189 1.0000     
∆$%, -0.2525*** 0.0052 0.0246*** 0.0523*** -0.2827*** 1.0000    
!!, 0.1107*** -0.1438*** 0.1739*** 0.0440*** 0.2041*** 0.0355*** 1.0000   
∆$', -0.0087 -0.0745*** 0.1245*** 0.0163 0.0874*** -0.0135 0.2126*** 1.0000  
 +,, -0.0221*** -0.0740*** -0.0322*** 0.4047*** -0.0407*** 0.0027 0.0067 -0.0017 1.0000 
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients with Sidak-adjusted significance level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively. 
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4.2. Overall sample estimation 
The regression of Model (1) reports a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow (0.32), 
significant at the 5% level, as it is shown in Table 5. This means that Portuguese firms, on 
average, increase their investment in 32 cents for each euro of extra cash flow, illustrative of 
the financial distress faced by such firms. We test for the overall significance of the regression 
obtaining a highly significant Wald test statistic (309.7). For the purpose of comparison, just 
as mere examples since such estimates result from different sample types—e.g. quoted or 
non-quoted firms, firms with more than 100 or 250 employees, inter alia—and different 
economic realities, Harhoff (1998) for Germany obtains a 0.314 estimate on ICFS, while 
Bond et al., find ICFS of -0.055, -0.033, 0.180 and 0.520 for Belgium, France, Germany and 
UK, respectively. 
 Meanwhile, as expected, the regression of Model (2) reports positive and significant 
sensitivities of cash to cash-flow confirming that, in general, Portuguese firms face financial 
constraints. As it is shown in Table 6, coefficients reported on cash flow are significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level for the total sample. The reported R-squared (0.18) is 
within the usual in these models. The estimated CCFS is 0.1843, meaning that Portuguese 
firms, on average, save 18 cents out of each euro of extra cash flow which is symptomatic of 
the presence of financial constraints. As an example of benchmark CCFS values, ACW, for a 
sample of COMPUSTAT manufacturing firms and based on size as a-priori classification, 
find CCFS estimates of 0.3836 for constrained firms and 0.0364 for unconstrained ones. With 
respect to firm age, Lin (2007), for Taiwan, finds that coefficients vary from 0.197 to 0.409 
for constrained firms and from -0.104 to -0.026 for unconstrained ones, depending on the 
regression technique. 
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Table V.5. Model 1-Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation 
Variables 
Total Size classes Age classes SA index  Dividend payment 
 [20;50[ [50;100[ [100;250[ [250;+∞[ [0;10[ [10;40[ [40;	+∞ [ 1st tercile 2nd terciles 3rd tercile No Yes 
,/, 0.1388*** 0.1239*** 0.1334*** 0.0903*** 0.0758** 0.1288* 0.1224*** 0.0452 0.0834** 0.1007*** 0.1486*** 0.1654*** 0.1484*** 
 (0.015) (0.032) (0.029) (0.026) (0.034) (0.077) (0.021) (0.040) (0.033) (0.026) (0.027) (6.089) (4.340) 
∆, 0.0633** -0.0122 -0.0103 0.0381 0.0246 0.0858** 0.0377 0.0640 0.0135 0.0059 -0.0242 0.0619 -0.0352 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.044) (0.028) (0.047) (0.039) (0.023) (0.033) (1.449) (-0.895) 
∆, -0.0009 0.0032 -0.0069 0.0038 0.0099 0.0018 -0.0027 -0.0050 0.0021 0.0043 -0.0012 -0.0050 0.0163 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.018) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (-0.643) (1.434) 
 ,/, 0.3195** 0.3174* 0.0432 -0.1276 0.1033 0.1580 0.2047 0.4209** 0.5666*** 0.1518 0.3028 0.9711*** 0.1525 
 (0.134) (0.191) (0.144) (0.171) (0.177) (0.211) (0.178) (0.185) (0.161) (0.177) (0.223) (3.059) (1.182) 
 ,/, 0.0805 0.0102 0.0351 0.1961** 0.0102 -0.0886 0.0094 0.1683 0.0705 -0.0530 0.0659 -0.1712 0.0001 
 (0.054) (0.073) (0.067) (0.088) (0.113) (0.159) (0.067) (0.105) (0.084) (0.101) (0.114) (-1.097) (0.001) 
              
Observations 18,359 5,206 4,382 4,831 2,402 1,612 13,373 3,374 4,434 5,088 7,278 7,483 4,562 
Number of 
firms 
6,242 2,308 1,726 1,597 751 854 4,652 1,220 1,709 2,056 2,443 3,423 2,399 
AR(2) p-value 0.998 0.114 0.426 0.664 0.737 0.770 0.726 0.448 0.387 0.509 0.599 0.752 0.0887 
Hansen chi2 
p-value 0.395 0.0281 0.934 0.0133 0.908 0.0496 0.0666 0.268 0.187 0.203 0.796 0.725 0.351 
Wald Chi2 309.7 26.67 132.9 71.55 99.62 46.02 375.8 34.53 43.26 88.84 223.4 161.5 42.74 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Year dummies are included in all 
regressions. 
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Table V.6. Model 2-Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation 
Variables 
Total Size classes Age classes SA index Dividend payment 
[20;50[ [50;100[ [100;250[ [250;+∞[ [0;10[ [10;40[ [40;	+∞ [ 1st tercile 2nd terciles 3rd tercile No Yes 
 , 0.1843*** 0.2831*** 0.1665*** 0.1212*** 0.1221*** 0.1978*** 0.1939*** 0.1213*** 0.2461*** 0.2491*** 0.0637** 0.2246*** 0.1278*** 
 (0.017) (0.035) (0.035) (0.027) (0.036) (0.048) (0.020) (0.041) (0.031) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) 
∆, 0.0149*** 0.0129** 0.0152*** 0.0193*** 0.0022 0.0177** 0.0113*** 0.0283*** 0.0242*** 0.0109** 0.0072 0.0120*** 0.0150*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
!, 0.0148*** 0.0172** 0.0161** 0.0120** 0.0114 0.0126 0.0165*** 0.0065 0.0291*** 0.0103 0.0083 0.0120** 0.0049 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
, -0.2193*** -0.2591*** -0.2051*** -0.1834*** -0.2136***-0.2126*** -0.2359*** -0.1494*** -0.2363*** -0.2484*** -0.1772*** -0.2995*** -0.1666*** 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.032) (0.031) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) 
∆$%, -0.1491*** -0.1712*** -0.1252*** -0.1338*** -0.1617***-0.1386*** -0.1593*** -0.1091*** -0.1667*** -0.1667*** -0.1272*** -0.1949*** -0.0981*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
!!, 0.0793*** 0.1068*** 0.0686*** 0.0613*** 0.0694*** 0.0622*** 0.0846*** 0.0705*** 0.0925*** 0.0932*** 0.0592*** 0.1138*** 0.0527*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
∆$', -0.2101** -0.3726** 0.1457 -0.2097 -0.4117 -0.3953 -0.2102* -0.0472 -0.4096** -0.0469 -0.1326 -0.1377 -0.1456 
 (0.094) (0.161) (0.182) (0.167) (0.285) (0.271) (0.111) (0.215) (0.185) (0.188) (0.148) (0.142) (0.166) 
 +,, -0.1290*** -0.2685*** -0.1065** -0.1045*** -0.1096*** -0.0736 -0.1430*** -0.1041*** -0.1353*** -0.2142*** -0.0960*** -0.1284*** -0.1287*** 
 (0.018) (0.050) (0.047) (0.026) (0.028) (0.046) (0.021) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.022) (0.025) (0.037) 
              
Observations 15,277 4,586 4,051 4,531 2,109 2,047 10,609 2,621 3,762 4,369 6,241 7,180 4,774 
Number of 
firms 
4,771 1,591 1,289 1,292 599 689 3,259 823 1,254 1,509 1,949 2,670 1,864 
Hansen chi2 
p-value 
0.289 0.158 0.246 0.404 0.138 0.663 0.372 0.266 0.760 0.700 0.784 0.145 0.872 
R-squared 0.184 0.253 0.154 0.158 0.185 0.175 0.203 0.141 0.229 0.207 0.140 0.251 0.129 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Year dummies are included in all 
regressions.  
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 Note that quite high coefficients on cash-flow may arise from three different reasons. 
First, equation (3) used to estimate Model (2) is somewhat close to an accounting identity so 
sensitivities might be overestimated. Second, for both Models, due to the relative 
underdevelopment of Portuguese financial markets, one would expect that firms operating in 
Portugal would face severe financial constraints. Finally, sales growth might not be capturing 
investment opportunities, since its use as a proxy is questionable. As a result, especially for 
Model (1), coefficients on cash-flow may possibly be overestimated. 
 
4.3. Classification schemes 
4.3.1. Size 
Both estimators used to measure financial constraints provide evidence that there is an 
inverse relationship between firm size and financial constraints. With respect to ICFS 
analysis, as it is shown in Table 5 (columns 2-5), those seem to affect only the smallest firms 
(with less than 50 employees), that invest 32 cents out of an extra euro of cash flow 
(significant at the 10% level). On the other hand, the estimates on ICFS for larger firms are 
not statistically different from zero, indicating that such firms do not suffer from financial 
distress. As to CCFS analysis (see columns 2-5 of Table 6), besides reporting a descending 
trend, coefficients on cash-flow for the subsamples of firms with less than 50 employees, 
between 50 and 100 employees and between 100 and 250 employees (0.28, 0.17 and 0.12, 
respectively) are all significant at the 1% level. This indicates that we might be in presence of 
a negative relationship between size and financial constraints. Note that there is a potential 
bias caused by the correlation between DIM (classes of firms by employees) and the 
covariate S (log total assets). We tested an alternative regression excluding S but the 
interpretation of results remains unchanged.8  
In order to confirm these findings, we estimated the same regressions of Models (1) 
and (2), but this time including an interaction term of cash-flow and the variable of interest—
Size in this case. Even though we can not interpret the magnitude of the estimates, their sign 
provides useful information. As we can see from Tables 7 and 8 (column 1), while it is not 
totally clear that financial constraints are lower for larger firms using ICFS—the interaction 
term is negative, but not statistically different from zero—, the result is quite straightforward 
using CCFS—larger firms have significantly lower financial constraints.  
                                                           
8
 With respect to the CCFS estimates, these are slightly lower for the second and third size group (0.1515 and 
0.1091, respectively) for the third group. The same coefficient for the top and bottom groups remains 
unchanged, as do so significance levels for all groupings. 
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4.3.2. Age 
With respect to age, we do not find a clear pattern that links age to financial constraints. 
Whilst the estimates on ICFS by age groups renders us a puzzle, since we would not expect 
higher sensitivities for older firms, as we can see in Table 5 (columns 6-8). Additionally, very 
old firms' investment seems not to react neither to investment opportunities, nor to previous 
investment, which adds to the argument that possibly these firms are either "inert" or have 
different objectives. On the other hand, the results for Model (2) regression suggest an 
inverse relationship between age and constraints, as one can observe in Table 6 (columns 6-
8). While for the oldest firms, cash-flow appears to have a relatively small impact on cash 
stocks (estimated coefficient is 0.12), the opposite is true for young and relatively mature 
firms, that save 20 and 19 cents out of every euro of extra cash-flow, respectively. 
 Introducing interaction terms reveals that neither interaction coefficient is statistically 
different from zero (Tables 7 and 8, column 2). Nevertheless, we should point that while 
using ICFS the coefficient is positive, in contrast with the negative sign of the corresponding 
CCFS interaction term. Moreover, we test whether firms that are both small and young (large 
and old) face higher (lower) financial constraints using another interaction term of cash flow 
with both Size and Age. While for the ICFS approach, there is no straightforward conclusion 
due to an insignificant interaction coefficient (Table 7, column 3). the CCFS estimates clearly 
denote higher constraints for smaller and younger firms (Table 8, column 3) 
 
4.3.3. SA index 
Our results appear not to support the findings of Hadlock and Pierce (2010), that present the 
SA index as way to sort firms by their degree of financial distress. With respect to investment 
demand, only for the bottom tercile of the SA index, do firms exhibit a statistically significant 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow (0.57), as it is reported in Table 5 (columns 9-11). This 
result is counter-intuitive, since we would expect the most constrained firms (top tercile) to 
exhibit higher and statistically significant ICFS. The same findings are obtained with respect 
to the framework of demand for liquidity. Albeit all grouping regressions report significant 
estimates (at the 1% level), estimates on cash-flow sensitivities drop from 0.25 to 0.64 
respectively for the bottom and middle to the top tercile, as reported in Table 6 (columns 9-
11). The decreasing coefficients reported are against the use of the SA index as a measure of 
financial constraints, since the results are the exact opposite to the ones expected.9  
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 Main issues are not altered by capping age and size (total assets) instead of winsorizing these variables. 
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Table V.7. Model 1-ICFS estimation with interactions 
Variables X≡log(Size) X≡log(Age) X≡log(Size*Age) X≡SA 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
,/, 0.1278*** 0.1073*** 0.1343*** 0.1372*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) 
∆, 0.0813** 0.0710** 0.0565* 0.0515 
 (0.037) (0.030) (0.032) (0.037) 
∆, -0.0074 -0.0080 -0.0045 0.0018 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 ,/, 1.3840 -0.5133 0.9846 -0.2963 
 (1.147) (0.811) (2.057) (0.463) 
 ,/, 0.0342 0.0301 0.0522 0.1236* 
 (0.066) (0.076) (0.080) (0.066) 
B, -0.2287 -0.3184* 0.0171 (Size) 0.0553 
 (0.244) (0.174) (0.044) (0.089) 
   -0.1763 (Age)  
   (0.166)  
     
( ,/,) ∗ B, -0.0974 0.2772 -0.0815 -0.2719 
 (0.108) (0.274) (0.270) (0.198) 
     
Observations 18,359 17,982 17,982 17,982 
Number of firms 6,242 6,031 6,031 6,031 
AR(2) p-value 0.657 0.549 0.928 0.475 
Hansen chi2 p-value 0.527 0.560 0.403 0.745 
Wald Chi2 289.9 457.2 304.0 464.9 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, 
.05, and .10 levels, respectively. Year dummies are included in all regressions. 
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Table V.8. Model 2-CCFS estimation with interactions 
Variables X≡log(Size) X≡log(Age) X≡log(Size*Age) X≡SA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 , 0.3708*** 0.2373*** 0.4280*** 0.0586 
 (0.079) (0.085) (0.110) (0.037) 
B, -0.0186*** -0.0187 -0.0179*** (Size) -0.0096 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.017) 
   -0.0076 (Age)  
   (0.012)  
     
 , ∗ B, -0.0407** -0.0159 -0.0313** -0.0558*** 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.014) (0.016) 
     
∆, 0.0149*** 0.0141*** 0.0142*** 0.0143*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
!, 0.0204*** 0.0158*** 0.0209*** 0.0210** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
, -0.2206*** -0.2168*** -0.2178*** -0.2165*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
∆$%, -0.1500*** -0.1499*** -0.1508*** -0.1504*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
!!, 0.0779*** 0.0782*** 0.0770*** 0.0790*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
∆$', -0.2080** -0.1824* -0.1762* -0.1903** 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095) 
 +,, -0.1419*** -0.1222*** -0.1337*** -0.1290*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
     
Observations 15,277 15,008 15,008 15,008 
Number of firms 4,771 4,661 4,661 4,661 
Hansen chi2 p-value 0.377 0.378 0.449 0.483 
R-squared 0.188 0.185 0.188 0.187 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
.01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Year dummies are included in all regressions. 
 
 
 Note that there is a potential bias caused by the inclusion of S (log total assets) in both 
the regression and classification scheme. Still, we tested an alternative regression excluding S 
but the results do not differ significantly.10 Nevertheless, these results may be due to the 
weight of Size in the index being overestimated, meaning that large firms actually manage 
to get into the top tercile (most constrained firms) due to this positive term, when in fact they 
are not financially constrained. In fact, while for the bottom tercile mean S (SIZE) is 13.90 
(56.12), for the top tercile it is 16.32 (229.32). Furthermore, interaction terms of the index’s 
values with cash-flow carry a negative sign in both ICFS and CCFS regressions (column 4, 
Tables 7 and 8, respectively), even though it is only statistically significant for case of Model 
(2). Therefore, the parameters used in the index calculations appear to be extremely sensitive 
                                                           
10
 With respect to the CCFS estimates, these are 0.2452, 0.2348 and 0.0715 for the bottom, middle and top 
terciles, respectively. The same significance levels remain unchanged for all groupings. 
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to different economic realities and samples used.11 Finally, the mixed results found for age 
subsamples, might also help to explain the inaccurate classification of constraints by the 
index. As a result, although being very intuitive, care must be taken when using this index. In 
particular, if data on firm self-assessment of constraints is available, which unfortunately is 
not our case, then reestimation of the index coefficients is certainly warranted. 
 
4.3.4. Dividend policy 
Dividend policy was the main classification scheme, primarily used to distinguish financially 
constrained from unconstrained firms. Both estimations confirm that dividend policy may be 
used to sort firms into financially constrained and unconstrained, as it is shown in Tables 5 
and 6. First, for Model (1), the pattern is clear since firms that pay no dividends appear to 
invest 97 cents out of every 1 euro of extra cash-flow while the same estimate for firms that 
pay dividends is not statistically significant. Second, CCFS are higher for firms that pay no 
dividends (0.22 against 0.13), both statistically significant and different at the 1% level. 
However, the differences in ICFS are remarkably large, possibly indicating that financial 
constraints measured through the former might be overestimated. It may be possible to argue 
that using ICFS might drive researchers to report firms as financially constrained more often, 
or at a larger degree than it should be expected. 
 Overall, firms appear to be financially constrained in Portugal, which might be due to 
relative underdevelopment of financial markets. However, despite the problems described 
above associated with the estimation of ICFS and the fact that the CCFS test may be 
relatively close to an accounting identity, some patters rose from the data indicating a 
potential inverse relationship between size, dividend policy and financial constraints, while 
rejecting the use of the SA index as a measure of constraints. As to age, the results are mixed 
and should be dealt with caution in order to ascertain if they originate from problems 
associated with the estimations, flawed classification schemes, or even erroneous theoretical 
assumptions. 
  
                                                           
11
 While for our sample mean log of inflation adjusted assets (in millions with benchmark 2000) is 17.788 and 
mean age is 22.494, in Hadlock and Pierce's (2010) sample mean log of inflation adjusted assets (in millions 
with benchmark 2004 and not 2000, even though the inflation difference is residual) is 782.928 and mean age 
(number of years listed in stock market) is 13.923. This may explain such biases in the coefficients, especially in 
size. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
In this Chapter we analyse the financial constraints faced by firms by estimating investment-
cash flow sensitivities and cash-cash flow sensitivities upon a large unbalanced panel of 
Portuguese firms. Additionally we split our sample according to firm's characteristics that are 
believed to be good proxies for financial constraints (size, age and dividend policy) as well as 
resorting to a new index of constraints (SA index) in order to test the validity of such 
classification schemes. 
 Our results, while supporting previous literature on the inverse relationship between 
size, dividend policy and financial constraints, they cast some doubts on previously devised 
relationships between age and the level of constraints. As to the SA index, it is clear that the 
model should be calibrated according to each economic reality in order to provide correct 
constraints classification. 
 This work adds to the discussion over financial constraints both by providing new 
results on the Portuguese (and perhaps also European) economy and by testing and 
comparing the results reached using different methodologies used to measure constraints and 
classify firms by their financial distress. 
 Finally, this Chapter reveals serious difficulties of firms in resorting to external 
finance. Therefore, despite a need for particular analysis of such measures, policies should be 
taken to alleviate firm's financial constraints, in particular, those aimed at firms with smaller 
size. These policies should be discriminative and specially devised for firms with favourable 
growth prospects but financially constrained.  
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CHAPTER VI –DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MANUFACTURING AND SERVICES 
 
1. Introduction 
Service firms have been shown to account for an increasing share of economic activity and to 
greatly contribute to productivity growth (Triplett and Bosworth, 2004). However, although 
financial constraints appear to influence firm growth (e.g. Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006), to 
our knowledge, constraints of service firms were never analysed explicitly. Additionally, the 
recent shortage of financial resources has raised new interest in the impact that such 
constraints have upon firms. In the presence of an inefficient allocation of funds—that 
distorts the growth dynamics of firms—and if firms in different sectors (and particularly 
industries) exhibit different growth potential, then it is certainly important to identify where, 
within the economic structure, are firms most affected by financial constraints. Moreover, 
this distinction is particularly relevant for the literature that relies on the classification of 
certain industries as financially dependent (cf. Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
 It is not clear whether we should expect significant differences in financial constraints 
between and within economic sectors of activity. On one hand, service firms will require, on 
average, a lower initial investment (lower sunk costs) than manufacturing firms, so we should 
expect lower constraints for the former. On the other, for most services, the main input is 
human and not physical capital, at the same time as their output is of an intangible nature, 
both harder to use as collateral when resorting to external finance. Nevertheless, distinct 
patters of constraints should emerge from an industry-level analysis of manufacturing and 
services due to their notable heterogeneity. 
 Therefore, the goal of this Chapter is to test for differences in financial constraints 
between and within manufacturing and service sectors. Particularly, it is in the scope of this 
Chapter to substantiate if previously devised relationships between financial constraints and 
firm size and age hold for economic sector disaggregation (see Chapter III). 
 For that purpose, we employ a recently developed technique to measure financial 
constraints within a framework of demand for cash.1 This methodology, first developed by 
Almeida et al. (2004), relies on the analysis of the sensitivity of variations in cash stocks to 
cash flow (hereafter CCFS) to identify financial constraints. Additionally, we compute an 
adaptation to CCFS of a recently developed firm-specific index, proposed by Hovakimien 
                                                           
1
 For different methodologies to measure financial constraints, see Chapter V, where we analyse the severity of 
such constraints for the whole Portuguese economy. 
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and Hovakimien (2009) (HH index)—compares cash stocks variation time average weighted 
by cash-flow with time average cash stocks variation—and analyse the distribution for the 
different sectors and industries as well as its relationship with size and age. To conduct our 
empirical tests, we use a large unbalanced panel of Portuguese firms covering the period 
1996-2004. 
 We claim that, not only there are clear differences in financial constraints, but most 
importantly, that size and age relationships to constraints depend on the sector being 
analysed, which has serious implications both at academic and policymaking levels. 
Specifically, we find that even though financial constraints are higher for services firms, there 
is a remarkable heterogeneity at the industry level. Additionally, our results suggest that, 
contrary to what is commonly accepted, the relationship between financial constraints and 
either size or age is in general U-shaped, but not robust to sector disaggregation—we only 
find strong evidence of an inverse relationship when it comes to firm age and for the case of 
service firms. 
 This Chapter is the first, as far as we know, to explicitly compare financial constraints 
between and within manufacturing and service sectors. Importantly, we question commonly 
accepted inverse relationships between firm size, firm age and financial constraints, as well 
as the robustness of such relationships to sector disaggregation. Additionally, we combine the 
recently developed HH index of constraints (has only been applied by Guariglia et al., 2010) 
with the CCFS framework, which is novel in the literature. 
 Finally, the importance of this Chapter with respect to policy making seems also 
worthwhile mentioning. While special public programs designed to alleviate financial 
constraints (credit lines, subsidies, tax benefits, among others) typically positively 
discriminate smaller, exporting or new firms, we introduce a new dimension to take into 
account. Namely, we argue that such policies should also accommodate the fact that financial 
constraints are distinct between sectors and highly heterogeneous across industries. 
 The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 makes a brief incursion on the existent 
literature regarding the differences between manufacturing and services, as well as it puts 
forward some hypothesis with respect to financial constraints. In Section 3 we describe the 
empirical methodology followed, while Section 4 presents the main results. Finally, in 
Section 5, we discuss the differences across sectors and industries, while Section 6 pulls the 
pieces together and concludes. 
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2. Recent developments and main hypothesis 
2.1. Services and firms’ financial constraints 
In the last decade, a new wave of empirical research aimed at the study of the service sector 
has emerged, motivated by the growing size and importance of this sector in modern 
economies, on one hand, and the new high-quality data that has become available to 
researchers, on the other. However, there is a lack of research on financial constraints faced 
by service firms, despite the growing body of empirical literature that compares service to 
manufacturing sectors in other areas of research, of which innovation and firm growth are 
just examples. It is argued that a remarkable feature of some service industries is their role in, 
not only providing support to innovation activities in the manufacturing sector—usually 
through outsourcing (Merino and Rodríguez, 2007)—, but also working as technology 
diffusers—see Wong and He (2005) for Singaporean business service firms, Czarnitzki and 
Spielkamp (2003) for Germany or Tether and Metcalfe (2004) for an overview. Conversely, 
differences in innovation activity seem to be greater within than between these sectors, as it is 
shown by Huges and Wood (2000) for the UK or Pires et al. (2008) for Portugal. 
 Regarding firm growth, contrary to manufacturing sector—where Gibrat's Law is 
usually found to be violated (eg. Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003 for US and Oliveira and 
Fortunato, 2008 for Portuguese firms)—for some service industries one can not reject the 
Law of Proportionate Effect—see Piergiovani et al. (2003) for Italian and Audretsch et al. 
(2004) for Dutch hospitality services, Vennet (2001) for a OECD sample of the banking 
industry, or Wilson and Morris (2000) for three out of seven service industries in the UK. The 
rationale is that, compared to manufacturing, some services do not experience fast small firm 
growth in order to reach a survival size threshold (efficient scale), but may in fact remain 
relatively small business (Lotti et al., 2001).2 If financial constrains are more rigorous in 
service firms and particularly in industries that are technology-intensive (e.g. Kukuk and 
Stadler, 2001), then not only firm growth, but also innovation and technological diffusion 
will be severely affected. 
  
                                                           
2
 Interestingly, for the Portuguese case, Oliveira and Fortunato (2008) do not corroborate this findings, despite 
they analyse the aggregate service sector. 
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 From the discussion in Chapter II, it is clear that no consistent measure of financial 
constraints has yet been developed and the abstract nature of the concept adds to the 
difficulty in finding such a perfect measure. Keeping this caveat in mind, we attempt to 
clarify and compare the financing problems of manufacturing and service firms, by resorting 
to the HH index and the estimation of CCFS upon a large unbalanced panel of Portuguese 
firms. Inferences using this sample, representative of Portuguese firms, may be made with 
respect to, at least, the EU economy (cf. Cabral 2007). 
 
2.2. What should we expect? 
Firstly, it is not clear whether significant differences in the severity of financial constraints 
should be found between manufacturing and service sectors. On one hand, service firms will 
require, on average, a lower initial investment (lower sunk costs) than manufacturing firms, 
so we should expect lower constraints for the former. On the other, for most services, the 
main input is human and not physical capital, at the same time as their output is of an 
intangible nature, both harder to use as collateral when resorting to external finance. 
Accordingly, we test the following hypothesis: 
H1: The level of financial constraints is different between sectors 
 
 Secondly, if lenders are not able to correctly assess firms' financial condition through 
the limited information they have and if other than pure financial dimensions have a role in 
explaining financial distress (Bottazzi et al. 2011), then we might expect that, besides 
aggregate sector differences, remarkably distinct industry-level specificities are in line with 
heterogeneous financial constraints across different industries. Therefore, distinct patters of 
constraints should emerge from an industry-level analysis of manufacturing and services: 
H2: Differences in financial constraints are larger within than between 
sectors 
 
 Finally, in line with empirical literature on financial constraints (Chapter III), we 
expect that smaller firms face more severe financial constraints, since such firms do not have 
the reach or visibility that larger firms have, so investors have difficulties in screening the 
quality of projects. The same type of relationship is expected when it comes to firm age, since 
over time firms develop relationships with creditors, who build up knowledge on firms' and 
management quality, reducing information asymmetries. However, differences in the cost 
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structure of manufacturing versus service firms in terms of physical capital (can easily be 
collateralized) and human capital (may lead to larger benefits from learning processes) 
intensities might affect this relationship. Specifically, a clearer inverse relationship between 
size and financial constraints might arise for manufacturing firms in contrast with an inverse 
age relationship for service firms. 
H3: There is an inverse relationship between financial constraints and firm 
size and age, robust to sector disaggregation 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. CCFS 
In order to compare the financial constraints faced by Portuguese manufacturing and service 
firms we borrow insights from a framework of demand for cash. As we have seen in Chapter 
I, ACW (Almeida et al., 2004) construct a model of liquidity demand and derive an empirical 
equation to estimate the sensitivity of cash to cash-flows. They argue that, by being forced to 
manage liquidity, constrained firms will save cash out of cash-flows, while no systematic 
relationship should be found for unconstrained firms. 
 As outlined in Chapter VI, the financial nature of the cash stock variable should, in 
principle, work as a shield against miss-measurements in Q (sales growth in our case) and 
investment opportunities hidden in cash-flow because it is not expected that firms will 
increase their cash stocks if cash-flow signals a new\better investment opportunity, unless 
they are financially constrained. However, Acharya et al (2007) show that financially 
constrained firms will tend to use cash to increase cash stocks if their hedging needs are high. 
Yet, if their hedging needs are low, they will instead use cash to reduce debt. Therefore one 
might find firms whose propensity to save cash out of cash flow is low, even if they are 
financially constrained. Consequently, controlling for investment opportunities is necessary. 
We use sales growth (
,i ty∆ ) instead of Q as a proxy for investment opportunities (see Chapter 
IV, Section 3). In order to deal with the potentially problematic use of sales growth as a 
proxy for investment opportunities we tested the use of forward investment, lead investment 
and forward sales growth (Table A1 in Appendix). However, results do not change 
significantly and this modification implies a great loss of observations.3  
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 Forward investment is 
, 1i tI + , while lead investment is ( ), 1 , 2 ,/i t i t i tI I I+ ++ . There is a huge loss of 5583 or 
9542 observations corresponding to the loss of 1353 or 2635 firms if using forward or lead investment, 
respectively. The same applies to the use of future sales growth (
, 1i ty +∆ ). 
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 In addition to the problems associated with proxying investment opportunities, the 
ACW methodology assumes that cash is the only way to transfer resources across time. In 
fact, in a subsequent paper (Almeida et al. 2011), they point out that since holding cash is not 
the only form of inter-temporal allocation of capital—in the ACW paper they assumed that 
all fixed investment is illiquid—, CCFS may actually be negative for constrained firms 
(Riddick and Whited 2009) since firms may invest in relatively liquid assets, other than cash. 
As a result, we try to control for this effect through investment in non-cash net working 
capital and financial investments. 
 Keeping these caveats in mind, we implement a slight modification to the ACW 
baseline empirical equation (as in Chapter V). In the spirit of Lin (2007), we substitute the 
variation of short term-debt by the sum of net debt and equity issuances (
,i tISS ) and interest 
rate variation (
,i tINT∆ ).Furthermore, we also control for financial investments ( i,tFinI ), that 
not only are a demand for cash but may also work as an alternative way to transfer resources 
across time. The augmented empirical equation is as follows:  
i,t i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t 4 i,t 5 i,t 6 i,t 7 i,tCS = CF + y + S + I + NWC + ISS + INTβ β β β β β β1∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ +
 
8 i,t t i,t + FinI + + , β τ ε
      
(VI. 1) 
where i,tCS∆  is the variation in cash stocks for firm i in period t, i,tCF  is cash-flow, i,tS  is log 
of total assets, i,tI  is investment, i,tNWC∆  is the variation of noncash net working capital, tτ  
are year dummies and i,tε  the error term.
4
 
 The financial and investment covariates are endogenous, so there is a need to estimate 
the model using instrumental variables (GMM) along with fixed effects to take account of 
unobserved firm-level heterogeneity and panel-robust standard errors. The set of instruments 
includes twice lagged cash flow, twice lagged sales growth, lagged investment, lagged 
variation of noncash net working capital, two-digit industry indicators (for overall samples), 
size (measured as number of employees), lagged bond issuance, lagged variation in interest 
payments and lagged financial investments. This specification is particularly useful, since it 
makes use of variables that, for service firms, are easy to obtain and do not entail significant 
measurement problems. 
  
                                                           
4
 With the exception of total assets (S), all variables are scaled by total assets 
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3.2. Size and Age 
Additionally, we will test if size and age, that are generally agreed to work as good proxies 
for financial constraints (Chapter III), are able to provide consistent insights on the degree of 
financial distress of either manufacturing or service firms. 
 As in Chapter V, we measure firm size as number of employees instead of either sales 
or assets. Accordingly, we create four firm size classes, with partitions set at 50, 100 and 250 
employees. With respect to firm age, we create three age classes corresponding to those firms 
younger than 10, between 10 and 40, and over 40 years old—see Chapter V, Section 3.3 for 
further detail on these thresholds. We should note that there is a problem with size and age 
sample partition since either we compute the firm mean values and disregard that such firm 
may move across classes along the time, or we assign the current value which may implicate 
that the same firm is accounted for the estimation of different classes. We opt for the former. 
Moreover, we should point that, for the estimation of CCFS upon these subsamples of firms, 
we drop total assets (S) from the specification due to its correlation with number of 
employees (SIZE). 
 
3.3. CCFS with interacted cash-flow 
In order to provide further insights on the degree of financial constraints upon different 
sectors and industries as well as on the relationship between firm size, age and constraints, 
we test cash-flow interactions with sector, industrial, size class and age class dummies, as 
well as interactions with SIZE, SIZE2, AGE and AGE2.5 Therefore we estimate different 
specifications (corresponding to the different X variables interacted with CF) of the following 
equation: 
i,t i,t 0 2 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t 4 i,t 5 i,tCS = CF + X+ CF X+ y + I + NWC + ISS + a aβ β β β β1∆ ∗ ∆ ∆  
6 i,t 7 i,t t i,t+ INT + FinI + + , β β τ ε∆  (VI. 2) 
  
                                                           
5
 We should note however that when X corresponds to exhaustive sector, industry and class dummies, the term 
i,tCFβ1  is omitted since for such cases i,t i,tCF CFkk X∗ =∑ . Additionally, when X corresponds to dummy 
variables, the term 0Xa  is omitted. 
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3.4. The HH index 
Finally, in order to provide robust findings, we additionally compute the HH index 
(Hovakimien and Hovakimien 2009) and compare it to CCFS estimates. This is a time 
averaged, firm-specific measure that, in the spirit of ICFS, compares the time average of 
investment weighted by cash-flow, against the simple average investment.6 Accordingly, 
investment in years when cash-flow is higher receives a higher weight, which means that if a 
firm invests more (less) in years with higher cash flow, the HH index will turn our positive 
(negative). The reverse is also true. As a result, this measure captures the sensitivity of 
investment with respect to variations of cash-flow. However, in order to avoid extreme 
negative values, all cash-flow observations with negative values are set to zero.7 The index is 
constructed in the following way: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
n
i,t
i i,t i,tt=1 1
i,t1
1
_ =  - , 
n
n
t
t
CF
K I IHH I K KnCF
K
=
=
     ∗      
∑ ∑
∑
 
where CF is cash-flow, I is investment, K is total assets, n the number of annual (t) 
observations for firm i. For methodological consistency, we adapt this index to the CCFS 
framework by substituting investment (I) by variation of cash stocks ( CS∆ ), which yields: 
( )
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( ) ( )
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i,t
i
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1
=  - , 
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     ∆ ∆∗      
∑ ∑
∑
               (VI. 3) 
 The drawbacks of this measure are on one hand the fact that we are only able to 
analyse a cross section of firms and therefore need to additionally compute time averages of 
other variables of interest (such as size and age). On the other hand, this measure does not 
explore marginal effects and the computed levels of the index disregard investment 
opportunities (see D'Espallier et al. 2009 for a critic). We assume that firms saving more 
(less) cash in years of higher cash-flow provides evidence of higher (lower) financial 
constraints—i.e. CCFS correctly identifies constraints. Keeping these caveats in mind, we 
analyse the distribution of the index for different sectors, industries, as well as its relationship 
                                                           
6
 Note that other firm-specific indexes such as for example the KZ index of Lamont et al. (2001) or the SA 
index of Hadlock and Pierce (2009) require either a self assessed measure of constraints or management reports 
to estimate coefficients for the computation of the index, therefore being specific to the dataset used. We have 
no access to such qualitative information. 
7
 This is the same procedure as in Hovakimien and Hovakimien (2009).We also remove firms for which 
investment level is only observed once. 
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with firm size and age. In particular, we test if there is a non-linear relationship between size, 
age and financial constraints through an OLS regression upon: 
i i
2 2
i ii 2 2 iHH = SIZE SIZE + AGE AGE +e ,β θ θ α α1 1+ + +                 (VI. 4) 
where iSIZE  and iAGE  are firm time average values of size (number of employees) and age, 
respectively. The purpose of such analysis is just to capture the relationship between size, age 
and financial constraints. In fact, this is in line with Hadlock and Pierce (2010) approach to 
obtain coefficients for their SA index.8 However, they work with total assets instead of 
number of employees. Still, due to the stickiness of labour force, number of employees is less 
correlated with firms' short-term operating activities. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics of the main variables used in the estimation of 
equations (1)-(2) for the overall sample, as well as for manufacturing and service sectors. A 
striking contrast between both sectors can be seen in the different mean cash stocks 
variation—for manufacturing firms, variation in cash stocks is only about 11% of the 
variation for service firms. Remarkable differences are also found with respect to mean sales 
growth (higher for service firms), number of employers (service firms are larger), as well as 
in terms of age (manufacturing firms are older). In fact, both parametric mean and variance 
equality tests (t and F tests, respectively), as well as the non-parametric two sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Fligner-Policello tests for equality of distributions, strongly reject 
the null hypothesis. Additionally, when we perform these tests for other main variables, only 
for the case debt and equity issuances, variations of interest paid and financial investments, 
we are not able to strongly reject (at 1% level) that differences exist between manufacturing 
and services.9 When we further disaggregate the samples into manufacturing and service 
industries (Tables 1.2 and 1.3, respectively), it is notorious the presence of high heterogeneity 
in terms of all variables analysed, as one might expect due to industrial specificities. 
 
                                                           
8
 They use a logit specification for their qualitative dependent variable. 
9
 The statistics and p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Fligner Policello can be found in Table A5 in the 
Appendix. While the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not require normality, the Fligner-Policello test as the 
advantage of being valid for non-normal distributions with different variances and shape. 
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Table VI.1.1. Summary statistics 
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing Services 
∆, 0.0021 0.0002 0.0043 
 
(0.062) (0.057) (0.068) 
, 0.0842 0.0856 0.0825 
 
(0.089) (0.089) (0.090) 
∆, 0.0365 0.0185 0.0572 
 
(0.288) (0.245) (0.329) 
, 15.5066 15.5314 15.4779 
 
(1.402) (1.325) (1.486) 
	, 0.0622 0.0645 0.0596 
 
(0.081) (0.079) (0.084) 
∆
, -0.0472 -0.0536 -0.0397 
 
(0.167) (0.161) (0.173) 
	, 0.0306 0.0295 0.0320 
 
(0.157) (0.150) (0.164) 
∆	
, -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0005 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
	, 0.0392 0.0366 0.0423 
 
(0.090) (0.082) (0.097) 
SIZE 170.1442 157.0521 185.2585 
 
(490.211) (265.542) (660.256) 
AGE 26.8550 28.0386 25.4886 
 
(17.739) (17.880) (17.476) 
 
   
Observations 15,441 8,274 7,167 
Number of firms 4,255 2,247 2,006 
Notes: Mean values and standard deviations, given in parenthesis, of the 
main variables used to estimate equations (1)-(2). Both total sample and 
sector subsamples’ statistics are reported. 
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Table VI.1.2. Summary statistics for manufacturing firms 
VARIABLES DA DB DC DD DE DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN 
∆, 0.0015 -0.0018 0.0023 -0.0006 0.0014 -0.0002 0.0009 -0.0018 0.0019 0.0030 -0.0024 0.0010 -0.0012 
 
(0.051) (0.059) (0.070) (0.038) (0.056) (0.049) (0.046) (0.052) (0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.078) (0.053) 
, 0.0766 0.0681 0.0667 0.0653 0.1024 0.0984 0.0971 0.1016 0.0930 0.0907 0.1002 0.0986 0.0939 
 
(0.075) (0.097) (0.089) (0.069) (0.100) (0.082) (0.092) (0.087) (0.088) (0.077) (0.083) (0.110) (0.089) 
∆, 0.0263 -0.0243 -0.0557 0.0376 0.0318 0.0582 0.0565 0.0102 0.0445 0.0234 0.0196 0.0499 0.0367 
 
(0.207) (0.261) (0.364) (0.228) (0.135) (0.212) (0.198) (0.173) (0.235) (0.234) (0.345) (0.321) (0.260) 
, 15.8105 15.2284 15.1314 15.5363 15.7878 16.1085 15.7023 15.7575 15.3760 15.2316 15.5302 15.8377 15.1400 
 
(1.302) (1.215) (1.025) (1.360) (1.607) (1.349) (1.143) (1.244) (1.318) (1.163) (1.414) (1.549) (1.202) 
	, 0.0638 0.0566 0.0551 0.0579 0.0768 0.0627 0.0788 0.0770 0.0641 0.0585 0.0654 0.0675 0.0708 
 
(0.078) (0.072) (0.068) (0.079) (0.096) (0.078) (0.084) (0.094) (0.072) (0.072) (0.075) (0.074) (0.086) 
∆
, -0.0503 -0.0659 -0.0541 -0.0377 -0.0616 -0.0458 -0.0595 -0.0704 -0.0439 -0.0422 -0.0405 -0.0578 -0.0451 
 
(0.157) (0.180) (0.186) (0.134) (0.169) (0.141) (0.153) (0.140) (0.158) (0.155) (0.162) (0.148) (0.165) 
	, 0.0334 0.0237 0.0114 0.0403 0.0337 0.0351 0.0401 0.0254 0.0323 0.0234 0.0306 0.0305 0.0342 
 
(0.145) (0.155) (0.162) (0.137) (0.165) (0.136) (0.154) (0.141) (0.152) (0.146) (0.154) (0.174) (0.133) 
∆	
, -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0003 
 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
	, 0.0427 0.0325 0.0266 0.0377 0.0452 0.0535 0.0434 0.0492 0.0293 0.0326 0.0221 0.0324 0.0211 
 
(0.090) (0.075) (0.058) (0.095) (0.092) (0.101) (0.082) (0.098) (0.066) (0.075) (0.065) (0.086) (0.068) 
SIZE 122.6096 182.1056 211.7662 120.8793 147.1787 128.1222 143.2018 152.3623 122.6628 113.9006 263.7255 291.2023 146.6866 
 
(165.478) (185.086) (336.092) (141.323) (202.099) (135.384) (191.388) (166.773) (124.642) (143.691) (715.917) (558.860) (245.298) 
AGE 34.5270 26.3549 23.1403 26.6466 31.2952 32.9467 26.8735 28.2658 26.6501 25.4725 22.7525 24.4868 24.6866 
 
(23.412) (15.596) (10.938) (15.628) (21.184) (19.655) (14.351) (18.482) (17.430) (12.070) (13.813) (14.127) (13.310) 
 
             
Observations 1,368 1,496 385 348 498 450 332 726 866 654 408 341 402 
Number of firms 371 426 103 96 139 122 89 186 232 186 116 89 104 
Notes: Mean values and standard deviations, given in parenthesis, of the main variables used to estimate equations (1)-(2), disaggregated by manufacturing industries. 
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Table VI.1.3. Summary statistics for services firms 
VARIABLES G H I K M N O 
∆, 0.0032 -0.0001 0.0031 0.0102 0.0091 0.0072 0.0030 
 
(0.059) (0.079) (0.062) (0.086) (0.109) (0.073) (0.061) 
, 0.0696 0.0872 0.1051 0.0972 0.1129 0.1108 0.1002 
 
(0.071) (0.098) (0.109) (0.119) (0.115) (0.083) (0.101) 
∆, 0.0508 0.0343 0.0677 0.0899 0.0544 0.0604 0.0523 
 
(0.340) (0.198) (0.299) (0.425) (0.221) (0.140) (0.209) 
, 15.5417 15.8438 16.0435 15.0535 14.2609 14.9290 15.7862 
 
(1.229) (1.697) (1.904) (1.686) (1.324) (1.261) (1.780) 
	, 0.0442 0.0774 0.0953 0.0598 0.1044 0.0898 0.0926 
 
(0.063) (0.110) (0.105) (0.085) (0.120) (0.087) (0.111) 
∆
, -0.0238 -0.0530 -0.0766 -0.0449 -0.0827 -0.0765 -0.0646 
 
(0.152) (0.185) (0.185) (0.214) (0.204) (0.179) (0.185) 
	, 0.0264 0.0332 0.0403 0.0513 0.0197 0.0285 0.0438 
 
(0.152) (0.176) (0.170) (0.193) (0.162) (0.157) (0.199) 
∆	
, -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
	, 0.0365 0.0788 0.0565 0.0474 0.0292 0.0472 0.0277 
 
(0.084) (0.136) (0.118) (0.111) (0.093) (0.107) (0.063) 
SIZE 128.0468 302.1312 364.0069 291.5635 119.8056 96.4388 182.5935 
 
(565.617) (580.197) (1,277.360) (608.387) (156.967) (151.820) (291.911) 
AGE 27.0594 24.9253 27.9241 17.5042 23.4796 23.4895 27.8489 
 
(16.812) (14.753) (21.317) (13.043) (14.530) (9.832) (29.577) 
 
       
Observations 4,206 442 725 960 319 237 278 
Number of firms 1,182 118 206 264 90 66 79 
Notes: Mean values and standard deviations, given in parenthesis, of the main variables used to estimate equations 
(1)-(2), disaggregated by manufacturing industries. 
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 Since most of the variables analysed do not follow a normal distribution, we compute 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficients and the respective confidence intervals (Table 2). 
Significance levels were set at the 1% level and results are robust to Kendall's τ . We find 
that while the association between changes in cash stocks and both cash-flow and sales 
growth is not different between sectors, the association between the former and investment 
(as well as financial investments) is only significantly negative for service firms. 
Nevertheless, the negative correlations between cash stock variation and investment, financial 
investments as well as variations of non-cash net working capital are as expected—they are 
demands and not sources of cash. Moreover, the correlation between cash-flow and debt and 
equity issuances is negative, possibly indicating that either when there is a shortage in 
internal funds firms resort to issuances or, on the contrary, when firms have large cash flows 
they use them to reduce debt. 
Furthermore, whereas for manufacturing firms there is a strongly significant positive 
association between total assets and both cash-flow and investment, this associations are 
negative and strongly significant for the case of services. Additionally, the positive 
association between cash-flow and investment is stronger for the case of manufacturing 
firms. Even though these relations are unconditional (and relatively small for the case of total 
assets), this may well be associated with the different cost structures.  
Finally, when it comes to firm size and age, we should note that even though we find 
a positive and significant correlation coefficient for manufacturing firms, this is not the case 
for service firms. Interestingly, we find no statistical significant association between these 
variables and variation of cash stocks, except for the case of age in the overall sample. 
Surprisingly, while cash-flow is always positively related to size, it is strongly negatively 
related to firm age. 
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Table VI.2. Spearman's rank correlation matrixes for manufacturing and services 
VARIABLES ∆, , ∆, , 	, ∆
, 	, ∆	
, 	, 	, , 
Overall            
∆, 1.00           
,  0.0831* 1.00          
∆, 0.1178* 0.2494* 1.00         
, 0.0009 -0.0292* 0.0464* 1.00        
	, -0.0291* 0.3091* 0.1613* -0.0051 1.00       
∆
, -0.2524* 0.0186 0.0290* 0.0450* -0.2816* 1.00      
	, 0.1260* -0.1668* 0.2028* 0.0519* 0.2288* -0.1576* 1.00     
∆	
, -0.0088 -0.0805* 0.1189* 0.0141 0.0847* -0.0181 0.2268* 1.00    
	, -0.0222 -0.0629* -0.0335* 0.3945* -0.0268* -0.0054 0.0045 -0.0011 1.00   
	, 0.0003 0.0659* 0.0728* 0.5852* 0.1069* -0.0486* 0.0245* 0.0079 0.2434* 1.00  
, -0.0243* -0.0929* -0.1183* 0.1231* -0.0697* 0.0191 -0.0456* -0.0186 0.2417* 0.0647* 1.00 
Manufacturing            
∆, 1.00           
,  0.0834* 1.00          
∆, 0.1173* 0.2782* 1.00         
, 0.0082 0.0520* 0.0648* 1.00        
	, -0.0068 0.3291* 0.1883* 0.0362* 1.00       
∆
, -0.2242* 0.0175 0.0372* 0.0423* -0.2779* 1.00      
	, 0.1049* -0.1712* 0.1735* 0.0228 0.2471* -0.1407* 1.00     
∆	
, -0.0074 -0.0760* 0.1230* 0.0005 0.0836* -0.0099 0.2250* 1.00    
	, 0.0007 -0.0462* -0.0136 0.4364* -0.0243 -0.0077 0.0096 -0.0086 1.00   
	, -0.0041 0.0672* 0.0347* 0.6782* 0.0629* -0.0247 -0.0143 -0.0111 0.3225* 1.00  
, -0.0255 -0.1146* -0.1057* 0.1347* -0.0948* 0.0167 -0.0418* -0.0182 0.2394* 0.1248* 1.00 
Services            
∆, 1.00           
,  0.0862* 1.00          
∆, 0.1153* 0.2324* 1.00         
, -0.0074 -0.1119* 0.0293 1.00        
	, -0.0431* 0.2749* 0.1541* -0.0534* 1.00       
∆
, -0.2860* 0.0302 0.0139 0.0492* -0.2731* 1.00      
	, 0.1447* -0.1619* 0.2292* 0.0805* 0.2159* -0.1755* 1.00     
∆	
, -0.0111 -0.0840* 0.1131* 0.0293 0.0911* -0.0295 0.2284* 1.00    
	, -0.0448* -0.0812* -0.0529* 0.3537* -0.0322* -0.0028 -0.0002 0.0068 1.00   
	, 0.0124 0.0503* 0.1330* 0.5004* 0.1161* -0.0494* 0.0624* 0.0330* 0.1709* 1.00  
, -0.0204 -0.0828* -0.1171* 0.1151* -0.0673* 0.0355* -0.0486* -0.0155 0.2477* -0.0216 1.00 
Notes: Rank correlation coefficients were calculated using Sidak's adjustment. * denotes statistical significance at the .01 level.  
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4.2. Aggregate Manufacturing and Services 
As expected, the regression of equation (1) reports positive and significant sensitivities of 
cash to cash-flow. As it is shown in Table 3 (column 1), coefficients reported on cash flow 
are significantly different from zero at the 1% level for the overall sample. The estimated 
CCFS is 0.154, meaning that Portuguese firms save, on average, 15.4 cents out of each euro 
of cash flow, which is symptomatic of the presence of severe financial constraints. Note that 
quite high coefficients on cash-flow may arise from two different reasons. First, equation (1) 
is somewhat close to an accounting identity so sensitivities might be overestimated. Second, 
due to the relative underdevelopment of Portuguese financial markets, one would expect that 
firms operating in Portugal would face severe financial constraints. 
 The comparison between aggregate manufacturing and service sectors (columns 2 and 
3) indicates that firms operating in the former are not as severely affected by financial 
constraints as firms in the latter. In fact, while manufacturing firms save, on average, 10 cents 
out of each euro of extra cash flow, service firms save 23 cents out of each euro of extra cash 
flow. These estimates are both significant at the 1% level and statistically different at the 1% 
level.10 Another striking difference can be found on the impact of size (assets) on firms' cash 
policy, since only for service firms it is not significant at the 1% level. This may be due to the 
fact that manufacturing firms have an higher minimum efficiency scale and incur in 
significant sunk costs in initial (and subsequent) investment, when compared to service firms. 
Accordingly, the liquidity needs of the former firms are larger. Finally, except for sales 
growth, the impact of the remaining explanatory variables is greater for the case of services, 
meaning that these firms are, in general more cautious with their cash policy than 
manufacturing firms. 
 
                                                           
10
 The reported R-squared statistics are within the usual in these models. See Chapter V for a few benchmark 
CCFS estimates from other studies. 
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Table VI.3. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation for manufacturing and services 
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing Services Overall Manufacturing Services Overall Manufacturing Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
, 0.154*** 0.096*** 0.227*** 0.159*** 0.107*** 0.226*** 0.160*** 0.108*** 0.228*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.032) (0.018) (0.021) (0.032) (0.018) (0.020) (0.032) 
 [0.119;0.189] [0.056;0.135] [0.165;0.290] [0.124;0.194] [0.067;0.147] [0.164;0.288] [0.124;0.195] [0.068;0.148] [0.166;0.291] 
∆, 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.011** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.011** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.011** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
 [0.007;0.019] [0.007;0.024] [0.002;0.019] [0.008;0.021] [0.009;0.026] [0.002;0.020] [0.008;0.021] [0.009;0.026] [0.002;0.020] 
, 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.015** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.016** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.016** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
 [0.010;0.026] [0.012;0.032] [0.003;0.027] [0.008;0.025] [0.009;0.030] [0.003;0.029] [0.008;0.025] [0.009;0.030] [0.003;0.029] 
	, -0.205*** -0.150*** -0.269*** -0.202*** -0.143*** -0.270*** -0.202*** -0.142*** -0.270*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) 
 [-0.228;-0.181] [-0.177;-0.123] [-0.308;-0.230] [-0.225;-0.178] [-0.170;-0.115] [-0.309;-0.231] [-0.225;-0.178] [-0.170;-0.115] [-0.309;-0.230] 
∆
, -0.124*** -0.109*** -0.140*** -0.124*** -0.109*** -0.140*** -0.124*** -0.109*** -0.139*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
 [-0.136;-0.112] [-0.124;-0.094] [-0.159;-0.122] [-0.136;-0.112] [-0.124;-0.094] [-0.158;-0.121] [-0.135;-0.112] [-0.124;-0.094] [-0.157;-0.121] 
	, 0.076*** 0.059*** 0.095*** 0.078*** 0.063*** 0.094*** 0.078*** 0.063*** 0.095*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
 [0.064;0.089] [0.044;0.074] [0.076;0.114] [0.066;0.091] [0.048;0.078] [0.075;0.114] [0.066;0.091] [0.048;0.078] [0.075;0.114] 
∆	
, -0.260*** -0.215* -0.331** -0.126 -0.054 -0.220 -0.126 -0.057 -0.215 
 (0.097) (0.120) (0.155) (0.104) (0.130) (0.166) (0.104) (0.130) (0.166) 
 [-0.450;-0.071] [-0.450;0.021] [-0.635;-0.026] [-0.329;0.077] [-0.308;0.201] [-0.544;0.105] [-0.329;0.077] [-0.311;0.197] [-0.540;0.110] 
	, -0.123*** -0.088*** -0.157*** -0.125*** -0.093*** -0.159*** -0.126*** -0.091*** -0.161*** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.028) (0.018) (0.025) (0.027) (0.018) (0.024) (0.027) 
 [-0.159;-0.086] [-0.136;-0.039] [-0.211;-0.103] [-0.161;-0.089] [-0.141;-0.045] [-0.212;-0.105] [-0.162;-0.090] [-0.139;-0.044] [-0.215;-0.107] 
Dummies          
Year NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Observations 13,874 7,590 6,256 13,874 7,590 6,256 13,874 7,590 6,256 
No. of firms 4,322 2,277 2,043 4,322 2,277 2,043 4,322 2,277 2,043 
Hansen p-val. 0.368 0.206 0.819 0.463 0.430 0.751 0.560 0.455 0.830 
R-squared 0.155 0.125 0.193 0.158 0.131 0.195 0.159 0.132 0.195 
Notes: Regression of equation (1). Robust standard errors in parenthesis; 95% confidence intervals in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and 
.10 levels, respectively. Results do not change significantly with different proxies for investment opportunities (Table A1).  
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 These results are robust to the introduction of year and industry dummies (Table 3, 
columns 4-9). Furthermore, using different proxies for investment opportunities (Table A1 in 
Appendix) results do not change significantly and we still find that the CCFS of 
manufacturing firms is lower than that of services (even though these estimates are 
statistically different only at the 90% level). Moreover, when we test interactions of cash-
flow with sector dummies (equation 2), we also find that both manufacturing and service 
sectors coefficients are positive, significant and larger for services (Table A3 in Appendix, 
column 2). Alternatively, we compute the HH index as in equation (3) and compare the 
distribution for the different sectors (Table 4).11 Firstly, the median and mean are higher for 
the services sample, even though there is larger variation (columns 2-3, line 5 and columns 5-
6, lines 2-3, respectively). Secondly, service firms' HH distribution is more skewed to the 
right, as well as there is an higher percentage of observations above zero—within the CCFS 
interpretation, firms that save more cash in years of higher cash-flows are financially 
constrained—of 54.2% against 52.7% in manufacturing (columns 5-6, lines 4 and 7, 
respectively). Thirdly, even though a formal Mann–Whitney test indicates that manufacturing 
and services medians are not statistically different at any level smaller than 12.54%, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Fligner-Policello tests reject the equality of distributions (column 
4, lines 10, 9 and 11, respectively).12 Finally, a quantile-quantile plot of the HH index values 
for each sector (Figure 1) indicates that the HH distribution for services is more dispersed, 
skewed and, most importantly, it reveals that for positive values of the index (i.e. firms that 
are financially constrained), services' HH distribution seems to dominate the manufacturing's 
HH distribution. On the whole, the comparison of the HH index between these sectors 
suggests that, when present, financial constraints are higher for service firms. 
 Overall, these results provide robust evidence that financial constraints are different 
between manufacturing and service sectors—hypothesis H1 should not be rejected. In fact, 
these constraints are higher for service than for manufacturing firms. 
 
 
                                                           
11
 We validate the use of the adapted HH index to the cash management perspective by testing if, using equation 
(1), CCFS estimation yields higher cash-flow estimates for higher HH levels. There is a clear increase in CCFS 
when we move from lower to higher quartiles of the index (Table A2 in Appendix). Accordingly, we conclude 
that this version of the index correctly identifies CCFS. 
12
 Note that the Fligner-Policello test statistic is 1.532 and the rejection is only at the 10% level. 
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Table VI.4. HH index distribution 
Percentiles Overall Manufacturing Services Statistics Overall Manufacturing Services 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Min -0.1618 -0.1270 -0.1618 Obs. 9112 4406 4706 
1 -0.0226 -0.0180 -0.0251 Mean 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 
5 -0.0065 -0.0051 -0.0078 . . 0.0088 0.0071 0.0102 
10 -0.0030 -0.0023 -0.0037 Skew. 2.3606 1.4108 2.5207 
25 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0007 Kurt. 82.5336 74.9682 73.7531 
50 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001     
75 0.0010 0.0008 0.0012 %Obs.>0 53.48% 52.70% 54.21% 
90 0.0047 0.0037 0.0054     
95 0.0094 0.0077 0.0108 K-S p. 0.000   
99 0.0286 0.0267 0.0313 M-W p. 0.1254 P(Manuf.>Serv.)=0.491 
Max 0.1632 0.1270 0.1632 F-P p. 0.0628   
Notes: Distribution of the HH index, as in equation (3), for the overall manufacturing and services samples. We report the minimum and 
maximum values (Min and Max, respectively), the mean (Mean), standard deviations (S.D.), skewness (Skew.), kurtosis (Kurt.), the percentage 
of observations above zero (%Obs.>0), as well as the p-values for the following non-parametric tests: Kolmogorov-Smirnov for equality of 
distribution (K-S p.), Mann–Whitney adjusted for ties (M-W p.), Fligner-Policello test (F-P p.) and the probability that manufacturing HH values 
are larger than services values (P(Manuf.>Serv.)). 
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Figure VI.1. Quantile-Quantile plot of the HH index for different sectors 
 
Notes: We plot the quantiles of the HH index distribution (computed as in equation 3), for Manufacturing 
against those of Services firms (vertically and horizontaly, respectively). Values above the vertical 
(horizontal) lines at HH=0 indicate that services (manufacturing) firms save more cash in years of higher 
cash-flow, suggesting the presence of financial constraints. Values above (under) the symmetry line (y=x) 
indicate higher HH values for manufacturing (services) firms. 
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4.3. Differences across industries 
Table 5 presents the estimates for manufacturing industries. A noticeable outcome of the 
estimation of CCFS is the relatively lower estimates obtained when compared with the 
overall and aggregate service sample. The machinery manufacture industry (DK) is the only 
case for which financial constraints are higher than the overall sample (0.1629). Still, the 
degree of financial distress in the aggregate service sector is substantially higher. 
Additionally, only firms that produce food, beverages and tobacco (DA), wood and furniture 
(DD), paper (DE), or chemicals (DG) appear to be financially constrained, while in the 
remaining industries firms do not suffer from such constraints. The severity of these 
constraints varies from the chemicals industry (DG), the least constrained (firms save, on 
average 10 cents out of each extra euro of cash-flow), to the machinery manufacture industry 
(DK), the most constrained. For these particular cases, while the former industry is mature 
and highly spatially concentrated, firms in the latter face significant sunk costs, which might 
help to explain the differences in constraints. 
 Table 6 reports the estimation results for service industries. Depending on industry, 
the coefficient on cash flow ranges from not statistically significant—health (N) and other 
service industries (O)—to remarkable values of 0.53 and 0.43 for firms in the education (M) 
and hospitality (H) industries, respectively. In fact, firms in these industries are extremely 
constrained as they save more than 40% of their cash flows. Additionally, it is possible to 
find both high and low levels of constraints in other industries. Namely, while for wholesale 
(G) the severity of such constraints is high (0.2016), for transport and communications (I) and 
rentals and business services (K) industries, the CCFS (0.1618 and 0.1494, respectively) are 
relatively low when compared to other service industries, but still near the overall sample 
average. Still, lower constraints for business services firms (K), for example, might result 
from their subcontracting relationships with manufacturing firms, since interaction between 
firms and establishment of credit links in form of, for example, trade credit may reduce 
financial constraints for the subcontracted firms. Overall, the differences in constraints tend 
to be larger within than between manufacturing and services. In fact, the analysis at the 
industry level, reveals that while in some industries firms are clearly not financially 
constrained, for industries whose firms are found to be constrained, the degree of constrains 
varies in a wide range—firms tend to save, on average, from 10% to 49% of their cash flow, 
depending on industry. 
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Table VI.5. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation for manufacturing industries 
VARIABLES DA DB DC DD DE DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
, 0.126** 0.070 0.059 0.129* 0.133*** 0.102* 0.182 0.040 0.113 0.163** 0.082 0.022 -0.016 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.086) (0.074) (0.051) (0.058) (0.135) (0.053) (0.077) (0.073) (0.074) (0.086) (0.064) 
∆, 0.013 0.017* 0.019 -0.015 -0.026 0.013 0.003 0.047** 0.016 0.041*** 0.025** 0.006 0.045*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) (0.024) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) 
, 0.027** 0.017 -0.024 0.024* -0.003 0.020 0.053 0.025 0.013 0.050** 0.002 0.040 0.006 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.028) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.033) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.017) 
	, -0.137*** -0.160*** -0.217*** -0.085** -0.204*** -0.052 -0.080* -0.135*** -0.161*** -0.193*** -0.146** -0.217*** -0.056 
 (0.031) (0.038) (0.064) (0.034) (0.048) (0.038) (0.047) (0.045) (0.041) (0.046) (0.060) (0.064) (0.035) 
∆
, -0.084*** -0.115*** -0.123*** -0.113*** -0.081*** -0.064** -0.034* -0.114*** -0.142*** -0.158*** -0.117*** -0.129** -0.039* 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.032) (0.034) (0.025) (0.027) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.034) (0.036) (0.051) (0.022) 
	, 0.065*** 0.034 0.082** 0.017 0.131*** 0.033 0.018 0.084*** 0.065*** 0.056** 0.026 0.048 0.090*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.035) (0.019) (0.029) (0.023) (0.032) (0.029) (0.022) (0.025) (0.029) (0.038) (0.033) 
∆	
, -0.400 0.036 -0.312 0.134 -1.142*** 0.003 -0.148 -0.594 -0.142 -0.300 0.408 -0.658 -0.046 
 (0.335) (0.246) (0.771) (0.248) (0.411) (0.369) (0.388) (0.380) (0.295) (0.448) (0.531) (0.625) (0.351) 
	, -0.090* -0.063 0.042 -0.008 0.073 -0.197*** 0.068 -0.151* -0.116 -0.138 -0.795*** -0.170** 0.194 
 (0.052) (0.057) (0.084) (0.039) (0.064) (0.075) (0.102) (0.079) (0.091) (0.106) (0.255) (0.079) (0.236) 
              
Observations 1,277 1,346 353 306 463 419 301 661 797 595 376 302 367 
No. of firms 377 432 103 100 141 122 89 189 237 188 117 89 105 
Hansen p-val. 0.657 0.920 0.358 0.375 0.170 0.388 0.887 0.0329 0.226 0.415 0.185 0.0804 0.443 
R-squared 0.126 0.105 0.164 0.119 0.226 0.121 0.082 0.171 0.153 0.211 0.137 0.138 0.134 
Notes: Regression of equation (1). These estimations also include year dummies. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, 
.05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further test statistics available from the authors on request. Industry key: (DA) food, beverages and tobacco; (DB) textiles; (DC) tanning; 
(DD) wood and furniture; (DE) paper; (DG) chemicals; (DH) plastics; (DI) non-metallic mineral products; (DJ) metal, except machinery; (DK) machinery; (DL) electric, optic 
and other equipment ; (DM) vehicles and transports; (DN) furniture and recycling. See Chapter IV for further detail. 
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 Most of these results are confirmed by the estimation of equation (2) with industry 
dummy interactions with cash-flow as an alternative to the partition-wise approach (Table A3 
in Appendix, column 2). However, for the case of textiles (DB), plastics (DH) and electric, 
optic and other equipment (DL), the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, 
meaning that possibly, in these industries, firms are also financially constrained. 
 Nevertheless, it remains clear that there is a huge heterogeneity within sectors when it 
comes to the level of financial constraints. In fact, computing the HH index and comparing 
mean and median values (absolute and relative values with respect to the overall sample), as 
well as the percentage of positive observations (Table A3 in Appendix, columns 3-5), it is 
clear that such heterogeneity is very much present, as one would expect (if not from the 
industry-level summary statistics presented in Section 5.1). These results implicate that usual 
measures that rely on sample averages fail to capture such heterogeneity, therefore assigning 
firms incorrectly as constrained or not. 
 Overall, when we disaggregate service and manufacturing sectors into industries, we 
find a remarkable heterogeneity of financial constraints. Therefore, the hypothesis that 
differences in such constraints are larger within than between sectors (hypothesis H2) should 
not be rejected. 
 
4.4. Differences across firms’ size and age 
We find that while for the case of age, in line with previous literature, the estimated 
interaction coefficients are always lower for older firms (Table 7 columns 2, 4 and 6), this is 
not the case for of size-cash flow interactions. In fact, for service firms, we do not find the 
expected inverse relationship between size and constraints, since the estimated interaction 
coefficients decrease until size class 3 ([100;250[ employees) and then increases for firms 
with more than 250 employees (column 5). This suggests that, for the case of services, a non-
monotonic (U-shaped) relationship between firm size and financial constraints might be 
present. 
 Also using equation (2), we further investigate these relationships by testing the 
inclusion of size and age interactions (as well as its quadratic terms) with cash-flow (Table 
8). We find that, for the case of size and both the overall sample and manufacturing firms 
(columns 1 and 2, lines 6 and 8), estimates indicate the presence of an U-shaped relationship 
to financial constraints. All remaining interaction terms are not statistically different from 
zero. These results cast some doubts on previously devised monotonic relationships between 
firm size and financial constraints.   
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Table VI.6. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation for services industries 
VARIABLES G H I K M N O 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
, 0.202*** 0.431*** 0.162** 0.149** 0.528*** 0.133 0.070 
 (0.045) (0.127) (0.068) (0.062) (0.128) (0.160) (0.108) 
∆, 0.002 0.040 0.022 0.030*** 0.049 -0.081 -0.028 
 (0.005) (0.035) (0.015) (0.011) (0.036) (0.051) (0.042) 
, 0.012 0.007 -0.000 0.040*** 0.069* -0.004 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.012) (0.015) (0.036) (0.019) (0.020) 
	, -0.234*** -0.367*** -0.142*** -0.278*** -0.561*** -0.363*** -0.093 
 (0.026) (0.059) (0.049) (0.052) (0.074) (0.083) (0.065) 
∆
, -0.129*** -0.146*** -0.069*** -0.192*** -0.168*** -0.221*** -0.109** 
 (0.011) (0.029) (0.021) (0.023) (0.046) (0.051) (0.043) 
	, 0.096*** 0.188*** 0.073** 0.035 0.323*** 0.063 0.075* 
 (0.011) (0.043) (0.029) (0.025) (0.060) (0.045) (0.038) 
∆	
, -0.555*** 0.426 0.043 -0.609 1.266* 0.400 -0.872* 
 (0.176) (0.460) (0.415) (0.403) (0.753) (0.776) (0.523) 
	, -0.133*** -0.126** -0.029 -0.056 -0.375** -0.422*** -0.227** 
 (0.037) (0.052) (0.054) (0.064) (0.168) (0.128) (0.103) 
        
Observations 3,630 427 636 786 297 222 250 
Number of firms 1,196 131 208 266 95 67 79 
Hansen  p-value 0.963 0.555 0.336 0.454 0.523 0.312 0.794 
R-squared 0.183 0.323 0.105 0.249 0.378 0.321 0.158 
Notes: Regression of equation (1). These estimations also include year dummies. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further 
test statistics available from the authors on request. Industry key: (G) wholesale; (H) hospitality; (I) transport 
and communications; (K) rentals and business services industry; (M) education; (N) health; (O) other 
services. See Chapter IV for further detail. 
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 Alternatively, we look at the relationship between the HH index and either size or age 
for the different sectors. We find that, in some cases, one might expect a non-monotonic 
relationship (namely U-shaped) between these variables. Firstly, the spearman correlation 
coefficients yield negative but not statistically significant correlations between the HH index 
and both size and age (available from authors). Secondly, the results from a simple OLS 
regression of equation (4) report an inverse relationship and a U-shaped relationship between 
size and constraints for the overall and manufacturing samples, respectively (Table 9, 
columns 1-3).13 Oddly, neither of the coefficients is statistically significant for service firms 
and results point towards a direct relationship between age and constraints for manufacturing 
firms. However, if we restrict our sample to positive HH values (only those firms that are 
financially constrained), we find a U-shaped relationship between constraints and firm size 
for all subsamples (columns 4-6) and an inverse relationship between age and constraints 
both for the overall and services subsamples. Interestingly, the coefficients on firm age for 
manufacturing firms are not statistically significant. If we estimate a simultaneous quantile 
regression of equation (4), results show that while for lower quantiles there is an inverted U-
shaped relationship between constraints and both size and age, for higher quantiles, this 
relationship changes to a U-shaped one.14 
 Overall, size and age interplay with financial constraints in a rather non-trivial way. 
On one hand, the relationship between size and constraints is non-monotonic for the case of 
services and, even though we find some evidence suggesting an inverse relationship for 
manufacturing firms, this finding is not robust to all approaches. On the other, the 
relationship between age and constraints, in fact, appears to be inverse for the case of 
services. However, this is not the case for manufacturing firms, for whom we have mixed 
evidence. Consequently, these results indicate that the hypothesis (H3) should be rejected. 
Accordingly, the rather odd possibility of the relationship between size, age and constraints 
being of an U-shaped form opens for further discussion both at the theoretical and empirical 
levels. 
  
                                                           
13
 Note that this regression is done upon a cross section that results from the computation of average time values 
of the variables of interest, since the HH index is a time average itself. Furthermore, zero but statistically 
significant coefficients arise due to the scale of size and age variables with respect to HH values (see Table 1.1). 
14
 Simultaneous quantile regression, with 499 bootstrap replications, for the following quantiles: 5; 10; 15; 20; 
25; 30; 35; 40; 45; 50; 55; 60; 65; 70; 75; 80; 85; 90 and 95—Tables A6, A7 and A8 in the Appendix. 
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Table VI.7. CCFS with size and age classes interactions 
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing Services 
 Size Age Size Age Size Age 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
, ∗ 	       
[20;50[ 0.230***  0.164***  0.297***  
 (0.030)  (0.038)  (0.045)  
[50;100[ 0.163***  0.147***  0.185***  
 (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.046)  
[100;250[ 0.114***  0.084***  0.149***  
 (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.050)  
[250;+∞[ 0.132***  0.047  0.241***  
 (0.030)  (0.037)  (0.050)  
, ∗ :       
[0;10[  0.179***  0.132***  0.247*** 
  (0.038)  (0.045)  (0.061) 
[10;40[  0.169***  0.114***  0.238*** 
  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.034) 
[40;+∞[  0.125***  0.089**  0.168** 
  (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.068) 
       
∆, 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.011** 0.011** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
	, -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.141*** -0.140*** -0.271*** -0.271*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) 
∆
, -0.123*** -0.122*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.141*** -0.140*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
	, 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
∆	
, -0.091 -0.097 -0.011 -0.015 -0.180 -0.195 
 (0.103) (0.104) (0.130) (0.130) (0.165) (0.166) 
	, -0.118*** -0.116*** -0.083*** -0.079*** -0.148*** -0.148*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) 
       
Observations 13,874 13,874 7,590 7,590 6,256 6,256 
Number of firms 4,322 4,322 2,277 2,277 2,043 2,043 
Hansen chi2 p-value 0.473 0.364 0.533 0.499 0.277 0.308 
R-squared 0.158 0.156 0.129 0.127 0.196 0.193 
Notes: Regression of equation (2), where X corresponds to either size or age classes dummies. These 
estimations also include year dummies. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table VI.8. CCFS with size and age interactions 
VARIABLES Overall Manufacturing Services 
 (1) (2) (3) 
, 0.157*** 0.104* 0.217*** 
 (0.047) (0.057) (0.076) 
    
	, -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
, ∗ 	, -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
, ∗ 	

, 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
, 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
, ∗ , 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
, ∗ 

, -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
∆, 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.011** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
	, -0.196*** -0.139*** -0.262*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) 
∆
, -0.122*** -0.106*** -0.138*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
	, 0.084*** 0.070*** 0.100*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 
∆	
, -0.061 0.029 -0.173 
 (0.105) (0.132) (0.169) 
	, -0.116*** -0.081*** -0.150*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.028) 
    
Observations 13,724 7,527 6,169 
Number of firms 4,255 2,247 2,006 
Hansen chi2 p-value 0.882 0.380 0.970 
R-squared 0.157 0.132 0.193 
Notes: Regression of equation (2), where X corresponds to size, age and its square 
values. These estimations also include year dummies. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 
levels, respectively. 
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Table VI.9. Relationship of size and age with the HH index 
VARIABLES All HH values HH>0 subsample 
 Overall Manuf. Services Overall Manuf. Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
	 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
	

 
0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 


 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Constant 0.001** 0.000 0.001** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
       
Observations 8,841 4,298 4,543 4,745 2,264 2,481 
R-squared 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.009 0.008 
Notes: Regression of equation (4) to test for the relationship between size, age and financial constraints, 
measured by the HH index. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively. The zero, but statistically significant coefficients, arise due to the scale of the variables 
Size and Age—see Table 1.1. 
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5. Discussion 
The results show that the level of firms' financial constraints is heterogeneous across different 
sectors and industries. Therefore, for an accurate analysis of constraints, the decomposition of 
the structure of the economy should definitely be taken into account. In fact, common 
measures of financial constraints do not take into account potential heterogeneity stemming 
from sectoral and industrial specificities. For the case of CCFS and other indirect measures of 
financial constraints, the use of industry dummies is not enough to capture this heterogeneity 
because the dependent variable is not financial constraints. Instead, these are captured by the 
parameter estimate of the sensitivity of cash to cash-flow (this is similar for the case of 
ICFS). When it comes to indexes of constraints (e.g. Lamont et al. 2001; Hadlock and Pierce 
2010) this heterogeneity is usually not taken into account, with the exceptions of Whited and 
Wu (2006) (includes industry sales growth) and Musso and Schiavo (2008) (a score based on 
the values of seven different variables for each firm-year relative to the respective industry 
average). Therefore future analysis of firms' financial constraints should also take into 
account this dimension. 
 Furthermore, not rejecting (H1) and (H2) implies that the heterogeneous financing 
problems of firms across different industries and economic sectors, by imposing distinct 
barriers to firm growth, will have a crucial impact upon the composition of the economy. 
Accordingly, different degrees of financial constraints will undoubtedly affect the dynamics 
of structural change and thus economic growth (cf. Saviotti and Pika 2004). Moreover, the 
extent to which the notion of financial constraints should be extended to the industry and 
sector levels should be further explored. In fact, the high degree of heterogeneity found at the 
sectoral and particularly the industrial level, suggests that aggregated analysis may well hide 
a number of specificities that might affect the extent to which firms are financially 
constrained. Therefore, this work is particularly useful to the literature that attempts to 
classify sectors and industries as financially constrained.15 
 On the other hand, the distinct results obtained between manufacturing and services 
with respect to firm size and age (rejection of H3) cast serious doubts on previous 
relationships between these variables and financial constraints, found for aggregated samples 
of firms. While for samples that include all sectors of economic activity, previous empirical 
literature identifies an inverse relationship between both size and age and constraints, this 
research shows that such findings are not robust to sector and industry disaggregation. Still, 
                                                           
15
 This classification is specifically used in the literature on financial development at the regional and country 
levels since Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
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this is a somewhat expected result, since the characteristics of different economic activities 
might have a significant impact on financial constraints. In particular, manufacturing firms, 
on average, require a larger initial investment, have a larger portion of sunk-costs and have to 
attain a higher minimum efficient scale than service firms. Accordingly, size is more 
important for manufacturing than for service firms, explaining the linear coefficient on size 
carrying a negative sign in all estimations for the former and the U-shaped relationship found 
for the latter. Conversely, service firms, for whom human capital is preponderant, may draw 
larger benefits from a learning process than do manufacturing firms. Therefore, age has a 
decisive and clear impact on the constraints faced by services, that contrasts with the mixed 
evidence found for manufacturing. 
 These results have important implications. In particular, when it comes to empirical 
research that relies on (either one or both) size and age as proxies of financial constraints. 
Firstly, it is not totally clear that, for aggregated samples, there is an inverse relationship 
between such constraints and size or age. Secondly, our findings suggest that, depending on 
the sector being analysed, size or age may work as better proxies of financial constraints.   
 As a consequence, these findings put into perspective widely accepted results on 
financial constraints and firm size and age. Additionally, measures and indexes of constraints 
that are based on either one or both of these variables must be checked for its robustness. The 
most notorious example is the SA index (see Hadlock and Pierce 2010) that is based solely on 
these variables. 
 Finally, the effects of size and age, as well as other firm characteristics, on financial 
constraints are most probably distinct across different industries. Despite being extremely 
interesting, due to the lack of observations we were unable to carry out such analysis.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this Chapter, we analyse the differences in financial constraints between and within 
manufacturing and service sectors, by estimating cash-cash flow sensitivities upon a large 
unbalanced panel of Portuguese firms. Moreover, we split our sample according to exogenous 
firm characteristics that are believed to be good proxies for financial constraints (size and 
age) in order to test the validity of such classification schemes in different sectors of 
economic activity. As robustness tests, we additionally interact size and age with cash-flow 
and make use of the HH index. 
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 This work adds to the discussion over firms' financial constraints as well as it 
contributes to a better understanding of the differences between manufacturing and services 
and the heterogeneity within these sectors. 
 On the whole, our results clearly show that financial constraints is a serious problem 
affecting the dynamics of Portuguese firms. Furthermore, we verify that such constraints are 
more severe for service than for manufacturing firms. With respect to industry analysis, 
despite the considerable differences between the severity of financial constraints in the 
aggregate manufacturing and service sectors, we find a striking heterogeneity of access to 
external finance. Moreover, regarding firm size and age, distinct patterns arise between those 
sectors, indicating that size or age work as better proxies of financial distress, depending on 
firms' economic sector of activity. This result has serious implications on the interpretation of 
previous findings. 
 These results are relevant for policymaking purposes. Public financial support, that 
typically positively discriminates smaller, exporting or new firms, should to take into account 
a new dimension. Namely, we argue that such policies should also accommodate the fact that 
financial constraints are distinct between sectors and highly heterogeneous across industries.  
 Finally, the severity of financial constraints in services that are fundamental for 
economic development (e.g. education) or are main technology diffusers (e.g. some business 
services) calls for policies that help to mitigate these constraints. 
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Appendix 
Table VI.A1. CCFS with different proxies for investment opportunities 
VARIABLES Forward investment Lead investment Forward sales growth 
 Overall Manufacturing Services Overall Manufacturing Services Overall Manufacturing Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
, 0.141*** 0.096*** 0.204*** 0.122*** 0.097*** 0.168*** 0.137*** 0.107*** 0.173*** 
 [0.099;0.184] [0.051;0.141] [0.125;0.282] [0.070;0.175] [0.037;0.157] [0.083;0.253] [0.103;0.172] [0.069;0.145] [0.111;0.234] 
	, 0.014 0.021 0.014       
 [-0.014;0.041] [-0.010;0.052] [-0.035;0.062]       
, ,!
,
 
   0.000** 0.000 0.000**    
   [0.000;0.000] [-0.000;0.000] [0.000;0.000]    
∆,       -0.012*** -0.011** -0.012** 
       [-0.018;-0.006] [-0.020;-0.003] [-0.020;-0.003] 
∆, 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.014** 0.020*** 0.014* 0.030*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.006 
 [0.010;0.025] [0.011;0.030] [0.002;0.026] [0.009;0.031] [0.002;0.025] [0.013;0.047] [0.005;0.017] [0.008;0.024] [-0.003;0.015] 
, 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.025** 0.007 0.015 0.004 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.014* 
 [0.011;0.033] [0.012;0.037] [0.007;0.042] [-0.008;0.022] [-0.003;0.033] [-0.020;0.028] [0.007;0.025] [0.009;0.031] [0.000;0.027] 
	, -0.222*** -0.171*** -0.279*** -0.265*** -0.221*** -0.331*** -0.210*** -0.165*** -0.260*** 
 [-0.250;-0.194] [-0.203;-0.139] [-0.326;-0.233] [-0.304;-0.225] [-0.267;-0.176] [-0.400;-0.263] [-0.233;-0.186] [-0.193;-0.138] [-0.298;-0.222] 
∆
, -0.132*** -0.116*** -0.149*** -0.143*** -0.115*** -0.185*** -0.125*** -0.111*** -0.137*** 
 [-0.145;-0.118] [-0.133;-0.100] [-0.171;-0.127] [-0.163;-0.123] [-0.137;-0.093] [-0.218;-0.151] [-0.137;-0.114] [-0.126;-0.097] [-0.154;-0.120] 
	, 0.085*** 0.075*** 0.093*** 0.101*** 0.093*** 0.108*** 0.080*** 0.071*** 0.088*** 
 [0.070;0.099] [0.057;0.092] [0.071;0.115] [0.079;0.122] [0.066;0.119] [0.074;0.141] [0.068;0.092] [0.056;0.087] [0.069;0.107] 
∆	
, 0.096 -0.163 0.323 0.124 0.119 0.099 0.048 -0.006 0.074 
 [-0.148;0.339] [-0.466;0.141] [-0.064;0.710] [-0.216;0.465] [-0.328;0.567] [-0.411;0.608] [-0.147;0.244] [-0.260;0.247] [-0.224;0.373] 
	, -0.118*** -0.090*** -0.144*** -0.129*** -0.091* -0.158*** -0.115*** -0.073*** -0.158*** 
 [-0.160;-0.076] [-0.144;-0.036] [-0.209;-0.080] [-0.190;-0.068] [-0.170;-0.013] [-0.249;-0.067] [-0.149;-0.080] [-0.118;-0.028] [-0.210;-0.105] 
Dummies          
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
          
Observations 13,874 7,590 6,256 13,874 7,590 6,256 13,874 7,590 6,256 
No. of firms 4,322 2,277 2,043 4,322 2,277 2,043 4,322 2,277 2,043 
Hansen p-val. 0.368 0.206 0.819 0.463 0.430 0.751 0.560 0.455 0.830 
R-squared 0.155 0.125 0.193 0.158 0.131 0.195 0.159 0.132 0.195 
Notes: Regression of equation (1) with forward investment (	,), sales growth (∆,) and lead investment (, ,! ,⁄ ) as alternative proxies for investment 
opportunities. We report 90% confidence intervals in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further test statistics 
available from the authors on request. 
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Table VI.A2. Validation of HH index 
VARIABLES HH index quartiles 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
, -0.2113*** -0.0499*** 0.1467*** 0.4843*** 
 (0.041) (0.019) (0.022) (0.037) 
∆, 0.0077 0.0050 0.0032 0.0259*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
	, -0.2563*** -0.0742*** -0.1491*** -0.2730*** 
 (0.030) (0.014) (0.018) (0.029) 
∆
, -0.1250*** -0.0552*** -0.0859*** -0.1992*** 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) 
	, 0.1297*** 0.0377*** 0.0478*** 0.0963*** 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) 
∆	
, -0.0349 -0.1315 -0.2509** -0.4780* 
 (0.257) (0.109) (0.112) (0.244) 
	, -0.2613*** -0.0331** -0.0715*** -0.1465*** 
 (0.058) (0.014) (0.025) (0.054) 
     
Observations 2,633 4,443 4,184 2,614 
Number of firms 893 1,274 1,255 900 
Hansen chi2 p-value 0.063 0.174 0.009 0.135 
R-squared 0.261 0.064 0.105 0.310 
Notes: Regression of equation (1) by quartiles of the HH index. We should note that using 
interactions, as in equation (3), would result in collinearity problems, by construction of the 
index. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
.01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Further test statistics available from the authors on 
request. 
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Table VI.A3. Summary of results on CCFS and HH index by sector and industry 
CAE TEXT CCFS 
CCFS 
INTERACT HH 
HH 
norm. 
Median 
%HH>0 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ALL Overall Sample 0.153*** N.A. 0.0006 0 0.0000 
 
[0.118;0.188] N.A. (0.0088) (1) 53.48% 
MANUF Manufacturing firms 0.093*** 0.129*** 0.0005 -0.011 0.0000 
 
[0.054;0.132] [0.091;0.168] (0.0071) 0.806) 52.70% 
DA Food, beverages & tobacco 0.1263** 0.146*** 0.0006 0.001 0.0001 
 
[0.028;0.224] [0.053;0.238] (0.0058) (0.653) 53.95% 
DB Textiles 0.0702 0.117*** 0.0003 -0.035 0.0000 
 
[-0.027;0.168] [0.035;0.198] (0.0089) (1.009) 51.35% 
DC Tanning 0.0585 0.110 0.0009 0.029 0.0000 
 
[-0.111;0.228] [-0.054;0.274] (0.0062) (0.699) 55.02% 
DD Wood 0.1295* 0.127* 0.0004 -0.021 0.0000 
 
[-0.016;0.275] [-0.024;0.278] (0.0057) (0.648) 45.49% 
DE Paper 0.1331*** 0.115** 0.0002 -0.050 0.0001 
 
[0.033;0.233] [0.006;0.224] (0.0043) (0.489) 57.54% 
DG Chemicals 0.1019* 0.121** -0.0001 -0.075 0.0000 
 
[-0.011;0.215] [0.014;0.228] (0.0063) (0.708) 51.47% 
DH Plastics 0.1825 0.235** 0.0003 -0.035 0.0000 
 
[-0.083;0.448] [0.000;0.469] (0.0042) (0.476) 53.21% 
DI Non-metallic mineral products 0.0397 0.077 0.0006 -0.002 0.0000 
 
[-0.064;0.143] [-0.028;0.183] (0.0063) (0.710) 51.61% 
DJ Metal, except machinery 0.1130 0.194*** 0.0006 -0.005 0.0000 
 
[-0.037;0.263] [0.068;0.320] (0.0052) (0.589) 53.11% 
DK Machinery 0.1629** 0.176*** 0.0004 -0.019 0.0000 
 
[0.020;0.306] [0.056;0.295] (0.0077) (0.872) 52.20% 
DL Electric, optic & other equipment 0.0823 0.166** 0.0009 0.039 0.0000 
 
[-0.062;0.227] [0.021;0.311] (0.0069) (0.783) 58.08% 
DM Vehicles & transports 0.0222 0.085 0.0012 0.071 0.0000 
 
[-0.146;0.191] [-0.055;0.224] (0.0100) (1.130) 52.33% 
DN Furniture & recycling -0.0156 0.063 0.0007 0.013 0.0000 
 
[-0.142;0.111] [-0.097;0.223] (0.0104) (1.179) 53.20% 
SERV Services firms 0.227*** 0.211*** 0.0007 0.011 0.0001 
 
[0.165;0.289] [0.152;0.271] (0.0102) (1.152) 54.21% 
G Wholesale 0.2016*** 0.169*** 0.0003 -0.033 0.0000 
 
[0.113;0.290] [0.086;0.252] (0.0072) (0.810) 53.56% 
H Hospitality 0.4311*** 0.358*** 0.0004 -0.026 0.0001 
 
[0.183;0.680] [0.133;0.584] (0.0090) (1.017) 54.42% 
I Transport and communications 0.1618** 0.164*** 0.0005 -0.015 0.0000 
 
[0.028;0.296] [0.044;0.284] (0.0089) (1.006) 52.78% 
K Rentals & business services 0.1494** 0.189*** 0.0009 0.038 0.0001 
 
[0.028;0.271] [0.064;0.315] (0.0146) (1.649) 54.01% 
M Education 0.5281*** 0.408*** 0.0050 0.495 0.0004 
 
[0.278;0.778] [0.167;0.648] (0.0207) (2.347) 64.29% 
N Health 0.1332 0.074 0.0024 0.200 0.0001 
 
[-0.181;0.447] [-0.290;0.438] (0.0165) (1.864) 56.25% 
O Other services 0.0697 0.097 0.0007 0.007 0.0001 
 
[-0.142;0.281] [-0.103;0.297] (0.0063) (0.712) 55.00% 
Notes: Results on financial constraints, for different sectors and industries, through different approaches: 
Column (1) reports the estimation results for equation (1) upon the different subsamples; Column (2) those of 
equation (2) with industry dummies; Column (3) the means and standard deviations of the HH index as in 
equation (3); Column (5) the median of the index and the percentage of observations above zero (financially 
constrained). For easier interpretation, we report adjusted HH distributions: ##$ = &'(
)
, where * is the HH 
original value, + the overall sample mean and , the overall sample standard deviations (column 4). 
Interpretation is with reference to the overall sample distribution that is set to have zero mean and unit standard 
deviation. Robust standard deviations in parenthesis and 95% level confidence intervals in brackets. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
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Table VI.A4: Summary of size and age relationships with financial constraints 
 
Overall Manufacturing Services 
 
Key for the estimation used 
SIZE - 
U 
- 
U U U 
 
CCFS HH fit for 
U 
- 
U U N N 
 
HH>0 
AGE 
- 
U 
- 
N 
- -  CCFS HH fit 
N N N + N N  interactions 
Notes: This table shows what type of relationship one might expect, given the results obtained with the 
estimation of: a) CCFS upon different subsamples and size and age classes interactions with cash-flow (Table 7); 
b) CCFS with size and age cash-flow interactions (Table 8); c) a quadratic fit of the HH index on size and age 
(Table 9, columns 1-3); d) the same quadratic fit for the subsample of firms that are found to be financially 
constrained using the HH index—values above zero—(Table 11, columns 4-6). The signs (+) and (-) denote a 
possible direct and inverse relationship, respectively. Additionally, (U) denotes a possible U-shaped relationship 
and N that no clear relationship was found. 
 
Table VI.A5. Main variables in Services against Manufacturing 
VARIABLES K-S test F-P test 
 
(1) (2) 
∆, 0.0644 -4.872 
p-val 0.000 0.000 
,- 0.0795 7.953 
p-val 0.000 0.000 
∆, 0.0788 -9.704 
p-val 0.000 0.000 
,- 0.0485 4.534 
p-val 0.000 0.000 
	,- 0.0956 10.805 
p-val 0.000 0.000 
∆
, 0.0704 -7.682 
p-val 0.000 0.000 
	,- 0.0262 -1.006 
p-val 0.009 0.314 
∆	
,- 0.0227 -1.408 
p-val 0.036 0.159 
	,- 0.0505 1.575 
p-val 0.000 0.115 
SIZE 0.1771 20.045 
p-val 0.000 0.000 
AGE 0.0906 12.195 
p-val 0.000 0.000 
Notes: We report the statistics and p-values of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
and a Fligner-Policello test for comparing the distributions of main 
variables between services (1) against manufacturing (0) samples. 
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Table VI.A6. Quantile regression for the Overall sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables q05 q10 q15 q20 q25 q30 q35 q40 q45 q50 
           
Size 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size2 -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Age 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age2 -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Constant -0.0102*** -0.0048*** -0.0026*** -0.0016*** -0.0009*** -0.0005*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0000 0.0001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
Observations 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 
           
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Variables q55 q60 q65 q70 q75 q80 q85 q90 q95 
          
Size -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
Age -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
Constant 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0009*** 0.0015*** 0.0024*** 0.0038*** 0.0065*** 0.0118*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
          
Observations 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 8,841 
Notes: Quantile regression results for the quantiles (q#) of the HH index. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively. The zero, but statistically significant coefficients, arise due to the scale of the variables Size and Age—see Chapter VI, Table 1.1.   
142 
 
Table VI.A7. Quantile regression for the Manufacturing sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables q05 q10 q15 q20 q25 q30 q35 q40 q45 q50 
 
          
Size 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
          
Age 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age2 -0.0000* -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
          
Constant -0.0079*** -0.0037*** -0.0022*** -0.0013*** -0.0008*** -0.0005*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
          
Observations 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 
 
          
 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Variables q55 q60 q65 q70 q75 q80 q85 q90 q95 
 
         
Size -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size2 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
         
Age 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
         
Constant 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0009*** 0.0015*** 0.0026*** 0.0045*** 0.0093*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
         
Observations 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 
Notes: Quantile regression results for the quantiles (q#) of the HH index. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively. The zero, but statistically significant coefficients, arise due to the scale of the variables Size and Age—see Chapter VI, Table 1.1.   
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Table VI.A8. Quantile regression for the Services sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables q05 q10 q15 q20 q25 q30 q35 q40 q45 q50 
 
          
Size 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
          
Age 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age2 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
          
Constant -0.0124*** -0.0059*** -0.0033*** -0.0018*** -0.0011*** -0.0006*** -0.0002*** -0.0001* 0.0000 0.0001*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
          
Observations 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 
 
          
 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Variables q55 q60 q65 q70 q75 q80 q85 q90 q95 
 
         
Size -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
         
Age -0.0000* -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
         
Constant 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0010*** 0.0014*** 0.0021*** 0.0031*** 0.0049*** 0.0081*** 0.0149*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
         
Observations 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 4,543 
Notes: Quantile regression results for the quantiles (q#) of the HH index. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively. The zero, but statistically significant coefficients, arise due to the scale of the variables Size and Age—see Chapter VI, Table 1.1.   
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CHAPTER VII – OPENNESS, EXPORTS AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY 
INTEGRATION 
 
1. Introduction 
The causality flow between financial constraints and openness to foreign markets is rather 
unclear. On one hand, open firms may have access to foreign finance and, especially if they are 
strong exporters, see their domestic credit conditions improve. On the other, these firms may 
only export because they were able to overcome the financial constraints barrier. Effectively, 
there are additional costs to explore foreign markets and the required investment may be 
financially constrained. As a result, only firms that are not financially constrained are able to 
export. 
 This Chapter explores how financial constraints relate to the openness of firms to foreign 
markets, in particular to their exporting and importing activities. Additionally, it evaluates the 
changes in firms' levels of constraints driven by a monetary integration process (the European 
Common Currency). While we find an inverse relationship between export intensity and 
financial constraints, we cast some doubts on the argument stating that only unconstrained firms 
self-select into export behaviour. In fact, a priori constrained firms are also able to export and 
there are significant improvements in firms' ability to raise external funds once they start 
exporting. Furthermore, we argue that while in general the monetary integration reduced the 
constraints faced by Portuguese firms, these were affected differently depending on their 
importing and exporting activities. 
 After the accession to the European Economic Communities (now the European Union, 
EU) in 1986, Portugal experienced not only the creation of the Common Market in 1992, but 
most of all the introduction of the Common Currency in 2001. The monetary integration that 
culminated in the Euro brought several changes, of which we should point out the reduction of 
interest rates (annualised benchmark interest rate fell from 7.2% in 1996 to 2.1% in 2004)1 and 
the promotion of deeper integration of financial markets within the Euro area. Not only could 
economic agents obtain finance in the Euro area cheaper and in an easier manner, but also the 
                                                 
1
 Annualised Euribor and Lisbor at 3 months with adjusted Lisbor by the mean difference in common years—see 
Chapter IV, Section 3 for details. 
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adoption of a stronger currency has eased the access of Portuguese firms to foreign finance. 
 This work is the first, to our knowledge, to analyse the effects of the European Monetary 
Integration on firms' ability to raise external funds. Additionally, along with the recent text of 
Silva (2011b), it is the first to analyse the relationship between openness to foreign markets, 
exports and firms' constraints for Portugal. Furthermore the relatively large time span of our 
unique dataset (see Chapter IV) allows us to compare two distinct periods (before and after 
monetary integration), which, as far as we know, is novel in the analysis of financial constraints 
at the firm level.2 
 The importance of this research with respect to policy making seems also worthwhile 
mentioning. On one hand, it provides insights on the effects that monetary integrations have 
upon firms financial constraints, which is relevant not only to understand the subsequent 
behaviour of Portuguese firms after the introduction of the Euro, but also for policymakers in 
countries now joining the Common Currency. On the other, the clarification of the relationship 
between constraints, degree of openness and, most importantly, export activity, provides further 
evidence that is crucial to devise the adequate incentives to alleviate constraints and ultimately 
foster exports. 
 The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 makes a brief discussion of the literature 
on financial constraints, firms' exports and monetary integration. In Section 3 we describe our 
empirical methodology, while Section 4 presents the main results. Finally, Section 5 pulls the 
pieces together and concludes. 
 
2. Financial constraints, trade and monetary integration 
Financial constraints seem to be an important factor to take into account when analysing 
international trade, as suggested, for example, by the theoretical models of Chaney (2005), 
Manova (2010) and Broll and Wahl (2011). These models are based on Melitz (2003), that 
already recognizes the importance of fixed costs when firms decide to export. However, in such 
models, financial constraints are seen as an exogenous barrier to export, even though we provide 
evidence that firms that start exporting experience a reduction in constraints. Shipping goods 
                                                 
2
 Focusing on firm size issues and using different datasets, Cabral and Mata (2003) and Oliveira and Fortunato 
(2006) have also analyzed the role of financial constraints. The former use entrepreneurs' age as a proxy for wealth 
(ultimately for financial constraints) to analyse the evolution of firm size distribution; the latter  estimate the impact 
of cash-flow upon firm employment growth (significant cash-flow coefficients are usually regarded as indicating the 
presence of financial constraints) 
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across countries may entail significant additional costs than selling them in the domestic market, 
not to mention jurisdiction differences between countries (Bekaert and Hodrick, 2008). Even 
though one should expect a negative relationship between financial constraints and exports, it is 
not clear whether exporting reduces financial constraints or unconstrained firms self-select into 
exporting. On one hand, start exporting may lead to more stable cash-flows due to sales 
diversification, that hedge against demand side shocks (Bridges and Guariglia, 2008). Moreover, 
exporting may signal efficiency to investors (Ganesh-Kumar et al., 2001), not to mention that 
such firms may additionally gain access to foreign finance. On the other hand, firms face 
significant sunk costs when they start exporting, thus financial constraints may work as a major 
barrier to export activity. In fact, Bellone et al. (2010), for French firms, find that financial 
constraints work as an ex-ante barrier to export, since less constrained firms self-select into 
exporting behaviour. Examples of this self-selection effect can also be found in Greenway et al. 
(2007) for the UK, Manole and Spatareanu (2010) for the case of Czech firms, Forlani (2010) 
and Minetti and Zhu (2011) for Italian firms or in Berman and Hericourt (2010) for 9 developing 
and emerging economies. Therefore, if financial constraints work as a major barrier to export 
then, in order to foster exports, incentives particularly designed to alleviate such constraints are 
certainly warranted.3 Recently, for the Portuguese case, Silva (2011b) analyses firms financial 
condition prior to export and uses an index of constraints based on Bellone et al. (2010) as 
dependent variable for treatment effects estimation of the impact of exports upon financial 
constraints. His results support that not only there is a self-selection effect, but also that such 
constraints are reduced once firms engage in exporting activity. 
 When it comes to financial development and integration, while previous empirical 
literature, in general, found that it alleviates firms' financial constraints (see Chapter III), recent 
studies analysing the impacts of financial crises, put these results into perspective. As an 
example, Popov and Ongena (2011), comparing both Western and Central with Eastern European 
countries, find that interbank market integration has reduced the level of constraints, especially 
in highly competitive banking sector markets. However, there were significant risks of 
overleveraging when integration took place at an accelerated pace. Nonetheless, Amiti and 
Weinstein (2009), for Japan, find that financial constraints severely affect exporting activity 
                                                 
3
 Note that, for the Portuguese case, Silva (2011a) finds that production subsidies neither significantly increase the 
probability that firms start to export nor increase their export intensity, even though production subsidies may not be 
particularly designed to foster exports, as the author argues. 
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during financial crisis, while Chor and Manova (2011), using US imports data find that, during 
the recent financial crisis, higher interbank interest rates led to lower exports especially for firms 
in more financially constrained sectors. For the European case, we should also stress that 
monetary integration came along, among others, with the loss monetary policy instruments. Still, 
the levels of financial constraints seem to be lower in bank-based systems (see Chapter III for a 
survey or Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2010 for an example), especially for short-
term finance (Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). Gorg and Spaliara (2009), comparing firms 
operating in the UK and France, find that firm failure is more sensible to financial variables for 
firms in the "market-oriented system" of the UK. Additionally, they find that continuous export 
behaviour increases firm survival. 
 Overall, not only there is still much to be said with respect to the causality flows between 
financial constraints and degree of openness, but also the real benefits of the European monetary 
integration process are, still nowadays, rather unclear and very debatable. Specifically, despite 
the extensive literature on firm's financial constraints, the consequences of such processes upon 
the ability of firms to raise the necessary amounts to invest, grow and export are still to be fully 
explored. Keeping in mind that no fully consistent measure of financial constraints has yet been 
developed (see Chapter II), we test the following hypothesis:  
H1) Monetary integration alleviates financial constraints and benefits mostly open firms 
H2) Financially unconstrained firms self-select into exporting activity 
 
 
3. Methodology  
As described in previous Chapters, ACW (Almeida et al., 2004) construct an alternative model of 
liquidity demand and derive an empirical equation to estimate CCFS. Even though the financial 
nature of the cash stock variable avoids measurement problems in Tobin's Q and investment 
opportunities hidden in cash-flow (see Chapter II), as pointed by Acharya et al (2007), 
financially constrained firms will only use cash to increase cash stocks if hedging needs are high 
(investment opportunities). Therefore, we control both for debt issuances as well as for 
investment opportunities. Additionally, as pointed by Almeida et al. (2011), firms may invest in 
relatively liquid assets, other than cash, to transfer resources across time. As a result, we control 
for this effect through investment in non-cash net working capital (∆,) and financial 
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investments (	
,). Furthermore, we follow of Lin (2007) and use the sum of net debt and 
equity issuances (,), as well as variations of interest paid (∆,), for reasons outlined in 
Chapter V. In this specification, all variables are scaled by total assets (except the control for firm 
size). As a result, we have the following empirical specification: 
∆, =  + , + ∆, + , + , + ∆, + ,	 
+	∆,+	
, +  + ,,				(VII. 1) 
where ∆, is the variation in cash stocks of firm i in period t, , the cash-flow, , is a 
control for firm size (log of total assets), , investment,  are two-digit industry dummies 
(CAE rev. 2.1) and , the error term. We do not have financial markets information that would 
allow us to compute Tobin's Q. Therefore, we use sales growth (∆,) to proxy investment 
opportunities (see Chapter IV, Section 3 for a discussion). 
 The financial and investment covariates are endogenous, so we estimate the model using 
instrumental variables (GMM) with fixed effects to take account of unobserved firm-level 
heterogeneity and panel-robust standard errors. The set of instruments includes twice lagged cash 
flow, twice lagged sales growth, lagged investment, lagged variation of noncash net working 
capital, number of employees, lagged bond issuance and lagged variation in interest payments.4 
 
 In an attempt to capture the effects of monetary and financial integration, we split our 
sample into two major periods, before and after integration—i.e. up to 2000 and from 2001 
onwards. Even though the integration processes is continuous, we pick this breakpoint for two 
main reasons. First, we only have access to the period 1996-2004, consequently, to guarantee a 
consistent estimation that takes advantage of lagged variables, we must guarantee that the 
subpanels have at least a 3 year depth (preferably 4 year to have a larger number of observations 
for a more efficient estimation).5 Accordingly, our breakpoint should be either on 1999 or 2000. 
Second, since the Euro was introduced on the 1st January 2001, a landmark for the monetary 
integration process, we expect that the possible benefits would be observed from 2001 onwards. 
                                                 
4
 Note that if the methodology is applied to a large number of observations, coefficients are usually found to be 
statistically significant, since the precision of the estimate is higher. However, one should still expect that such 
coefficients are higher for financially constrained groups of firms. Comparison of CCFS estimates with other studies 
can be found in Chapter V. 
5
 The limitations of the period of analysis (1996-2004) are due to methodological changes on the collection of data 
by INE—see Chapter IV. 
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Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that the real effects of the potential benefits from the 
ongoing integration process before 2001 would be subject to a "policy lag", therefore only 
having a significant impact on firms during the subsequent period. As a result, we expect that the 
bulk impact of the integration process would be felt during the period 2001-2004.6  
 In order to capture the effects of integration upon financial constraints by different classes 
of firms, according to their degree of openness to foreign markets, we construct a score that 
identifies firms as closed, open and, within open firms, those with low and high levels of 
openness (see Chapter IV, Section 3 for further detail). Consequently, we obtain different 
subsamples of firms depending on their exposure to European markets. Over the period, the EU, 
on average, accounts for 75% of the total exports and 89% of imports. As a result, we focus 
mainly on the degree of openness towards the EU. In fact, the results using a broader definition 
that covers total exports and imports remain unchanged.7 The same procedure is made with 
respect to exports and imports, that we then classify as levels of export and import intensity, 
respectively. With the purpose of comparing the CCFS estimates across subsamples, we perform 
formal significance tests. The robustness of the inverse relationship between financial 
constraints, degree of openness, export and import intensities is checked by introducing 
interaction terms between cash-flow and these variables (Table A2 in Appendix). 
 Finally, in order to compare firms' constraints before and after shifting into open, 
exporting or importing activity, we group firms that moved from closed to open, started 
exporting and importing, respectively. We further divide the period of time, for each firm, 
according to the moment they shifted. 
 
  
                                                 
6
 Note that this second period not only captures a downward economic cycle, but it also corresponds to higher 
bilateral exchange rates (convergence was before 2001 but effects might be time lagged) which affects the capacity 
of firms to export and import (although very debatable, degree of openness should account for this inverse sign 
effects). Conversely, the previous period, not only captures an economic expansion period, but also carries the 
effects of the implementation of the Common market in 1992. This latter effect is, however, expected to be 
transversal to the whole period. 
7
 For an example, compare the results of Table A3, columns 1-2 with those of Table 3, columns 8-9. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1.1 allows us to compare mean values, before and after monetary integration as well as by 
degree of openness, of the main variables used in the estimation. It is clear that after monetary 
integration mean variation of cash stocks and size (total assets) increased during the period, 
while mean cash-flow, sales growth, investment, debt and equity issuances, benchmark interest 
rate and degree of openness decreased (columns 2 and 3).8 Additionally, while firms faced a 
mean decrease in interest paid, the mean variation in non cash net working capital increased. If 
instead we compare different levels of openness, it is possible to see that, for the whole period, 
differences between less open and highly open firms (columns 5 and 6) are, in general, larger 
than differences between closed and slightly open firms (columns 4 and 5). This indicates that 
firms with no or a low level of openness appear to be quite similar. However, when we further 
distinguish between levels of export and import intensity (Table 1.2 columns 1-3 and 4-6, 
respectively), this pattern is not as clear. While firms with higher levels of both import and 
export intensity are larger and face both lower cash stock variation and higher cash-flows (which 
should be expected at least for heavy exporters and might be a sign of lower constraints), 
intensive exporters are distinct from intensive importers when it comes to sales growth. In fact, 
while for higher levels of export intensity firms face lower sales growth, the opposite is true for 
higher levels of import intensity. This is rather puzzling, in particular for the case of exporters, 
since we would expect that sales would increase with higher levels of export intensity, even 
though it may well depend upon economic growth abroad. This odd result is also evident when 
we compare firms before and after they shifted into exporting or importing (columns 7-10).9 In 
addition, for both of these groups of firms, they face larger cash stocks variation and lower cash-
flows, once they shifted, which is in contrast with the statistics found for different intensities.10 
  
                                                 
8
 We should note that the economic downturn that came after 2001 may be affecting, to a larger extent some of these 
variables (e.g. exports or sales growth). 
9
 Nevertheless, this is in line with the downward economic cycle that came after 2001, which, for the Portuguese 
case, is clear from the reduction in sales growth in the second major period of analysis (Table 1.1). 
10
 See Table A1 for non-parametric tests comparing the distribution of main variables between different subsamples. 
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Table VII.1.1. Summary Statistics 1 
 Period Degree of Openness 
VARIABLES 1996-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 NO LOW HIGH 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆, 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (0.062) (0.064) (0.061) (0.070) (0.055) (0.059) 
,  0.085 0.091 0.081 0.083 0.082 0.089 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.098) (0.085) (0.083) 
∆, 0.037 0.073 0.015 0.040 0.041 0.030 
 (0.288) (0.280) (0.290) (0.326) (0.269) (0.264) 
, 15.539 15.441 15.599 15.074 15.698 15.840 
 (1.448) (1.508) (1.406) (1.508) (1.476) (1.237) 
,  0.063 0.077 0.054 0.068 0.061 0.060 
 (0.081) (0.091) (0.074) (0.090) (0.077) (0.076) 
∆, -0.048 -0.060 -0.040 -0.051 -0.046 -0.047 
 (0.166) (0.179) (0.157) (0.189) (0.155) (0.152) 
, 0.035 0.058 0.021 0.036 0.037 0.032 
 (0.209) (0.218) (0.203) (0.227) (0.201) (0.198) 
	
, 0.039 0.038 0.040 0.039 0.042 0.036 
 (0.088) (0.086) (0.090) (0.096) (0.090) (0.079) 
∆, -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
R 0.030 0.037 0.026    
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)    
OPEN 0.125 0.134 0.119    
 (0.175) (0.180) (0.171)    
       
Observations 17,283 6,600 10,683 5,757 5,444 6,066 
N. of firms 4,771 2,606 3,333 1,537 1,462 1,632 
Notes: Mean values and standard deviations, given in parentheses, of the main variables used in the estimations. 
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Table VII.1.2. Summary Statistics 2 
 Export intensity Import intensity Export shifting Import shifting 
VARIABLES NO LOW HIGH NO LOW HIGH Before After Before After 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
∆, 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003 
 (0.067) (0.055) (0.058) (0.069) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.055) (0.058) (0.056) 
, 0.083 0.085 0.088 0.081 0.083 0.091 0.094 0.085 0.089 0.081 
 (0.095) (0.081) (0.084) (0.096) (0.085) (0.082) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
∆, 0.045 0.033 0.027 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.066 0.035 0.051 0.024 
 (0.313) (0.261) (0.266) (0.323) (0.271) (0.256) (0.292) (0.271) (0.272) (0.279) 
, 15.226 15.817 15.809 15.106 15.663 15.947 15.724 15.818 15.827 15.793 
 (1.540) (1.302) (1.301) (1.496) (1.450) (1.229) (1.413) (1.414) (1.469) (1.434) 
,  0.067 0.056 0.062 0.066 0.060 0.062 0.074 0.054 0.067 0.056 
 (0.089) (0.075) (0.074) (0.088) (0.076) (0.077) (0.092) (0.072) (0.079) (0.079) 
∆, -0.050 -0.039 -0.051 -0.050 -0.049 -0.044 -0.053 -0.039 -0.048 -0.047 
 (0.181) (0.148) (0.154) (0.187) (0.154) (0.149) (0.175) (0.168) (0.169) (0.167) 
, 0.040 0.034 0.028 0.035 0.033 0.037 0.060 0.026 0.044 0.024 
 (0.222) (0.194) (0.200) (0.226) (0.202) (0.194) (0.222) (0.197) (0.230) (0.197) 
∆, -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
	
, 0.040 0.037 0.040 0.039 0.043 0.036 0.042 0.049 0.048 0.049 
 (0.094) (0.082) (0.084) (0.094) (0.091) (0.078) (0.092) (0.105) (0.100) (0.108) 
           
Observations 8,039 4,315 4,913 6,652 5,066 5,550 990 990 1,302 1,302 
N. of firms 2,210 1,144 1,333 1,782 1,374 1,523 300 300 397 397 
Notes: Mean values and standard deviations, given in parentheses, of the main variables used in the estimations. 
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 Table 1.3 reports the Spearman's correlation coefficients for the main variables used 
and by different sub-periods.11 Firstly, we should point that the positive association between 
cash-flow and both changes in cash stocks and investment is slightly larger for the first 
period, which may provide the first insights on possible differences in CCFS (as well as 
ICFS).12 Secondly, we should highlight that whereas in the first period there is a significant 
positive correlation between the benchmark interest rate and sales growth, this association 
is negative and significant in the second period (which may well result from the economic 
cycle). Meanwhile, the correlation between benchmark interest rate and cash-stock 
variation is only significantly negative for the first period. This latter pattern is also verified 
when it comes to the correlation between exports and both cash stock variation and sales 
growth. Additionally, there is a strong positive association between size and both export 
and import intensity, suggesting that larger firms are those that export and import the most, 
which is not unexpected.13 Furthermore, the extremely high and significant correlation 
between import and export intensities is also as expected and indicates that defining degree 
of openness as the combination of both is sensible. Finally, the positive correlation between 
cash-flow and both export and import intensity is higher and strongly significant for the 
second period, pointing to potentially larger benefits for international firms after the 
Monetary integration. 
 
                                                 
11
 We avoid using Pearson's correlation coefficients due to the non-normality of a large number of variables. 
12
 We test the alternative ICFS methodology and in fact results point to larger sensitivities in the first period 
(0.61 against 0.23, significant at 5% level). 
13
 In fact, the correlation between size (total assets) and degree of openness is positive, high and statistically 
significant. The same is true if instead of total assets we use number of employees as a measure of size 
(spearman's rho is 0.23*). Furthermore, for different size classes (with thresholds at 50, 100 and 250 
employees) the mean degree of openness is 0.07, 0.11, 0.16 and 0.17 for small, medium-small, medium-large 
and large firms, respectively. 
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Table VII.1.3. Spearman's rank correlation coefficients for the different periods 
1996-2004 ∆ CF ∆ S I ∆ ISS ∆ 	
, R EXPORT IMPORT OPEN 
∆ 1.000             
CF 0.0830* 1.000            
∆ 0.1185* 0.2395* 1.000           
S -0.0012 -0.0539* 0.0386* 1.000          
I -0.0274* 0.3205* 0.1594* -0.0189 1.000         
∆ -0.2525* 0.0051 0.0248* 0.0518* -0.2827* 1.000        
ISS 0.1105* -0.1433* 0.1740* 0.0437* 0.2043* 0.003 1.000       
∆ -0.0089 -0.0742* 0.1246* 0.0164 0.0876* 0.0354* 0.2125* 1.000      
	
,  -0.0218* -0.0736* -0.0324* 0.4043* -0.0404* -0.0135 0.0065 -0.0019 1.000     
R -0.0307* 0.0360* 0.0888* -0.0514* 0.1318* -0.0377* 0.0598* 0.1180* -0.0054 1.000    
EXPORT -0.0202 0.0492* -0.0254* 0.2135* 0.0260* -0.0028 -0.0188 -0.0340* 0.0817* 0.0121 1.000   
IMPORT -0.0101 0.0507* 0.0131 0.2876* 0.0130 0.0303* 0.0009 -0.0199 0.0819* 0.0232* 0.5501* 1.000  
OPEN -0.0170 0.0477* -0.0092 0.2581* 0.0145 0.0175 -0.0083 -0.0281* 0.0761* 0.0239* 0.8256* 0.8619* 1.000 
1996-2000              
∆ 1.000             
CF 0.0896* 1.000            
∆ 0.1277* 0.2170* 1.000           
S -0.0158 -0.0619* 0.0426* 1.000          
I -0.0170 0.3496* 0.1211* -0.0216 1.000         
∆ -0.2372* -0.0336* 0.0284 0.0671* -0.3055* 1.000        
ISS 0.1087* -0.1491* 0.1596* 0.0736* 0.1926* 0.0616* 1.000       
∆ -0.0196 -0.0828* 0.1289* 0.0327* 0.0727* -0.0073 0.2039* 1.000      
	
,  -0.0192 -0.0599* -0.0265 0.4242* -0.0338* 0.0030 0.0189 0.0064 1.000     
R -0.0700* -0.0241 0.0564* 0.0202 -0.0244 0.0549* 0.0073 0.3142* 0.0005 1.000    
EXPORT -0.0386* 0.0374* -0.0544* 0.2311* 0.0341* 0.0018 -0.0128 -0.0258 0.0653* -0.0178 1.000   
IMPORT -0.0254 0.0248 0.0062 0.3251* 0.0099 0.0445* 0.0158 -0.0013 0.0925* 0.0004 0.5372* 1.000  
OPEN -0.0386* 0.0245 -0.0334* 0.2862* 0.0128 0.0286 0.0014 -0.0149 0.0720* -0.0091 0.8264* 0.8536* 1.000 
2001-2004              
∆ 1.000             
CF 0.0766* 1.000            
∆ 0.1115* 0.2462* 1.000           
S 0.0131 -0.0372* 0.0587* 1.000          
I -0.0362* 0.2822* 0.1487* 0.0098 1.000         
∆ -0.2698* 0.0540* 0.0419* 0.0270 -0.2460* 1.000        
ISS 0.1135* -0.1520* 0.1671* 0.0285 0.1892* 0.0215 1.000       
∆ 0.0055 -0.0747* 0.1088* 0.0065 0.0872* -0.0144 0.2191* 1.000      
	
,  -0.0243 -0.0850* -0.0349* 0.3846* -0.0442* 0.0009 -0.0030 -0.0086 1.000     
R -0.0207 -0.0143 -0.1026* -0.0165 0.0263 -0.0287 -0.0152 -0.0829* 0.0113 1.000    
EXPORT -0.0015 0.0573* -0.0050 0.2009* 0.0101 -0.0032 -0.0308* -0.0458* 0.0984* -0.0013 1.000   
IMPORT 0.0049 0.0717* 0.0138 0.2550* 0.0065 0.0194 -0.0185 -0.0416* 0.0724* 0.0208 0.5619* 1.000  
OPEN 0.0044 0.0658* 0.0057 0.2361* 0.0051 0.0106 -0.0245 -0.0450* 0.0809* 0.0161 0.8248* 0.8693* 1.000 
Notes: Rank correlation coefficients were calculated using Sidak's adjustment. * denotes statistical significance at the .01 level. 
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4.2. Monetary integration 
Portuguese firms, during the period 1996-2004 were, on average, financially constrained. 
Table 2 shows that before monetary integration firms saved, on average, 25 cents out of 
each euro of cash flow, meanwhile after integration the CCFS was reduced to 0.183 (first 
line of columns 2 and 3, respectively).14 A formal Wald test rejects the hypothesis that the 
CCFS coefficient after integration is the same as before integration, at the 95% level. If we 
abstain from controlling for the money market, the difference in CCFS is also large and 
statistically significant (columns 6 and 7).15 Noteworthy differences are also found with 
respect to the impact of sales growth, size, debt and equity issuances and interest payments 
variations in the cash policy of firms. The Euro landmark is further emphasized if year 
dummies are introduced (column 1). Even though a comparison between the two periods 
with year dummies is not econometrically feasible, in a regression over the whole period 
1996-2004, only the dummy corresponding to 2000 is statistically significant.16 This may 
indicate that, in this particular year, there were changes that significantly affected firms' 
cash policy. Alternatively, if we control for the evolution of the benchmark interest rate 
(columns 4 and 5), it is possible to observe that not only the CCFS difference between 
periods is much lower (and not statistically significant), but also that there is a huge 
difference in the impact of the benchmark interest rate between periods (negative for the 
first period and not different from zero in the second).17 This result indicates that the 
evolution of interest rates (fell from 7.2% in 1996 to 2.1% in 2004), that mirrors the 
integration process, were an important determinant of firms' cash policy. Therefore, even if 
firms anticipated this effect, it helps in explaining the differences in CCFS between periods 
(columns 2-3 and 6-7) and supports the analysis distinguishing each period.  
                                                 
14
 Results using ICFS approach (see Chapter V) yield 0.710*** and 0.326** estimates for the periods 1996-
2000 and 2001-2004, respectively. 
15
 Chapter V refers to a few benchmark CCFS coefficients from other studies. 
16
 The use of lagged variables both as independent\endogenous variables and instruments imposes that a 
number of year dummies must be dropped due to collinearity. However, we tested simpler regressions and 
results do not differ substantially. Namely, either d5 (2000) is the only significant dummy (always at 1% 
level) or dummies corresponding to previous years are slightly significant (at either 5% or 10% levels), while 
2000 remains the most significant. 
17
 Note that the introduction of the benchmark interest rate, that is common to all firms—even though in 
practice firms are able to negotiate with banks\lenders their own interest rate (the reason to use interest 
paid)—implies that neither year dummies nor interest paid can be used in the estimation. 
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Table VII.2:CCFS estimation with different controls for money market 
 Dummies Baseline estimation Benchmark interest rate No controls 
VARIABLES 1996-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
, 0.185*** 0.245*** 0.184*** 0.221*** 0.190*** 0.245*** 0.188*** 
 (0.017) (0.037) (0.027) (0.037) (0.027) (0.037) (0.027) 
∆, 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.011** 0.021*** 0.010** 0.019*** 0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
, 0.015*** 0.028** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.023* 0.040*** 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) 
, -0.220*** -0.241*** -0.241*** -0.244*** -0.242*** -0.237*** -0.243*** 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) 
∆, -0.149*** -0.155*** -0.159*** -0.148*** -0.161*** -0.151*** -0.161*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) 
, 0.079*** 0.103*** 0.071*** 0.095*** 0.071*** 0.102*** 0.071*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
	
, -0.130*** -0.252*** -0.235*** -0.241*** -0.237*** -0.243*** -0.237*** 
 (0.017) (0.048) (0.030) (0.047) (0.030) (0.048) (0.030) 
∆, -0.214** -0.205 -0.364**     
 (0.094) (0.157) (0.143)     
R    -0.734*** -0.100   
    (0.129) (0.128)   
1999 -0.002       
 (0.002)       
2000 -0.009***       
 (0.002)       
2002 -0.001       
 (0.002)       
2003 0.001       
 (0.002)       
        
Observations 15,277 5,212 8,756 5,212 8,756 5,212 8,756 
N. of firms 4,771 2,606 3,333 2,606 3,333 2,606 3,333 
R-squared 0.184 0.212 0.201 0.224 0.199 0.211 0.199 
Hansen p-val. 0.289 0.393 0.134 0.282 0.0976 0.312 0.0912 
Notes: Regression of equation (1) as baseline estimation (columns 2 and 3). In column (1) we introduce year 
dummies, while in columns (4) and (5) we use the benchmark interest rate (R). In columns (6) and (7) we omit 
both ∆, and R. All regressions include two-digit industry dummies (CAE rev.2.1). Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
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4.3. Exporting and importing 
As expected, Table 3 shows that there might be an inverse relationship between the degree 
of openness to foreign markets and financial constraints since, for the whole period, the 
higher the openness, the lower is the CCFS—columns 1-3 report the CCFS estimates that 
are all statistically different. This result may arise either because more open firms may have 
better access to foreign finance or only unconstrained firms are able to exploit foreign 
markets. 
 Interestingly, when we split the sample by the two major periods, we find a 
reduction in constraints for open firms (columns 6 and 7), while the level of financial 
distress of closed firms remains mostly unchanged (columns 4 and 5). However, depending 
on the degree of openness, firms' financial constraints were either reduced (columns 10 and 
11) or, if not equal (estimates in columns 8 and 9 are not statistically different), were 
amplified. This is a puzzling result since we would expect, a priori, that even though the 
reduction in constraints should be larger for highly open firms, firms with lower levels of 
openness should also exhibit a reduction in constraints, given that monetary integration 
should benefit mostly those firms that also have businesses overseas—through exchange 
rate stability and access to both foreign banks and financial markets. Additional differences 
arise between firms with low and high levels of openness with respect to the impacts of 
sales growth, investment and variation of interest paid. We also tested the inclusion of real 
GDP growth or unemployment, in order to capture possible influences of the economic 
cycle, nevertheless the results remain very similar. Results remain unchanged if we 
additionally control for the benchmark interest rate, or even if, instead of degree of 
openness-EU, we use total degree of openness (see Table A3, in the Appendix). 
 These results indicate that while highly open firms benefited the most with the 
integration, closed firms experienced no changes with respect to constraints and, most 
interestingly, slightly open firms faced, if not the same, higher constraints in the second 
period. This odd result arises for firms that have very small degrees of openness—smaller 
than 0.5%, while for firms between 0.5% and 1% the results are as previously hypothesised. 
This might, however, be associated with larger competition for funds in the integrated 
markets, since firms with low degrees of openness might not be as visible abroad as they 
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would be in the domestic market, while at the same time, losing their advantage on the 
domestic market, where lenders will then opt to finance domestic or even foreign firms 
with better prospects. In fact, if we compare the level of constraints of these firms with 
those of closed firms, the difference in CCFS estimates is larger for the initial period than 
for the second period. One could argue that lenders would no longer distinguish between 
slightly open and closed firms. 
 If instead we look at firm export and import activity separately, we see that firms 
with higher export or import intensities are less financially constrained, as expected, even 
though the pattern is clearer for the case of exports—while for exports (Table 4, columns 1-
3) all estimates are statistically different, for the case of imports (Table 5, columns 1-3), 
high intensity estimates are not statistically different from those of lower intensity. 
However, when we compare the levels of constraints before and after monetary integration, 
distinct patterns arise. While no significant differences between periods are found for firms 
that either imported or not (Table 5, columns 4-7), firms that either exported or not (Table 
4, columns 4-7) seem to have experienced a slight reduction in constraints with integration 
(a formal Wald test only rejects that the coefficients are statistically equal at the 90% level). 
Nevertheless, the levels of constraints for non-exporting firms in the second period is much 
larger than those of exporting firms in the first period (Table 4, columns 5 and 6, 
respectively).18 
 If we further distinguish between low and high levels of export and import 
intensities, we find a clear contrast between these firms. Whereas for high export intensity 
firms, financial constraints levels remain unchanged at low levels (estimates in columns 10 
and 11 of Table 4 are not statistically different), high intensity importers experienced a clear 
reduction in constraints (Table 5, columns 10 and 11). These results suggest that firms that 
rely mostly on imports accrued larger benefits from integration than did export driven 
firms. This may arise because the former saw their credit conditions improved overseas, 
while the latter already benefited from a privileged position before integration, corroborated 
by the CCFS estimates for the first period (Table 5, column 10). Conversely, while there is 
                                                 
18
 Note that the reduction in constraints for non-exporting firms, even though apparently unexpected, goes in 
line with the general findings in section 5.2. 
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a clear increase in financial constraints for firms with lower import intensities (Table 5, 
columns 8 and 9), the level of constraints for firms with low export intensity, if not lower, 
remains practically unchanged in the second period (Table 4, columns 8 and 9 report CCFS 
estimates that are not statistically different). This result clarifies the higher CCFS, after 
integration, found for firms with lower degree of openness, provided it is due to a higher 
contribution of importing firms rather than exporting ones.  
 In order to verify if firms' constraints were actually reduced with shifting, there is no 
longer a point in analysing firm openness, since if a firm starts importing, even though 
there might be a constraints alleviating effect due to relationships established abroad, the 
opposite effect might be larger due to a possible necessity of importing goods (either 
machinery or raw materials) that boosts the demand for cash (this pattern is clear from the 
comparison of columns 5 and 6 in Table 6). However, if we look at firms that started 
exporting, it is clear that the self-selection effect (financial constraints barrier) is not as 
large as the benefits accruing from access to better finance either abroad or at home, as we 
can see from the comparison of the estimates from columns 4 and 5 (CCFS coefficients 
dropped from 0.265 to 0.145 and are statistically different). If instead estimates on CCFS 
before and after starting to export would be similar, then this would suggest that less 
constrained firms would self-select into exporting.19 These results are confirmed if, instead 
of splitting the sample, we interact cash-flow with a binary indicator for the shifting 
status—before and after shifting (Table A1 in appendix). Nevertheless, even after starting to 
export, these firms still face significant constraints as they save, on average, 15 cents out of 
each extra euro of cash-flow. Finally, the fact that, on average, firms before starting to 
export present high CCFS (they save 27 cents out of each euro of extra cash-flow), casts 
serious doubts on the hypothesis that only unconstrained firms self-select into exporting 
activity. 
                                                 
19
 We should note that there is a significant reduction in the number of firms from the samples corresponding 
to the periods before shifting to those after shifting, which results from the estimator used, that requires at 
least 3 periods of observations for consistent estimation. This means that if a firm shifted in 1997 we will not 
have sufficient years to estimate the CCFS "before shifting", while such firm will appear in the "after shifting" 
CCFS estimation. To tackle this issue, we only estimate "after shifting" CCFS for those firms whose "before 
shifting" CCFS was feasible. Accordingly we have a smaller subsample of firms for which results are indeed 
comparable. 
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Table VII.3:CCFS estimation by openness towards the EU 
Openness NO LOW HIGH NO YES LOW HIGH 
 1996-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
, 0.269*** 0.173*** 0.107*** 0.284*** 0.272*** 0.208*** 0.151*** 0.167** 0.221*** 0.240*** 0.110*** 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.027) (0.062) (0.056) (0.047) (0.032) (0.068) (0.049) (0.065) (0.043) 
∆, 0.018*** 0.011** 0.014*** 0.031** 0.012* 0.015* 0.008 0.022* 0.004 0.009 0.013* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) 
,  0.018** 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.025 0.032** 0.026* 0.059*** -0.010 0.055*** 0.048** 0.070*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.024) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.022) (0.014) (0.021) (0.012) 
, -0.252*** -0.200*** -0.222*** -0.263*** -0.266*** -0.224*** -0.243*** -0.161*** -0.234*** -0.251*** -0.260*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.042) (0.032) (0.029) (0.020) (0.044) (0.036) (0.040) (0.027) 
∆, -0.166*** -0.134*** -0.161*** -0.168*** -0.177*** -0.148*** -0.163*** -0.137*** -0.150*** -0.166*** -0.182*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.025) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) 
, 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.108*** 0.069*** 0.098*** 0.075*** 0.107*** 0.076*** 0.092*** 0.067*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
∆, -0.484*** -0.081 -0.552*** -0.082 -0.685** -0.301 -0.196 0.186 0.071 -0.704** -0.492** 
 (0.177) (0.144) (0.168) (0.306) (0.285) (0.202) (0.156) (0.266) (0.218) (0.312) (0.229) 
	
,  -0.198*** -0.116*** -0.107*** -0.404*** -0.286*** -0.246*** -0.242*** -0.215*** -0.264*** -0.305*** -0.221*** 
 (0.046) (0.030) (0.030) (0.100) (0.083) (0.055) (0.033) (0.077) (0.062) (0.081) (0.037) 
            
Observations 4,299 4,163 5,173 1,274 2,497 3,400 5,502 1,282 2,340 1,802 2,789 
N. of firms 1,537 1,462 1,632 637 1,008 1,700 2,160 641 960 901 1,093 
R-squared 0.221 0.180 0.180 0.265 0.235 0.199 0.211 0.202 0.207 0.212 0.236 
Hansen p. 0.251 0.200 0.729 0.268 0.182 0.930 0.514 0.986 0.540 0.621 0.477 
Notes: Regression of equation (1). Firms’ openness score definition in Appendix. All regressions include two-digit industry dummies (CAE rev.2.1). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table VII.4:CCFS estimation by export intensity-EU 
Openness NO LOW HIGH NO YES LOW HIGH 
 1996-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
, 0.271*** 0.135*** 0.062** 0.313*** 0.269*** 0.151*** 0.099*** 0.186* 0.119** 0.130** 0.098** 
 (0.027) (0.036) (0.027) (0.059) (0.041) (0.047) (0.035) (0.106) (0.056) (0.051) (0.045) 
∆, 0.014*** 0.010 0.015*** 0.030*** 0.009 0.017** 0.015*** 0.030** 0.005 0.006 0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
, 0.016*** 0.021** 0.019*** 0.013 0.043*** 0.040** 0.042*** 0.077*** 0.014 0.044** 0.052*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.024) (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) 
, -0.253*** -0.210*** -0.174*** -0.253*** -0.271*** -0.235*** -0.203*** -0.275*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.200*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.020) (0.036) (0.026) (0.031) (0.021) (0.048) (0.032) (0.039) (0.028) 
∆, -0.158*** -0.155*** -0.142*** -0.158*** -0.167*** -0.159*** -0.156*** -0.164*** -0.170*** -0.156*** -0.156*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.026) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) 
, 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.063*** 0.111*** 0.079*** 0.100*** 0.064*** 0.109*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.047*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
∆, -0.420*** -0.385** -0.359** -0.039 -0.553** -0.381* -0.449** -0.748** -0.373 -0.258 -0.333 
 (0.139) (0.186) (0.169) (0.241) (0.223) (0.222) (0.177) (0.352) (0.254) (0.292) (0.235) 
	
, -0.162*** -0.161*** -0.079** -0.241*** -0.321*** -0.322*** -0.190*** -0.369*** -0.207*** -0.294*** -0.181*** 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.075) (0.061) (0.071) (0.030) (0.088) (0.049) (0.101) (0.042) 
            
Observations 6,475 3,293 4,299 1,984 3,804 2,762 4,333 1,022 1,833 1,580 2,280 
N. of firms 2,210 1,144 1,333 992 1,500 1,381 1,689 511 742 790 884 
R-squared 0.212 0.210 0.154 0.241 0.231 0.225 0.194 0.282 0.218 0.202 0.188 
Hansen p. 0.228 0.509 0.728 0.173 0.665 0.875 0.633 0.791 0.237 0.782 0.819 
Notes: Regression of equation (1). Firms’ export intensity scores definition in Appendix. All regressions include two-digit industry dummies (CAE 
rev.2.1). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
  
163 
 
 
Table VII.5:CCFS estimation by import intensity-EU 
Openness NO LOW HIGH NO YES LOW HIGH 
 1996-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
, 0.259*** 0.142*** 0.118*** 0.278*** 0.271*** 0.192*** 0.168*** 0.078 0.211*** 0.307*** 0.126*** 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.061) (0.053) (0.051) (0.034) (0.066) (0.053) (0.092) (0.047) 
∆, 0.017*** 0.014** 0.005 0.033*** 0.010 0.016* 0.008 0.017 0.008 0.009 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) 
, 0.017** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.017 0.032** 0.032** 0.061*** 0.009 0.054*** 0.071*** 0.052*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.023) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.023) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) 
, -0.248*** -0.176*** -0.253*** -0.238*** -0.264*** -0.245*** -0.242*** -0.135*** -0.251*** -0.280*** -0.263*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.041) (0.030) (0.032) (0.022) (0.049) (0.041) (0.040) (0.028) 
∆, -0.159*** -0.132*** -0.167*** -0.165*** -0.172*** -0.150*** -0.168*** -0.145*** -0.143*** -0.147*** -0.192*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) 
, 0.077*** 0.066*** 0.091*** 0.103*** 0.067*** 0.095*** 0.075*** 0.098*** 0.067*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.020) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) 
∆, -0.483*** -0.166 -0.267 -0.118 -0.623** -0.369* -0.273 -0.044 -0.041 -0.663* -0.216 
 (0.165) (0.151) (0.177) (0.290) (0.266) (0.219) (0.167) (0.254) (0.238) (0.382) (0.257) 
	
, -0.188*** -0.102*** -0.117*** -0.305*** -0.272*** -0.267*** -0.232*** -0.172*** -0.257*** -0.379*** -0.204*** 
 (0.042) (0.031) (0.031) (0.104) (0.070) (0.058) (0.035) (0.066) (0.066) (0.084) (0.038) 
            
Observations 4,925 3,865 4,614 1,426 2,845 3,076 4,977 1,142 2,109 1,532 2,461 
N. of firms 1,782 1,374 1,523 713 1,156 1,538 1,967 571 871 766 984 
R-squared 0.212 0.155 0.192 0.250 0.225 0.194 0.211 0.182 0.193 0.240 0.231 
Hansen p. 0.341 0.241 0.857 0.337 0.209 0.999 0.531 0.632 0.988 0.479 0.126 
Notes: Regression of equation (1). Firms’ import intensity scores definition in Appendix. All regressions include two-digit industry dummies (CAE 
rev.2.1). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table VII.6:CCFS for shifting firms 
 OPEN EXPORT IMPORT 
VARIABLES Before After Before After Before After 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
, 0.155* 0.178** 0.265*** 0.145** 0.060 0.211*** 
 (0.090) (0.074) (0.094) (0.063) (0.061) (0.062) 
∆, 0.025* 0.015 0.018 0.013 0.011 0.016* 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) 
,  0.024 0.004 0.013 0.025 0.010 -0.002 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015) 
, -0.201*** -0.182*** -0.222*** -0.186*** -0.198*** -0.189*** 
 (0.050) (0.038) (0.044) (0.041) (0.044) (0.036) 
∆,  -0.130*** -0.138*** -0.152*** -0.137*** -0.135*** -0.153*** 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) 
, 0.036** 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.070*** 0.043*** 0.087*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) 
∆, -0.145 -0.221 0.072 -0.023 0.036 0.098 
 (0.294) (0.392) (0.279) (0.393) (0.287) (0.367) 
	
, -0.160*** -0.198** -0.152*** -0.219** -0.171** -0.116 
 (0.059) (0.101) (0.041) (0.087) (0.068) (0.090) 
       
Observations 788 788 731 731 942 942 
N. of firms 330 330 300 300 397 397 
R-squared 0.183 0.215 0.222 0.214 0.179 0.233 
Hansen p-val. 0.528 0.887 0.947 0.493 0.636 0.985 
Notes: Regression of equation (1) for groups of firms that moved from closed to open, started exporting those 
that started importing. All regressions include two-digit industry dummies (CAE rev.2.1).  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
In this Chapter we investigate the extent to which the European monetary integration has 
influenced firms' financial distress, as well as the impact of financial constraints upon firms 
with different exporting and importing activities. 
 Our main findings suggest that firms with higher degrees of openness and 
particularly those with higher export intensities face much lower financial constraints. 
Additionally, while we cast some doubts on the argument that only unconstrained firms 
self-select into exporting activity, we show that firms face lower constraints once they start 
exporting. 
 Furthermore, we find that financial and monetary integration has helped in reducing 
firms' financial constraints. Only for low intensity importers did the level of constraints 
increase. While this process benefited mostly firms that were highly open, there was no 
substantial effect upon firms that relied solely on their domestic market. Overall, these 
results show that these integration processes alleviate firms’ financial constraints by easing 
their access to finance abroad and reducing the price of money in domestic markets. 
 Further research should aim at extending this analysis to a wider time span, 
particularly covering the recent financial crisis, as well as at comparing the level of 
constraints for exporting firms across different economies.  
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Appendix  
Table A1. Non-parametric tests comparing different subsamples 
VARS. i) Integration ii) Openness iii) Export iv) Shifting 
 K-S test F-P test K-S test F-P test K-S test F-P test K-S test F-P test 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
∆, 0.0317 -2.807 0.0484 1.536 0.0664 2.751 0.0664 -1.110 
p-val 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.125 0.033 0.006 0.033 0.267 
, 0.0680 9.112 0.0520 -3.345 0.0731 -3.697 0.0731 2.745 
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.006 
∆, 0.1148 15.813 0.0402 1.781 0.0698 3.525 0.0698 2.585 
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.010 
, 0.0644 -6.809 0.2241 -31.637 0.0507 -30.613 0.0507 -0.990 
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.180 0.322 
, 0.1367 20.755 0.0396 0.184 0.1273 1.658 0.1273 5.779 
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.854 0.000 0.0972 0.000 0.000 
∆, 0.0907 -8.787 0.0502 -1.293 0.0800 -1.747 0.0800 -2.477 
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.196 0.005 0.081 0.005 0.0132 
, 0.0992 13.017 0.0238 0.359 0.1090 2.515 0.1090 4.070 
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.720 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.001 
∆, 0.1173 12.044 0.0494 2.850 0.0763 4.093 0.0763 1.279 
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.201 
	
, 0.0140 -1.396 0.1235 -11.430 0.0550 -10.180 0.0550 -1.121 
p-val 0.392 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.119 0.262 
OPEN 0.0521 6.178       
p-val 0.000 0.000       
Notes: We report the statistics and p-values of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov and a Fligner-Policello test for 
comparing the distributions of main variables between: i) Before (1) against After (0) integration; ii) Open 
(1) against Closed (0); iii) Exporters (1) against Domestic (0); iv) Before (1) against After shifting to 
export (0). 
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Table VII.A2. Relationship between openness, exports, imports and financial constraints using 
interactions 
VARIABLES Open Export Import Export shift 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
, 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.198*** 0.238*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.049) 
 !"
, 0.001    
 (0.011)    
, ∗  !"
, -0.249***    
 (0.074)    
$%!&'(,  0.006   
  (0.007)   
, ∗ $%!&'(,  -0.159***   
  (0.043)   
)!&'(,   0.001  
   (0.008)  
, ∗ )!&'(,   -0.199***  
   (0.066)  
ℎ	+(,    0.014*** 
    (0.005) 
, ∗ ℎ	+(,    -0.113*** 
    (0.039) 
∆, 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.010 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
, 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.013 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
, -0.222*** -0.223*** -0.221*** -0.194*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.026) 
∆, -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.128*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) 
, 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.069*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
∆, -0.338*** -0.336*** -0.333*** 0.065 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.188) 
	
, -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.104*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) 
     
Observations 15,259 15,259 15,260 1,773 
N. of firms 4,765 4,765 4,765 514 
R-squared 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.170 
Hansen p-val. 0.218 0.229 0.222 0.534 
Notes: Regression of equation (1) with interaction terms for cash-flow and degree of openness, export 
intensity and import intensity (columns 1-3, respectively), as well as with a binary indicator for firms 
before and after shifting to export activity (column 4). All regressions include industry dummies (2-digit 
CAE rev.2.1). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
.01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
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Table VII.A3. CCFS changes with monetary integration for firms with low degree of openness 
VARIABLES Open World X≡GDP X≡R X≡U 
 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 1996-2000 2001-2004 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
, 0.167** 0.221*** 0.164** 0.223*** 0.164** 0.227*** 0.164** 0.227*** 
 (0.068) (0.049) (0.069) (0.049) (0.069) (0.049) (0.069) (0.049) 
∆, 0.022* 0.004 0.022* 0.003 0.022* 0.004 0.022* 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) 
	, -0.010 0.055*** -0.005 0.054*** -0.005 0.050*** -0.005 0.050*** 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) 

, -0.161*** -0.234*** -0.163*** -0.233*** -0.163*** -0.232*** -0.163*** -0.232*** 
 (0.044) (0.036) (0.045) (0.036) (0.045) (0.036) (0.045) (0.036) 
∆, -0.137*** -0.150*** -0.136*** -0.150*** -0.136*** -0.151*** -0.136*** -0.151*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) 

		, 0.107*** 0.076*** 0.104*** 0.076*** 0.104*** 0.077*** 0.104*** 0.077*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) 
∆
, 0.186 0.071 0.267 0.055 0.267 0.067 0.267 0.056 
 (0.266) (0.218) (0.283) (0.219) (0.283) (0.217) (0.283) (0.218) 

, -0.215*** -0.264*** -0.212*** -0.265*** -0.212*** -0.265*** -0.212*** -0.265*** 
 (0.077) (0.062) (0.075) (0.062) (0.075) (0.062) (0.075) (0.062) 
X   -0.003 0.001 -0.174 -0.418* 0.003 0.009* 
   (0.004) (0.002) (0.253) (0.220) (0.004) (0.005) 
         
Observations 1,282 2,340 1,282 2,340 1,282 2,340 1,282 2,340 
N. of firms 641 960 641 960 641 960 641 960 
Hansen p-val. 0.986 0.540 0.972 0.569 0.972 0.566 0.972 0.582 
R-squared 0.202 0.207 0.203 0.207 0.203 0.209 0.203 0.209 
Notes: Regression of equation (1). Firms’ openness score definition in Chapter IV. The following variables are tested: Gross domestic product (GDP), 
benchmark interest rate (R) and Unemployment (U). Column (1) also reports estimates using a broader definition of openness—exports and imports to and 
from any foreign country. All regressions include two-digit industry dummies (CAE rev.2.1). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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CHAPTER VIII – R&D INVESTMENT, INNOVATION AND SUBSIDIES 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent shortage of financial resources has raised new interest on the role of financial 
constraints in firm dynamics. As a consequence, it is crucial to verify and quantify the extent 
to which R&D investment and ultimately innovation is affected by these constraints. If 
innovation is to be one of the main drivers of economic growth and if indeed such constraints 
are present, hindering firms' ability to work as main drivers of innovation and distorting the 
selection process, then financial constraints and policies to mitigate them, must be a priority 
in microeconomic research. 
 Accordingly, the goal of this Chapter is to broadly analyse the financing problems of 
the innovation process. In particular, we investigate the impact of financial constraints upon 
R&D investment and innovation, as well as the role of public financial support in alleviating 
such constraints. In order to provide robust findings, we use different approaches and both 
direct and indirect measures of constraints. For this purpose, we construct an unique dataset 
that contains firms' characteristics, balance sheets, information on innovation activity and a 
direct (self-assessed) measure of financial constraints. Upon this data, we first estimate the 
cash-flow sensitivity of cash (CCFS), by distinguishing different subsamples of firms that 
either or not innovate, invest in R&D and receive public financial support. Secondly, to 
investigate the impact of financial constraints upon R&D investment, we test different 
specifications, controlling for selection and endogeneity. Thirdly, in order to account for 
endogeneity of financial constraints on innovation, we specify a simultaneous equations 
probit model that we further extend to the ordered probit case. Finally, we explore the impact 
of public financial support (subsidies) upon firms' perception of constraints, through both a 
probit and a simultaneous equations probit (and ordered probit) specifications. 
 Our findings suggest that firms that do not innovate (but are potential innovators), 
those that do not invest in R&D, and those that do not receive public funding are financially 
constrained. Moreover, controlling for endogeneity, we find that financial constraints 
severely reduce the amounts invested in R&D and seriously hamper innovation. Finally, we 
question the extent to which subsidies effectively alleviate firms' financial constraints. 
 This work is the first, as far as we know, to combine different methodologies to 
evaluate the role of financial constraints on the innovation activity of firms. More 
importantly, it contributes to the extant innovation literature by being the first, to our 
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knowledge, to explicitly analyse the nexus between financial constraints and public financial 
support, bridging two closely related lines of research within innovation studies. Finally, we 
make use of an unique dataset that covers the period 1996-2004 and combines firms' 
characteristics with both balance sheet data and information on the innovation activities of 
firms, drawn from three different waves of Community Innovation Surveys (CISs II, III and 
IV). This has barely been done and is a novelty with respect to Portugal. 
 The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 makes a brief incursion on the 
empirical literature concerning financial constraints, innovation and public financial support, 
as well as it puts forward the main hypothesis to be tested. In Section 3 we describe the 
empirical methodology followed. Section 4 presents the main results, that are followed by a 
discussion in Section 5. Finally Section 6 pulls the pieces together and concludes. 
 
2. Financing problems of the innovation process 
2.1. Financial constraints, R&D investment and innovation 
 As we have seen in Chapter III, Stylized Result 6, when it comes to R&D investment 
and innovation—assuming that the effort to innovate draws from the capacity that firms have 
to invest in R&D (input for innovation)—this type of investments is expected to be more 
financially constrained than investment in physical capital. The rational is that R&D, in 
opposition to physical capital is not only harder to use as collateral (possible credit multiplier 
effects), but is also of a riskier nature and entails significant information asymmetry problems 
(Hall and Lerner, 2010). In particular, these information asymmetries may be further 
amplified if firms try to conceal their R&D projects, fearing any leak of information to 
competitors, that could prove to be fatal in their attempt to innovate.1 
 Notwithstanding, empirical literature on the impact of financial constraints upon 
innovation has mostly relied on datasets composed mainly of firms' financial information, 
patents and R&D expenses (e.g. Bond, et al., 2003b, Scellato, 2007 or Brown and Petersen, 
2011) that are not as specific as for example (for the European case) the Community 
Innovations Surveys (CISs), that are particularly designed to evaluate the innovation activity 
of firms—see Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010 for a survey of findings using CIS. Additionally, 
they also include extremely useful information on firms' perception of financial constraints.  
                                                           
1
 We should note, however, that besides the usual, but distinct, forms to raise external finance (see Majumdar, 
2011 for heterogeneous impacts of different debt types in R&D investment)—such as bank lending, issuing debt 
and equity in capital markets or even trade credit—business angels and, notoriously, venture capital play a 
central role when it comes to innovation (see Hall and Lerner, 2010 for an overview). Nevertheless, an analysis 
of the role of venture capital on the financing of innovation is not in the scope of this work. Effectively, we do 
not have information on start-ups and very young firms due to the CIS sample design. 
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 To our knowledge, only a reduced number of tests have been performed with a 
combined dataset of CIS (or other specific innovation survey) and financial information, of 
which Mueller and Zimmermann (2006), Savignac (2008), Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer 
(2010) and Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011a) are examples. 
 While initial results using CISs found that the impact of obstacles on the innovation 
activity of firms was positive, subsequent literature has found that, after controlling for 
endogenous variables, such as financial constraints, the reported estimates on the impact of 
obstacles were found to be negative, as expected (e.g. Savignac, 2008, Tiwari et al., 2008). 
This endogeneity, for the specific case of financial constraints, results from unobservables 
that correlate both with financial constraints and innovation\R&D investment. This is the case 
of firm-specific R&D investment project uncertainty, duration and confidentiality (see 
Savignac, 2008). We should also note that innovators might be expected to face lower 
constraints due to a better financial position associated with a possibly better economic 
performance, which further adds to the endogeneity problem. Moreover, the decision to apply 
for credit and the probability of credit approval, may well depend upon firms' R&D intensity 
(Guiso, 1998; Azteni and Piga, 2005).2 Therefore, once endogeneity is taken into account, we 
expect that:3 
H1) Financial constraints reduce the amounts invested in R&D 
H2) The probability that a firm innovates is negatively affected by financial constraints 
 
 
2.2. Pubic financial support 
Financial constraints and subsidies are two closely related lines of research within innovation 
studies. On one hand, as previously discussed, researchers have strived to measure the impact 
of financial constraints upon R&D investment and innovation. On the other hand, the effects 
of public policy, and specifically subsidies, on R&D spending and innovation performance, 
have been given particular attention in recent years (e.g. Bloom et al., 2002; Almus and 
Czarnitzki, 2003; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Schneider and Veugelers, 2010). However, as far 
                                                           
2
 Not to mention the possible endogeneity stemming from the survey-based financial constraints variable we 
use, since the probability that a firm reports as constrained might well increase as it is committed to more 
innovation projects. Additionally, more innovative firms are also more aware of such constraints (e.g. Tiwari et 
al., 2008; Savignac, 2008). 
3
 Even though it is not the purpose of this work to explore such effects, we should note that innovation may also 
be hampered by other constraints that relate to the ability of firms to absorb new technology (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990) and enhance competitiveness (e.g. Teece et al., 1997). Namely, a set of resources and 
capabilities at the human, organizational, networking and legislatory levels, as argued by the resource-based 
literature, may significantly constrain innovation (e.g. Hewitt-Dundas, 2006). 
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as we know, the role of public financial support to R&D investment and innovation (hereafter 
subsidies for simplicity purposes) in alleviating firms' financial constraints has never been 
analysed explicitly (see Chapter III, Stylized Result 6).4 
 Subsidising private R&D and innovation activities is generally agreed by researchers 
to be desirable in order to foster economic growth, as well as it is in the agenda of several 
policymakers. The main theoretical argument for public support of R&D and innovation 
activities resides in higher social than private returns to R&D investment, due to incomplete 
appropriability and knowledge spillovers (Hall and Lerner, 2010). In this line, the main 
empirical issue is whether subsidies stimulate or replace R&D spending (David et al., 2000). 
Recent empirical literature suggests that the former hypothesis holds—subsidies have a 
significant additionality effect on R&D spending (e.g. Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Czarnitzki 
and Bento, 2011). This effect seems to be particularly relevant for research activity in 
comparison to development, where subsidies appear to have a "crowding out" effect 
(Clausen, 2009). This distinction—in line with the findings that point that the former is more 
prone to financial constraints than the latter (Czarnitzki et al., 2011)—suggests that subsidies 
may prove to be particularly efficient when aimed at financially constrained firms. 
 Accordingly, besides the market inefficiencies argument, associated with the "public 
good" nature of knowledge, the existence of financial market frictions (financial constraints) 
might also be ground for public intervention. Therefore, the question of interest is whether 
public financial support effectively reduces financial constraints? It is apparent that subsidies 
directly increase firms' financial capacity. However, when it comes to information 
asymmetries and firm access to external funds, the effect is not as clear—except for other 
public intervention forms such as special credit lines and backed debt policies. Nevertheless, 
provided that subsidies are specifically designed and correctly allocated to financially 
constrained firms, they signal favourable growth (innovation, in this particular context) 
prospects to investors. Additionally, such subsidies in the current period, may enhance 
current economic performance and therefore reduce financial constraints in the future. As a 
consequence, we expect that:  
H3) Subsidies reduce the extent to which R&D investment\innovation is 
financially constrained 
  
                                                           
4
 We should note that the impact of public intervention upon financial constraints, that are not specific to the 
innovation process, has been previously analysed, even though with different methodologies (e.g. Zecchini and 
Ventura, 2009). 
173 
 Overall, the analysis of the impact of financial constraints upon the innovation process 
usually relies on either subjective self-assessed measures or on methodologies that can be 
questionable on theoretical and empirical grounds. In fact, there appears to be no consistent 
measure of financial constraints, even though strong policy implications are drawn from 
investigations using a sole measure of such constraints with strong underlying assumptions 
(Coad, 2010a). Keeping this caveat in mind, and resorting to different measures, we attempt 
to contribute to the clarification of the financing problems (and possible remedies) of the 
innovation process. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Model A: Measuring financial constraints using CCFS 
As we have seen in previous Chapters, ACW (Almeida et al., 2004) suggest that firms’ 
financial constraints can be measured by the sensitivity of cash to cash-flows (CCFS). They 
argue that, by being forced to manage liquidity, constrained firms will save cash out of cash-
flows, while no systematic relationship should be found for unconstrained firms. In line with 
the discussion of this approach in Chapters II and V, while the financial nature of cash stocks 
avoids measurements problems in Q, recent literature pointed that cash may alternatively be 
used to reduce debt if hedging needs are low (Acharya et al, 2007) and that firms’ 
intertemporal transfers of resources can also be done using relatively liquid assets, rather than 
only through cash (Almeida et al., 2011). Keeping these caveats in mind, we have the 
following empirical specification: 
∆, = 	
, + ∆, + , + , + ∆, + , +  
+	∆,+
, + ,  (VIII. A1) 
where ∆, is the variation in cash stocks for firm  in year , 
, is cash-flow, , is a 
control for firm size (log of total assets),	, is investment, ∆, is the variation of 
noncash net working capital and , the error term. We shall use sales growth (∆,) instead 
of Q as a proxy for investment opportunities (see Chapter V). Additionally, we implement a 
slight modification to the original model. In the spirit of Lin (2007), we substitute the 
variation of short term-debt by the sum of net debt and equity issuances (,) and changes 
in interest paid (∆,). The former modification is due to the fact that debt and equity 
issuances, while being a signal of easier access to external funds, might have a significant 
impact upon cash stocks (by accounting procedures), so we control for such effect. With 
respect to the latter, firms may decide to reduce their borrowings or pay back debt according 
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to expected interest expenses. However, instead of benchmark interest rate variations, we use 
variations of interest paid, which allows for firm variation and thus can also be seen as a form 
of credit rating. Furthermore, we also control for financial investments (
,), that not only 
are a demand for cash but may also work as an alternative way to transfer resources across 
time.5 The above mentioned variables (except S) are scaled by total assets. 
 The financial and investment covariates are endogenous, so there is a need to estimate 
the model using instrumental variables, along with fixed effects to take account of 
unobserved firm-level heterogeneity and panel-robust standard errors. The cross-sectional 
nature of the different CIS waves (1997, 2000 and 2004) entails significant problems for the 
estimation of CCFS. The endogeneity of the financial covariates recommends the use of 
instrumental variables. However, the most appropriate instruments would be lagged—in 
some cases twice and further lagged because of the exogeneity condition, in order to provide 
consistent estimates—values of these variables. Unfortunately, the use of lagged values—
particularly those of variables built upon differenced values—will require at least 2 periods of 
data to be lost, meaning that the first wave of CIS (1997) would not be taken into account.6 
Therefore, for this model, we assume that the CIS information represents averages for the 
corresponding wave span and make use of the full length of the panel. 
 In order to compare financial constraints across different types of firms, we split our 
sample into subsamples of firms that: (i) innovated (INNOV=1) and those that did not 
(INNOV=1); (ii) decided to invest in R&D (RD=1) and those that did not (RD=0); (iii) 
received public financial support (SUB=1) and those that did not (SUB=1). For the case of 
investment in R&D, we additionally estimate an interaction of total R&D expenditures 
(I_RD) with cash-flow of the form: 
∆, = 	
, + _ !, + 	
, ∗ _ !, + ∆, + , + ∆, + , +  
+	∆,+
, + ,  (VIII. A2) 
 
  
                                                           
5
 We test the different specifications departing from Almeida et a. (2004). CCFS estimates range from 0.1 to 
0.26, where major differences are driven by the replacement of short-term debt by equity and debt issuances and 
interest payments. The inclusion of financial investments (always strongly significant) leads to a slight reduction 
of CCFS estimates, possibly capturing the effect (for financially constrained firms) of the use of these 
investments to allocate present resources (cash-flows) to future states as an alternative to cash holdings (see 
Table A1 in Appendix). 
6
 The set of instruments includes profitability, percentage of sales of innovated products, lagged net working 
capital two-digit industry indicators, lagged bond issuance, leverage and self assessed financial constraints. 
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3.2.Model B: Sample selection in R&D investment, with endogenous financial constraints 
In addition to the possible endogeneity of FC for reasons presented in Section 2.2, our R&D 
investment variable has an excess of zeroes and is highly skewed.7 Accordingly, we assume 
that the R&D investment process encompasses two decisions. While the first is firms' 
decision either to invest or not in R&D, the second is the decision of the amounts that should 
be invested. However, these are not independent (the errors from two-step equations are 
correlated, which we confirm further on) and therefore a joint specification is needed. 
Consequently, this setup falls into the selection models category.8 
 As a result, to evaluate the impact of financial constraints, as well as other firms' 
characteristics, on the amounts spent in R&D we build up a model that takes into account 
both selection and the endogenous nature of the financial constraint variable. The model is 
described as: 
 !_ = #		 + 
 +  (VIII. B1) 

∗ = $ + % (VIII. B2) 
 ! = 1'# + ( > 0+				,									(~'0,1+ (VIII. B3) 
where (B3) describes the selection process, since we only observe the amount invested in 
R&D ( !_)—measured in logarithms—when firms decide to invest in R&D ( ! = 1). This 
decision is based on a latent variable that can be seen as the propensity to invest ( !∗ =
# + (). Both Z and  ! are always observed. Additionally, self-assessed financial 
constraints (
) is also always observed (note that the latent variable 
∗ is not), but is an 
endogenous variable in (B1). Finally, we allow for arbitrary correlation among (, % and . 
 The estimation procedure takes two steps: (a) we estimate a probit model for equation 
(B3) upon the full sample and obtain the estimated inverse Mills ratios (-. =); (b) using that 
information, we estimate 
 !_ = #		 + 
 + /-. + 0 (VIII. B4) 
upon the selection sample. So far, this is similar to the traditional Heckit estimator (after 
Heckman, 1976, 1979). However, the suspected endogeneity of the ordinal FC requires that 
                                                           
7
 While we have 71% of zeroes, the mean (904324) is much higher than the median (163549). 
8
 We recognize the possibility of an alternative specification that relates to the Poisson distribution, usually 
associated with count data (GLM with a log-link that extends to the GMM version for instrumenting FC). See 
Nichols (2010) for a reference. 
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we take into account (B2) (see Wooldridge, 2002 pp. 567-570).9 Note that at least one 
covariate in Z must be excluded (#) in the estimating equation (B4) in order to guarantee 
identification. 
 In order to obtain correct standard errors we use the bootstrap pairs method, instead of 
a more complex derivation of the necessary correction of the standard errors. Accordingly, 
we bootstrap following procedure: 1) estimate a probit of the R&D investment decision; 2) 
construct the inverse Mills ratio; 3) estimate the volume of R&D investment, taking into 
account the inverse mills and the endogeneity of financial constraints. 
 To take into account the endogeneity of financial constraints we use different 
consistent approaches in the last step, namely: 3.1) Ignore the ordinal nature of FC and 
estimate a regular optimal GMM; 3.2) Obtain fitted values of FC by resorting to the 
appropriate ordered probit estimation and then use these as instrument for FC —see Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005 pp. 193. 
 Once again, the data imposes us some constraints in estimating the selection model. 
Not only the same problem with the inclusion of covariates persists, but there is an additional 
issue with our dependent variable (expenditures in R&D). If we opt to scale those expenses 
by either total assets or sales, there is a significant loss of observations (approximately half of 
initial number of observations). As a result we will work with non-scaled logarithm of total 
expenditures in R&D. Our full set of variables Z includes: firm size; age; industry dummies; 
exports (EXP); labour productivity (LPROD); investment opportunities to R&D investment 
(Y_IN); investment opportunities (∆1); percentage of R&D employees (RD_WORK), public 
funding (SUB); cooperation with other firms and institutions (COOP); leverage; market share 
(MKTS) and other barriers to innovate (B_TRAB, B_TECH and B_MARK). In the estimating 
equation (B4) we exclude MKTS, LPROD, leverage and other barriers to innovate in order to 
guarantee identification.10 
  
                                                           
9
 This equation explains financial constraints through the combination of both firms' characteristics and financial 
variables: firm size (SIZE); firm age (AGE); 2-digit industry dummies (CAE rev 2.1); percentage of public and 
foreign capital (PUB_K and FOR_K, respectively); investment opportunities (∆1); cash stocks (CS); cash-flow 
(CF); leverage (LEV); debt and equity issuances (ISS); changes in interest paid (∆INT); returns on financial 
investments (R_FIN); exports (EXP); market share (MKTS) and a dummy for firms that received subsidies 
(SUB). With the exception of PUB_K, FOR_K, ∆1, ISS and ∆, we use the year lag values to account for 
the wave span. 
10
 If #	=#, then 	 is only identified because of the nonlinearity of the inverse mills ratio. This can lead to 
multicollinearity problems. As a rule of thumb, at least two variables should not appear in the selected 
regression. 
177 
 We compare the estimates with those of a simple OLS, a "hurdle" model and a 
selection model with no endogeneity, where we should note that, in these cases, non-linear 
FC can not be used directly in the estimating equation. Accordingly we collapse it into a 
binary indicator of whether or not a firm reported any financial constraints (
2).11 
 
3.3.Model C: Impact of financial constraints directly upon innovation 
Following Savignac (2008), we estimate the impact of financial constraints directly upon 
innovation. This is achieved by estimating a simultaneous equations model (specifically a 
bivariate normal specification of errors within a simultaneous equations probit model) of 
underlying latent variables—propensity to innovate (34∗) and level of financial 
constraints (
2∗)—of the following form: 
534
∗ = $		 + 	
2 + 	

2∗ = $ + 34 + 
6
,            (VIII. C1) 
For logical consistency purposes we set ( = 0) and additionally normalize the variance of 
the errors: 
534
∗ = $		 + 	
2 + 	

2∗ = $ + 																								
6
, 7	8~Φ 9
0
0: ;
1 <
< 1=         (VIII. C2) 
where $	 includes the investment in R&D (RD_I), firm size, age, other barriers to innovate 
(B_TRAB, B_TECH and B_MARK), subsidies (SUB), cooperation with other firms and 
institutions (COOP), percentage of R&D employees (RD_WORK), investment opportunities 
(∆1) and market share (MKTS). In the vector $ we include the usual determinants of FC, in 
accordance to (B2) in Model B. If there are no omitted or unobservable variables that affect 
simultaneously the probabilities of a firm reporting financial constraints and innovating 
(< = 0), these equations can be estimated separately, meaning that FC can be treated as 
exogenous.  
  
                                                           
11
 The "hurdle" model is set as a pair of independent equations: a) decision equation, estimated through a probit; 
b) volume equation, estimated by OLS. We additionally estimate the corresponding two parts model taking into 
account the endogeneity of FC. For that purpose we estimate the corresponding simultaneous equations and IV 
regressions that allow us to test for endogeneity, since such tests are rather difficult to compute for the full 
Model B. 
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 We further extend the model to allow FC outcomes to be ordinal and estimate the 
corresponding ordered probit model (see Greene and Hensher, 2010 pp. 222 for details and 
Sajaia, 2008 for STATA implementation).12 Finally, we discriminate between product and 
process innovation in order to provide robust results. 
 
3.4. Model D: Subsidies and financial constraints 
The last group of estimations in this Chapter attempts to clarify the link between public 
financial support and financial constraints. Specifically, we estimate the impact of subsidies 
upon the reported levels of constraints.  
 There are some reasons to believe that subsidies are endogenous. Firstly, if a firm is 
financially constrained, there in a higher probability that it applies for subsidies (we do not 
have data on subsidy requests), as well as it might be seen as a potentially more appropriate 
target for public policy. Secondly, the possibility of artificial survey positive correlation 
being present may require that we use balance sheet variables as instruments. Finally, 
potential correlated unobservables, such as public policy goals and budgets, firms' 
applications for subsidy programs and the quality of the underlying project (Jaffe, 2002; 
Schneider and Veugelers, 2010) imply that treating SUB as endogenous should be 
considered. 
 Accordingly, as in the previous section, we specify a simultaneous equations probit 
model (with the corresponding latent variables specification), that we further extend to the 
ordered probit case in order to fully explore the FC variable. The same logical consistency 
constraint applies and we also normalize the variance of the errors. Therefore, we 
simultaneously estimate the following model: 
5

2∗ = $		 + 	>? + %
>?∗ = $ + (																	
6
,  7%(8~@ 9
0
0: ;
1 A
A 1=       (VIII. D1) 
where $	 includes the following controls: firm size (SIZE); firm age (AGE); 2-digit industry 
dummies (CAE rev 2.1); percentage of public and foreign capital (PUB_K and FOR_K, 
respectively); investment opportunities (∆1); cash stocks (CS); cash-flow (CF); leverage 
(LEV); debt and equity issuances (ISS); changes in interest paid (∆INT); returns on financial 
investments (R_FIN); exports (EXP); market share (MKTS). All these variables, are obtained 
from balance sheets. Therefore, we use the first lag of these variables to account for the CIS 
                                                           
12
 Note that since the estimation of marginal effects in this case are of rather hard computation and above all 
interpretation we refrain from estimating them. 
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wave span and reduce artificial survey correlation. Exceptions are PUB_K, FOR_K, ∆1, ISS 
and ∆, since they either do not have sufficient annual variation, or their construction is 
based on the previous period (would imply the loss of all CIS2 observations). When it comes 
to $, we include size (SIZE), age (AGE), percentage of R&D employees (RD_WORK), 
market share (MKTS), intangibles (INTANG), exports (EXP), percentage of public (PUB_K) 
and foreign capital and (FOR_K), cooperation with other firms and institutions (COOP) and 
share of subsidies by industry (SUB%I) and region (SUB%R). Again, if there are no omitted 
or unobservable variables that affect simultaneously FC and SUB (A = 0), we can estimate 
the equations separately. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of the main variables used in model (A), 
by the different subsamples of firms. We should point that mean cash-flow is larger (and less 
volatile) for firms that innovate, invest in R&D and those that receive subsidies. The same 
appears to be true with respect to size (total assets) and sales growth.13 
 Table 2 reports the same statistics for the remaining models. As it is clear from 
columns (2) and (3), firms that invest in R&D are larger (number of employees), older, have 
a larger percentage of R&D workers and export more. Additionally, while they have higher 
innovation investment opportunities (percentage sales of new products), they have lower 
physical capital investment opportunites (sales growth). Moreover, within this group, there is 
a larger number of firms that report higher financial constraints, receive subsidies and 
cooperate. 
 With respect to firms that innovate (columns 5-6), these are found to be larger 
(number of employees), older, have a higher percentage of R&D workers and higher market 
shares, but have lower investment opportunities (sales growth). These firms also spend 
remarkably larger amounts in R&D investment. Furthermore, there is a larger number of 
firms that innovate and receive subsidies, cooperate, report higher levels of financial 
constraints as well as other barriers to innovate (except for the case of market barriers).  
  
                                                           
13
 For each variable of interest, the differences between groups are formally tested through both Mann–Whitney 
and Fligner-Policello tests, as well as also confirmed by quantile-quantile plots. This applies to all results in 
Section 5.1. 
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 Finally, firms that receive subsidies (columns 8-9) are larger (number of employees), 
older, have larger (lower) percentage of public (foreign) capital, lower cash stocks but higher 
cash-flow, are less leveraged, issue less debt, have larger variation of non-cash working 
capital, export more and have larger market shares. 
 
 
Table VIII.1. Summary statistics: Model A. 
VARIABLES Overall INNOV=1 INNOV=0 RD=1 RD=0 SUB=1 SUB=0 
∆ 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 
 (0.060) (0.057) (0.064) (0.054) (0.065) (0.048) (0.061) 

 0.091 0.097 0.085 0.098 0.084 0.100 0.090 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.088) (0.094) (0.085) (0.092) 
∆1 0.033 0.051 0.014 0.048 0.018 0.064 0.030 
 (0.270) (0.260) (0.278) (0.254) (0.284) (0.189) (0.277) 
 16.080 16.409 15.740 16.499 15.670 16.670 16.021 
 (1.644) (1.646) (1.570) (1.605) (1.577) (1.569) (1.639) 
 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.065 0.061 0.078 0.062 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.088) (0.091) (0.082) (0.091) (0.086) 
∆ -0.048 -0.045 -0.050 -0.048 -0.047 -0.053 -0.047 
 (0.157) (0.146) (0.167) (0.145) (0.168) (0.131) (0.159) 
 0.022 0.026 0.018 0.027 0.018 0.041 0.021 
 (0.161) (0.154) (0.167) (0.144) (0.175) (0.128) (0.163) 
∆ -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 

 0.046 0.052 0.041 0.055 0.038 0.050 0.046 
 (0.100) (0.104) (0.095) (0.109) (0.089) (0.097) (0.100) 
        
Observations 3,941 2,003 1,938 1,947 1,994 356 3,585 
 100% 51% 49% 49% 51% 9% 91% 
Number of firms 1,355 697 658 645 711 116 1,239 
Notes: Mean values and standard deviations, given in parenthesis, of the main variables used to estimate 
equation (A1). Both total sample and subsamples’ statistics are reported. 
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Table VIII.2. Summary statistics: Models B, C and D. 
Model B Total RD=0 RD=1 Model C Total INNOV=0 INNOV=1 Model D Total SUB=0 SUB=1 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
RD_I   12.139 INNOV 0.487   FC 0.903 0.872 1.122 
   (2.012)  (0.500)    (1.175) (1.166) (1.214) 
FC 1.055 1.046 1.064 FC 0.907 0.828 0.991 SUB 0.125   
 (1.195) (1.185) (1.206)  (1.175) (1.153) (1.191)  (0.331)   
SIZE 4.866 4.640 5.098 RD_I 5.127 0.417 10.091 SIZE 4.845 4.770 5.363 
 (1.188) (1.139) (1.193)  (6.119) (2.134) (4.907)  (1.180) (1.149) (1.260) 
AGE 3.083 3.061 3.105 SIZE 4.823 4.616 5.041 AGE 3.074 3.065 3.136 
 (0.691) (0.667) (0.714)  (1.195) (1.123) (1.229)  (0.702) (0.697) (0.735) 
EXP 0.279 0.242 0.317 AGE 3.072 3.057 3.089 PUB_K 4.580 4.064 8.184 
 (0.502) (0.496) (0.506)  (0.702) (0.695) (0.710)  (19.683) (18.566) (25.933) 
Y_IN 0.113 0.030 0.199 SUB 0.125 0.011 0.246 FOR_K 12.501 12.583 11.928 
 (0.256) (0.135) (0.317)  (0.331) (0.103) (0.431)  (31.176) (31.470) (29.072) 
∆1 -0.032 -0.013 -0.052 COOP 0.164 0.011 0.325 ∆1 -0.026 -0.023 -0.049 
 (0.289) (0.307) (0.268)  (0.370) (0.106) (0.469)  (0.259) (0.263) (0.227) 
RD_WORK 0.006 0.002 0.010 B_TRAB 0.471 0.417 0.528 CS 0.069 0.070 0.055 
 (0.032) (0.015) (0.043)  (0.499) (0.493) (0.499)  (0.101) (0.103) (0.083) 
SUB 0.149 0.020 0.282 B_TECH 0.426 0.364 0.490 CF 0.091 0.088 0.110 
 (0.356) (0.141) (0.450)  (0.495) (0.481) (0.500)  (0.096) (0.096) (0.092) 
COOP 0.195 0.038 0.356 B_MARK 0.536 0.508 0.565 LEV 0.663 0.670 0.611 
 (0.396) (0.192) (0.479)  (0.499) (0.500) (0.496)  (0.258) (0.263) (0.210) 
    RD_WORK 0.005 0.002 0.008 ISS -0.031 -0.029 -0.049 
     (0.030) (0.018) (0.039)  (0.157) (0.158) (0.151) 
    ∆1 -0.026 -0.003 -0.050 ∆ 0.001 0.001 0.002 
     (0.259) (0.258) (0.258)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
    MKTS 0.227 0.221 0.234  _
 0.001 0.001 0.001 
     (0.270) (0.268) (0.273)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
        EXP 0.290 0.279 0.369 
         (0.521) (0.520) (0.518) 
        MKTS 0.227 0.225 0.245 
         (0.270) (0.269) (0.275) 
            
Observations 2,610 1,325 1,285 Observations 3,247 1,666 1,581 Observations 3,208 2,806 402 
Notes: Mean values and standard deviations, given in parenthesis, of the main variables used to estimate models B, C and D.  
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4.2 Results for Model A 
Analysing the results on financial constraints to innovation using the CCFS methodology 
(Table 3), we do not find statistically significant differences in constraints between 
innovators and non-innovators—the cash-flow coefficients are 0.100 and 0.112, respectively 
(columns 2-3). However, if we distinguish between non-innovators that are willing to 
innovate (hampered firms) and those that do not desire to innovate (unwilling to innovate), 
the figures are different—CCFS of 0.215 against 0.123, respectively (columns 5-6). Please 
see Chapter IV, Section 3 for definition details.14 
 Evidence on different levels of constraints is clearer if instead of comparing 
innovators with non-innovators, we distinguish between firms that invested in R&D and 
those that did not. In fact, as we can see from Table 4, there is a striking difference in CCFS 
(columns 1-2). While for firms that invested in R&D, the estimated CCFS is not statistically 
different from zero, firms that did not invest in R&D save, on average, a remarkable amount 
of 20 cents out of each euro of cash flow. With respect to total R&D expenditures (column 
5), the cash-flow interaction term is negative and statically significant (only at 0.1 level), 
further adding to a potential inverse relationship between financial constraints and R&D 
investment. 
 From the estimates in columns 3 and 4, it may be possible to argue that public finance 
has a positive effect in reducing financial constraints. Firms that do not have public financial 
support save, on average, 12 cents out of each euro of cash-flow, which contrasts with the 
group of firms that received funding (the coefficient is not statistically different from zero).15 
 
                                                           
14
 Nevertheless, the former estimate is quite imprecise due to a reduced number of observations and the latter is 
still statistically significant—possibly capturing firms that are financially constrained with respect to other 
activities, rather than innovation. We should also note that "hampered firms" include those that either faced 
financial constraints or any other sort of obstacles to innovate. If we restrict the sample to "hampered firms" that 
report financial constraints, we obtain 34 firms with the corresponding 75 observations and a CCFS estimate of 
0.339** (0.148). Conversely, for the remaining firms (hampered by other obstacles) the CCFS estimate is found 
to be negative but not statistically different from zero. 
15
 However, a test on the difference between estimates is not able to reject the equality of coefficients, even 
though this is due to the lack of precision stemming from the low number of observations for the SUB=1 
subsample. 
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Table VIII.3. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation: Innovators and potential innovators 
VARIABLES (1) Overall (2) Innovators (3) Non-Innovators (4) Potential (5) Hampered (6) Unwilling 
Potential innovators Both Yes Both Yes Yes No 
Innovators Both Yes No Both No No 

, 0.117*** 0.100* 0.112* 0.103** 0.215* 0.123* 
 (0.043) (0.055) (0.064) (0.052) (0.117) (0.068) 
 [0.046 - 0.189] [0.009 - 0.190] [0.007 - 0.218] [0.017 - 0.189] [0.023 - 0.407] [0.012 - 0.235] 
∆, 0.024** 0.019 0.023* 0.018 0.010 0.026* 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) 
 [0.008 - 0.040] [-0.001 - 0.040] [0.002 - 0.044] [-0.000 - 0.036] [-0.009 - 0.029] [0.003 - 0.049] 
, 0.018** 0.021** 0.015 0.019** -0.004 0.023 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.020) (0.018) 
 [0.004 - 0.032] [0.005 - 0.037] [-0.012 - 0.042] [0.004 - 0.033] [-0.038 - 0.030] [-0.006 - 0.053] 
, -0.143*** -0.152*** -0.131*** -0.162*** -0.188*** -0.112*** 
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.060) (0.034) 
 [-0.180 - -0.105] [-0.203 - -0.101] [-0.183 - -0.079] [-0.209 - -0.115] [-0.286 - -0.090] [-0.167 - -0.057] 
∆, -0.154*** -0.123*** -0.178*** -0.124*** -0.073 -0.192*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.019) (0.045) (0.027) 
 [-0.184 - -0.125] [-0.157 - -0.090] [-0.220 - -0.136] [-0.156 - -0.092] [-0.147 - 0.000] [-0.236 - -0.148] 
, 0.035** 0.069*** 0.010 0.065*** 0.039 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.047) (0.020) 
 [0.011 - 0.058] [0.038 - 0.100] [-0.021 - 0.041] [0.035 - 0.095] [-0.039 - 0.117] [-0.028 - 0.036] 
∆, -0.090 -0.116 -0.186 -0.072 -0.172 -0.297 
 (0.280) (0.360) (0.375) (0.340) (0.559) (0.387) 
 [-0.551 - 0.370] [-0.709 - 0.477] [-0.802 - 0.430] [-0.631 - 0.487] [-1.091 - 0.748] [-0.934 - 0.339] 

, -0.097*** -0.120*** -0.074 -0.111*** 0.527** -0.092 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.090) (0.032) (0.266) (0.093) 
 [-0.152 - -0.041] [-0.173 - -0.067] [-0.223 - 0.074] [-0.164 - -0.058] [0.090 - 0.964] [-0.245 - 0.060] 
       
Observations 3,320 1,546 1,774 1,674 128 1646 
Number of firms 1,458 677 781 727 50 731 
Hansen p-value 0.650 0.510 0.194 0.538 0.304 0.218 
R-squared 0.167 0.163 0.182 0.156 0.200 0.190 
Notes: All regressions use the specification of equation (A1). In column (1) we report the results for the full sample, while columns (2) and (3) report the estimates for 
firms that innovated and that did not, respectively. Of the non-innovating firms, columns (5) and (6) report the results for potential innovators (hampered) and for those 
firms that were unwilling to innovate, respectively. Column (4) reports the results for all potential innovators (either effective innovators or not). Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis and 90% confidence intervals in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
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Table VIII.4. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity estimation: R&D and Subsidies. 
VARIABLES RD=1 RD=0 SUB=1 SUB=0 I_RD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

, 0.051 0.204*** 0.072 0.123*** 0.135*** 
 (0.056) (0.068) (0.141) (0.045) (0.045) 
 [-0.041 - 0.143] [0.092 - 0.316] [-0.160 - 0.304] [0.049 - 0.196]  
_ !,     0.000 
     (0.001) 

, ∗ _ !,     -0.010* 
     (0.006) 
∆, 0.020* 0.030** 0.007 0.024** 0.024** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.025) (0.010) (0.010) 
 [0.001 - 0.039] [0.006 - 0.053] [-0.035 - 0.048] [0.008 - 0.041]  
, 0.031*** 0.012 0.041 0.017** 0.016* 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.031) (0.009) (0.009) 
 [0.011 - 0.050] [-0.019 - 0.042] [-0.010 - 0.092] [0.003 - 0.032]  
, -0.131*** -0.114*** -0.081 -0.146*** -0.149*** 
 (0.028) (0.039) (0.056) (0.025) (0.023) 
 [-0.178 - -0.085] [-0.178 - -0.049] [-0.174 - 0.011] [-0.186 - -0.106]  
∆, -0.110*** -0.194*** -0.089** -0.158*** -0.154*** 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.038) (0.019) (0.018) 
 [-0.143 - -0.077] [-0.239 - -0.150] [-0.151 - -0.026] [-0.189 - -0.127]  
, 0.048*** 0.019 0.014 0.033** 0.038*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.043) (0.015) (0.014) 
 [0.018 - 0.079] [-0.015 - 0.053] [-0.056 - 0.084] [0.008 - 0.058]  
∆, -0.343 -0.004 0.390 -0.079 -0.059 
 (0.354) (0.404) (0.851) (0.288) (0.284) 
 [-0.926 - 0.240] [-0.670 - 0.661] [-1.009 - 1.790] [-0.553 - 0.395]  

, -0.136*** -0.019 -0.268** -0.073** -0.098*** 
 (0.035) (0.126) (0.131) (0.033) (0.034) 
 [-0.194 - -0.078] [-0.227 - 0.189] [-0.483 - -0.052] [-0.128 - -0.017]  
      
Observations 1,500 1,718 255 3,065 3,065 
Number of firms 649 815 116 1,342 1,342 
Hansen p-value 0.319 0.830 0.637 0.763 0.763 
R-squared 0.142 0.214 0.156 0.171 0.171 
Notes: Regression of equation (A1) in columns (1-4) and of equation (A2) in column (5). Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis and 90% confidence intervals in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and 
.10 levels, respectively.  . 
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 With respect to other variables, we should note that investment and non-cash net 
working capital are demands for cash. Accordingly, the negative sign is not unexpected. 
Conversely, the positive impact found for equity and debt issuances reflects the importance of 
these sources of cash, even though there is an associated cost (interest payments) that reduce 
cash savings. Finally, financial investments are a demand for cash, but may also be used to 
transfer resources across time. Therefore, while we find a negative impact for those firms that 
are not expected to be financially constrained, the same is not true when it comes to 
constrained ones.16 
 Even though CCFS appear to be able to provide useful insights on the level of 
financial constraints, this methodology suffers from the fact that it is unable to explore the 
causality flow between financial constraints (an estimated mean for a given subsample) and 
R&D investment, innovation or subsidies. Consequently, bearing in mind the subjective 
nature of such variable, we resort to the reported levels of financial constraints to innovate, as 
an explanatory variable for these activities in the following sections. 
 
4.3. Results of Model B 
In Table 5 we report the estimation results of the selection model with endogenous financial 
constraints. It can be compared with the Heckman-style estimation of the corresponding 
model, with an additional treatment of endogeneity. While in column (1) we report the 
estimates of a simple OLS, columns (2-5) report the estimates of a two-parts specification, 
where we assume that the amount invested in R&D is independent of the decision to invest in 
R&D (no selection). In column (6) we estimate a model that accounts for selection but not 
endogeneity (Heckman) and finally, columns (7-8) report the estimates of the model that 
accounts for both selection and endogeneity.17 
  
                                                           
16
 Financially constrained firms may redirect cash-flows and present liquidity (cash stocks) to future states, in 
the form of financial investment (relatively liquid assets) to be used as a source of liquidity in the future. 
However, we should note that a decrease of financial investments may not necessarily mean an increase in cash 
stocks. The reason is that since both can be used to finance investment (e.g. R&D investment and innovation 
investment in general) or face financial distress (e.g. service debt, cover operational losses), it may occur a 
contemporaneous decrease in cash stocks and financial investments 
17
 Since the derivation of the appropriate correction terms for the asymptotic variance is rather complex, we 
resort to paired bootstrap estimation with 999 replications. 
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 While on one hand the results from columns (2-5) point that endogeneity must be 
taken into account (statistically significant <G coefficient on the decision equation and a formal 
endogeneity test on the volume equation), on the other hand, the necessity to account for 
selection is confirmed by the statistically significant coefficient on -. in columns (6-8). Once 
both selection and endogeneity are taken into account, we show that an increase in financial 
constraints leads to a decrease in the amounts invested in R&D.18 Accordingly, we do not 
reject H1. Additionally, our results suggest that subsidies stimulate R&D investment since, in 
all specifications, there is a strong positive impact of subsidies upon both the decision to 
invest and the amounts spent in R&D. 
 With respect to other variables of interest, we should note the positive impact of size, 
R&D investment opportunities, percentage of R&D employees and cooperation, which is not 
unexpected. On the other hand, investment opportunities (sales growth) reduce R&D 
investment, most probably due to the fact that higher sales growth signal that no innovation 
efforts are needed since the firm is performing rather well, or alternatively it might suggest 
that investment in physical capital is warranted.19 Conversely, a reduction of sales might 
signal that the firm needs to be innovative and change. Finally, the estimates on firm age are 
quite unstable. On one hand, the negative signs may indicate that, as firms grow older, they 
tend to accommodate and invest less in R&D. This can also be related to life cycle of a 
certain industry and the strength of the selection pressure. On the other hand, the positive 
signs suggest that as firms age, they increase their knowledge stock and are better suited to 
pursue R&D activities. 
 Overall, financial constraints severely affect the amounts invested in R&D once FC 
are treated as endogenous. 
 
                                                           
18
 As a check for robustness, we constructed a panel of the 3 wave periods by calculating the averages, over 
wave period, of financial variables (Table A2, appendix). In this case, there appears to be a reduction in the 
negative effect of financial constraints on R&D investment along the 3 waves. Additionally, results obtained 
fitting a Tobit to log(1+R&D investment)—e.g. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011b)—also lead to a negative (but 
not significant) impact of FC upon R&D investment. The coefficients (standard deviations) are -0.462 (0.953) 
and -0.021 (1.038) of the ordinal and collapsed binary financial constraints variables, respectively (taking into 
account endogeneity). 
19
 Note that the spearman correlation coefficient of sales growth is positive (0.2411*) and negative (-0.0591*) 
with respect to physical capital investment (I) and total R&D investment (I_RD), respectively. 
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Table VIII.5. Investment in R&D. 
Estimation OLS Two parts "hurdle" Two parts with endogeneity Selection  Full Model B 
procedure  Decision Volume Decision Volume Heckman last step 3.1) last step 3.2) 
Selection NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Endogeneity NO NO NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Dependent Var. (1) I_RD (2) RD (3) RD_I (4) RD (5) RD_I (6) RD_I (7) RD_I (8) RD_I 
FC 0.073 0.046 0.395*** -0.505*** -0.561*** -0.150 -0.637*** -0.707*** 
 (0.303) (0.086) (0.152) (0.055) (0.142) (0.115) (0.238) (0.271) 
SIZE 0.758*** 0.101*** 1.527*** 0.040 0.684*** 0.995*** 0.871*** 0.976*** 
 (0.109) (0.031) (0.055) (0.029) (0.065) (0.049) (0.059) (0.069) 
AGE -0.229 -0.045 1.022*** -0.007 -0.217** 0.191** 0.134* 0.273*** 
 (0.162) (0.053) (0.091) (0.048) (0.091) (0.081) (0.086) (0.098) 
EXP 0.014 -0.008 0.029 -0.045 0.016 0.007 0.021 0.028 
 (0.273) (0.074) (0.166) (0.065) (0.146) (0.129) (0.116) (0.124) 
Y_IN 4.618*** 1.321*** 1.180*** 1.076*** 0.938*** 1.501*** 1.243*** 1.735*** 
 (0.612) (0.236) (0.313) (0.195) (0.244) (0.233) (0.315) (0.348) 
∆1 -1.100*** -0.255** -1.658*** -0.215** -0.504* -0.829*** -0.701*** -0.923*** 
 (0.406) (0.113) (0.436) (0.098) (0.273) (0.213) (0.215) (0.251) 
RD_WORK 6.834*** 2.972 8.122*** 2.681 5.018*** 5.198*** 5.221*** 5.579*** 
 (2.566) (2.020) (1.331) (1.749) (1.108) (1.448) (0.936) (1.176) 
SUB 3.577*** 1.051*** 0.301* 0.863*** 0.593*** 1.059*** 0.876*** 1.203*** 
 (0.347) (0.145) (0.176) (0.128) (0.151) (0.171) (0.209) (0.228) 
COOP 4.018*** 1.120*** 0.157 0.872*** 0.091 0.874*** 0.456** 0.886*** 
 (0.332) (0.109) (0.169) (0.105) (0.130) (0.177) (0.221) (0.25) 
       
  
Endogeneity &     0.935***(<G) 13.439 1.597***(/G) 0.827**(/G) 1.685***(/G) 
Selection tests    (0.151) 0.0002 (0.249) (0.409) (0.457) 
         
Observations 2,608 2,608 1,285 2,567 1,270 2,608 1,270 1,270 
Chi-squared 0.663 (R2) 339.5 0.966 (R2) 755.2 0.191 (R2) 18987 0.972 (R2) 0.973 (R2) 
Notes: Estimates for Model B. Robust standard errors in parenthesis—bootstrapped (999 replications) for columns (7-8). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
.01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. All regressions include industry dummies. The estimates of the selection variable RD, the dummy variable that represents firms' decision 
to invest, as well as further test statistics, are available from the authors on request. In this table we omit the controls LPROD, LEV, MKTS and other barriers to innovation 
(see Section 3.2) in columns (1-2) and (4) for simplicity of presentation. In columns (1-3) and (6) the binary 
2 variable is used instead of ordinal FC. Estimation in 
columns (4-5) and (8) use the procedure 3.2) of Section 3.2 to take into account FC endogeneity, while in column (7) we use procedure 3.1). Statistically significant <G 
(column 4) and /G (columns 6-8) coefficients indicate the presence of endogeneity and selection, respectively, while in column (5) we report a Chi-squared and corresponding 
p-value of the endogeneity test.  
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4.4. Results of Model C 
When it comes to innovation, Table 6 reports our estimates of the simultaneous equations 
probit and ordered probit models (columns 2 and 3, respectively), as well as those of a simple 
univariate probit model (column 1) that does not account for the possibility of endogenous 
financial constraints. As expected, the rejection of the hypothesis of independent equations 
(Wald test of whether < = 0) confirms that FC must be treated endogenously. Once this 
endogeneity is taken into account, the impact of FC upon innovation becomes negative and 
statistically significant for both binary and ordinal specifications. Therefore, we are not able 
to reject H2. Additionally, as naturally expected, the amounts spent in R&D positively affect 
innovation, even though there is no significant impact of subsidies upon the probability that a 
firm innovates. Nevertheless, if we observe this effect for each wave, we find that while in 
the first two waves, there is a strong positive impact of subsidies upon innovation, this is not 
the case when we analyse the last wave (see table A3 in appendix). 
 With respect to other variables, cooperation and size (for the ordered specification) 
are found to significantly increase innovation, which is not unexpected—in contrast with the 
odd positive coefficient for market barriers. We do not find statistically significant 
coefficients, within the simultaneous equations specifications, for the remaining variables of 
interest.20 Finally, we do not find any statistically significant difference (at 0.1 level) between 
the impact of financial constraints on product and process innovation (see Table A4 in 
Appendix). Nevertheless, significant differences are found with respect to investment 
opportunities, that have a significant positive (negative) impact on product (process) 
innovation, as well as concerning the impact of subsidies—that appears to be only relevant 
for product innovation. 
 
 
  
                                                           
20
 As for the case of R&D expenditure, when we divide the sample by CIS wave periods (Table A3, Appendix) 
we find that financial constraints decrease in importance as we move along the CIS waves. 
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Table VIII.6. Innovation. 
VARIABLES Exogenous FC Endogenous FC 
 Probit Probit Ordered Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) 

2		\		FC -0.066 -0.815*** -0.463*** 
 (0.092) (0.303) (0.125) 
RD_I 0.209*** 0.193*** 0.239*** 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.017) 
SIZE 0.010 0.006 0.092* 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.051) 
AGE -0.094* -0.032 0.037 
 (0.052) (0.059) (0.073) 
SUB 0.237 0.276 0.475 
 (0.230) (0.215) (0.350) 
COOP 0.836*** 0.741*** 0.547* 
 (0.201) (0.193) (0.293) 
B_TRAB 0.099 0.090 -0.245 
 (0.142) (0.134) (0.183) 
B_TECH 0.152 0.127 0.283 
 (0.138) (0.127) (0.179) 
B_MARK -0.102 -0.080 0.467*** 
 (0.107) (0.097) (0.135) 
∆1 -0.982 -1.111 1.714 
 (1.485) (1.338) (1.752) 
RD_WORK -0.166 -0.172 -0.164 
 (0.147) (0.142) (0.212) 
MKTS -0.021 -0.039 -0.055 
 (0.136) (0.135) (0.142) 
    
<  0.545** 0.348* 
  (0.261) (0.209) 
    
Observations 3,247 3,206 3,206 
Chi-squared 852.2 1096 818.5 
Notes: Estimates for equation (C2). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. All regressions 
include industry dummies.  
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4.5. Results of Model D 
The results on the impact of subsidies on financial constraints (Table 7) are quite puzzling. 
While for regressions that use contemporaneous and lagged balance sheet variables (columns 
1, 3 and 4) we find a positive and statistically significant impact of subsidies on financial 
constraints (regardless of whether we control for endogeneity or not), when we use lagged 
subsidies and CIS wave variables (columns 2, 5 and 6), the estimated coefficients are not 
statistically different from zero. Interestingly (but not surprising) when lagged variables are 
used, one can not reject the null hypothesis that subsidies can be treated as exogenous. With 
respect to other potential determinants of financial constraints, when significant, they are 
found to carry the expected sign. 
 This rather puzzling rejection of H3, that contrasts with the expectations of an inverse 
relationship, as suggested by the findings in Section 4.2, deserves a detailed inspection of 
both survey variables. Specifically, in Table 8, we report the frequencies of FC and SUB. As 
expected, the majority of firms do not receive subsidies (88.1%), as well as there is a 
relatively large percentage of firms that face difficulties in obtaining external funds to finance 
innovation (43.3%, but increasing in the level of constraints). Additionally, for firms that 
report financial constraints and receive financial support (6.3%), the percentage of subsidies 
for those that report minor difficulties (12.5%) is lower than those that report high and very 
high levels of constraints (21% and 19.1%, respectively). 
 However, there is a remarkably large number of firms, among those that receive 
subsidies (11.9%), that reported not to be financially constrained (47.4%). This can either 
indicate that firms that receive subsidies ex-ante do not face significant constraints, or that 
there is a misallocation of subsidies. We are more inclined towards the second explanation 
since this value increases to 62.5% if instead of 
Kwe compute the relative frequencies for 

KL	—i.e. 62.5% of firms that received subsidies during one CIS wave, have reported no 
constraints in the previous wave (Table A5, appendix).21 Furthermore, if instead of >?K we 
use >?KL	, one can observe that only 39.3% of firms that received subsidies in one period, 
report no constraints on the subsequent period. Still, these results may well reflect the idea of 
"subsidy persistence" (e.g. Hussinger, 2008). In fact, the transition probability of a firm 
continuing as subsidized is 39.5%, being 40% for firms that report as unconstrained. 
  
                                                           
21
 The subscript w stands for CIS wave. Additionally, the impact of financial constraints on the probability that a 
firm receives subsidies (either in the current or subsequent period) is never statistically significant (see Table 6 
in the Appendix). 
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Table VIII.7. Financial constraints: The impact of subsidies. 
   SUB treated as endogenous 
Dependent Var. FC 
2 FC 
2 FC 
CIS wave lag (1) NO (2) YES (3) NO (4) NO (5) YES (6) YES 
SUB 0.174** 0.139 0.769*** 0.476*** -0.628 -0.064 
 (0.074) (0.135) (0.297) (0.175) (0.571) (0.860) 
SIZE -0.050** -0.022 -0.108*** -0.062** 0.037 -0.061 
 (0.023) (0.058) (0.028) (0.024) (0.083) (0.101) 
AGE 0.051 -0.024 0.057 0.048 -0.037 -0.110 
 (0.039) (0.096) (0.042) (0.039) (0.094) (0.116) 
PUB_K -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
FOR_K -0.003*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
∆1 -0.121 -0.121 -0.115 -0.115 -0.106 -0.260 
 (0.102) (0.225) (0.116) (0.102) (0.224) (0.274) 
CS -1.018*** -2.002*** -0.930*** -1.005*** -1.990*** -1.644** 
 (0.283) (0.689) (0.300) (0.283) (0.664) (0.737) 
CF -0.662** -0.765 -1.059*** -0.639** -0.720 -0.908 
 (0.318) (0.726) (0.345) (0.317) (0.734) (0.836) 
LEV 0.226** 0.185 0.493*** 0.226** 0.227 0.607* 
 (0.108) (0.259) (0.123) (0.107) (0.254) (0.311) 
ISS -0.375** -0.130 -0.296 -0.356** -0.101 0.101 
 (0.170) (0.356) (0.200) (0.169) (0.350) (0.445) 
∆ 12.341*** 13.252 10.454** 12.542*** 15.049* 15.722 
 (3.727) (8.843) (4.586) (3.717) (8.628) (12.121) 
 _
 -11.000 5.257 -16.506 -10.751 6.545 -1.368 
 (12.050) (22.711) (11.969) (11.981) (21.959) (22.696) 
EXP -0.049 -0.308*** -0.065 -0.056 -0.330*** -0.367*** 
 (0.060) (0.105) (0.065) (0.060) (0.106) (0.131) 
MKTS -0.165 -0.033 -0.159 -0.179* 0.025 0.286 
 (0.101) (0.179) (0.114) (0.101) (0.184) (0.242) 
       
A   -0.203* -0.227* 0.390 0.052 
   (0.109) (0.119) (0.404) (0.324) 
       
Observations 3,208 556 3,180 3,180 549 549 
Log-likelihood -1701 -377.3 -1222 -2105 -509.9 -320.6 
Notes: Columns (1-2) report estimates from an ordered probit regression, columns (3) and (5) those 
from an instrumental variables probit and columns (4) and (6) report the results for equation (D1). 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and 
.10 levels, respectively. All regressions include industry dummies.  
 
 
 These results need further testing, preferably using treatment effects estimation 
techniques. However, our CIS panel is not sufficiently long and the financial constraints 
variable is not linear (despite we can do a linear projection), not to mention possible problems 
associated with the subjective nature of this particular survey variable. In fact, we do not 
exclude the possibility that there are problems associated with the subjective nature of the FC 
self-assessed variable.  
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Table VIII.8. Frequencies of FC and SUB 
  SUB Total 
 FC 0 1  
Frequency 0 1,781 201 1,982 
SUB %  89.86 10.14 100 
FC %  56.68 47.41 55.58 
Total%  49.94 5.64 55.58 
Frequency 1 393 53 446 
SUB %  88.12 11.88 100.00 
FC %  12.51 12.50 12.51 
Total%  11.02 1.49 12.51 
Frequency 2 462 89 551 
SUB %  83.85 16.15 100.00 
FC %  14.70 20.99 15.45 
Total%  12.96 2.50 15.45 
Frequency 3 506 81 587 
SUB %  86.20 13.80 100.00 
FC %  16.10 19.10 16.46 
Total%  14.19 2.27 16.46 
Frequency YES 1,361 223 1,584 
SUB %  85.92 14.08 100.00 
FC %  43.32 52.59 16.46 
Total%  38.17 6.25 16.46 
Frequency Total 3,142 424 3,566 
SUB %  88.11 11.89 100.00 
FC %  100.00 100.00 100.00 
Total%  88.11 11.89 100.00 
Notes: Frequencies of financial constraints (rows) and subsidies (columns). SUB 
% (FC %) are relative frequencies within rows (columns) of each cell. For the 
ordinal FC variable, higher values correspond to higher reported constraints 
(zero for absence of constraints). 
 
 
5. Discussion 
Overall, our results suggest that the innovation process is negatively affected by financial 
constraints. On one hand, for the case of R&D investment, both our indirect and direct 
measures point towards a strong negative impact of financial constraints. Indeed, CCFS 
estimates are much larger for firms that do not invest in R&D (Model A, Section 4.2)—in 
line with the findings of Bond et al. (2003) for ICFS. This result meets the expectation that 
only firms that are not financially constrained are able to invest in R&D. Additionally, once 
endogeneity is taken into account, higher reported levels of constraints reduce the probability 
that a firm invests in R&D, as well as the R&D investment volume (Model B, Section 4.3). 
Accordingly, as stated in our hypothesis H1, financial constraints reduce the amounts 
invested in R&D. 
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 When it comes to innovation, even though the CCFS estimates do not allow a 
straightforward conclusion (Model A), the analysis of Model C (Section 4.4) reveals that, 
once we take into account endogeneity, financial constraints significantly reduce the 
probability that a firm innovates, as stated in H2. Yet, we should spend some time in trying to 
understand why we do not find clear-cut results using CCFS. In particular, the extent to 
which the non-innovators (innovators) group will include some firms that are, a-priori, not 
constrained (constrained)—one would expect significantly lower (higher) CCFS for firms 
that do (do not) innovate. 
 Firstly, this methodology is time-invariant and relies on an a priori assignment of 
firms into distinct groups. Therefore, some lag effects may not be totally captured by the 
methodology and, notoriously, it does not account for endogeneity. Secondly, regardless of 
being or not financially constrained, firms might just not be interested in innovating in the 
first step. For example, it might well be the case in industries where the pace of technological 
change is rather slow (Marsili and Verspagen, 2002; Castellacci, 2007). This is particularly 
relevant for our CCFS estimation because the question on self-assessed constraints (FC) is 
answered by all firms in all CIS waves, whether they innovated or not. Using this 
information, we identify potential innovators (within non-innovators) that, according to our 
estimates, seem to be more financially constrained than those firms not willing to innovate. 
Notwithstanding, the question is asked specifically with respect to innovation barriers. As a 
result, while it is not expected that firms that do not want to innovate report constraints to 
innovation (FC), the CCFS measure may also capture the extent to which firms—unwilling to 
innovate—are financially constrained with respect to their operational and physical capital 
investment activities (other than innovation). This is probably the reason why we still find 
significant CCFS for firms unwilling to innovate. Thirdly, non-financially constrained firms 
may try to innovate, even though they are unsuccessful and therefore will belong to the non-
innovators group. Finally, since innovation is measured in a rather broad sense, reasonably 
financially constrained firms, even without putting too much effort, might be able to 
innovate. As an example, if we would be able to distinguish between "radical" from "routine" 
types of investment in R&D and innovations, then we could expect significant differences in 
the impact of financial constraints (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011b). 
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 Nevertheless, the combination of both survey and balance sheet information—that 
allows us to instrument the self-assessed constraints variable—certainly helps to clarify the 
negative impact that financial constraints have upon R&D investment and ultimately 
innovation. Consequently, the perverse effect of financial constraints upon the innovation 
process, calls for policies that help to mitigate such constraints. Accordingly, we evaluate the 
extent to which public financial support (subsidies) effectively alleviates financial constraints 
to innovate. 
 Our first results, using CCFS, suggest an inverse relationship between subsidies and 
constraints (Section 4.2.). The immediate interpretation is that firms receiving subsidies are 
not constrained. In this case, even though we would expect the difference to the subsidised 
group to be significant, there certainly also exist some firms in the non-subsidised group that 
are not financially constrained. However, this analysis is static. Accordingly, it neither 
clarifies if there is a causality flowing from subsidized to unconstrained, nor whether 
subsidies are actually being allocated to financially constrained firms. In fact, even though 
the results from the CCFS analysis would suggest an inverse relationship between subsidies 
and constraints, the findings obtained using Model D (Section 4.5) point towards the rejection 
of the hypothesis that subsidies alleviate financial constraints (H3). This rather puzzling 
result requires further clarification and some explanations, that we summarize as follows: 
 a) Subsidies are not being allocated correctly. This is one of the two worrisome 
possible explanations, that is based on our analysis of relative frequencies. In fact, we report a 
large number of firms that receive subsidies, despite not reporting as financially constrained 
in current or previous periods. If this is the case, then policymakers should be more cautious 
in designing incentives and, notoriously, in scrutinizing firms as potential targets. 
Nevertheless, this hypothesis needs further testing, in particular with information on the 
specific incentive schemes. 
 b) Learning and self-selection in applying for subsidies. This is related to point a). We 
do not know which firms apply for subsidies. However, if certain firms are more engaged in 
innovation activities and have a better procedural knowledge, it is possible that they obtain 
subsidies, even if not financially constrained. Therefore, such subsidies will not affect the 
levels of constraints faced by such firms. We argue that there is a "learning by applying" 
effect, in which firms—along the time and consecutive applications for funds—learn own to 
best satisfy the requirements of subsidies programs, as well as they gain insights on the 
institutional setup behind subsidy allocation. This is in line with the "subsidy persistence" 
found in our data. If this is the case, firms that regularly apply for subsidies dominate the 
195 
application process, regardless of the effectiveness of the subsidy (either from a "constraints 
alleviating" or "innovation enhancing" perspective). Moreover, firms that already have an 
"application know-how", may discourage applications from firms that apply for the first time, 
since the latter know in advance that they lack the expertise and therefore have a lower 
probability of obtaining the subsidy. Consequently, regular applicants will self-select into 
subsidies. This self-selection effect may also explain the results of Section 4.2., where we do 
not find significant CCFS for subsidized firms. However, we should note that the extent to 
which firms learn how to apply for subsidies, may not signify that they also learn how to 
elaborate a successful project at the eyes of private lenders. This is due to different goals of 
private (maximize returns with minimal risk of default) and public lenders (deal with market 
failures by alleviating financial constraints, fostering innovation, or both). Accordingly, we 
may have constrained firms that will continue to receive subsidies with their levels of 
financial constraints remaining unchanged. 
 c) Subsidies do not alleviate financial constraints. In other words, the wedge between 
external and internal forms of finance remains unchanged after a firm receives a subsidy. 
This case also requires a serious rethinking of public policy programs. In fact, in addition to 
our estimation results, the analysis of frequencies using lagged values suggests that there is a 
significant percentage of firms that, even after receiving subsidies, report high levels of 
constraints. This may occur mainly for two reasons. On the one hand, such subsidies are 
strictly designed to foster innovation, regardless of firms' difficulties in raising external 
funds. This means that there is no "signalling" effect to investors and that ultimately funds are 
not being allocated to those firms that most need them. On the other hand, subsidies have a 
"crowding out" effect that does not alter economic performance and subsequent reduction in 
constraints. However, for a more appropriate causality testing, we would need a dependent 
variable of financial constraints that is firm-specific (not estimated means), objective, 
continuous (and not scores) and, most importantly, time varying (in order to allow treatment 
effects estimation). Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there is no such measure. Moreover, 
different forms of public incentives (such as special credit lines and backed debt policies), 
may prove to be more effective in reducing constraints. Regrettably, we do not have 
sufficient information to distinguish these forms of intervention from subsidies strictu sensu 
(e.g. grants and tax credit). 
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 d) The subjective nature of the survey FC variable. In this particular case, the possible 
bias would be towards higher reported levels of constraints, since firms would tend to over-
report as financially constrained. This would not be a major concern if the bias is transversal 
and equal to all firms (would only imply a scaling of the effect), which is already a quite 
strong assumption. However, if this bias is associated with a "subsidy persistence" 
phenomena, then it is natural to expect that a significant number of firms, that continuously 
receive subsidies, will still perceive themselves as financially constrained. Nevertheless, this 
respondent perception problem is not as serious for the other models, since for such cases 
financial constraints is an explanatory variable that is instrumented with balance sheet data. 
However interesting, the extent to which firms' self-evaluation of constraints deviates from 
reality is not in the scope of this Chapter, but is certainly a topic that deserves detailed 
investigation in the future. 
 While on one hand it appears that subsidies promote innovation (during the first two 
waves of our data) and particularly foster R&D investment (Sections 4.4. and 4.3., 
respectively), on the other our results do not support the idea that this is done via a reduction 
of financial constraints (Section 4.5.). In other words, the rationale for subsidies appears to be 
solely on the grounds of innovation as a "public good". Accordingly, the allocation of funds 
to firms that do not suffer financial constraints (if this is the case), may well create 
inefficiencies, possibly even within a social welfare perspective, since it may reinforce the 
dominant position of certain firms against other firms (or profitable net present value 
projects) that either are unable to obtain external finance or do not have the necessary 
expertise to obtain public financial support—provided explanation c) holds. 
 On the whole, even though in this Chapter we lack a simultaneous analysis of the 
different dimensions (which is econometrically extremely complex), it provides a broad view 
of the effects of financial constraints upon the innovation process. Furthermore, the Chapter 
raises a number of questions and provides ground for debate regarding the allocation and 
effectiveness of subsidies in alleviating firms' financial constraints. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this Chapter we broadly analyse the financing problems of the innovation process. 
Specifically, we explore the impact of financial constraints to R&D investment and 
innovation, as well as the role of public financial support in alleviating such constraints. 
Accordingly, we estimate a selection model, simultaneous equations probit models, as well as 
the sensitivity of cash to cash-flow upon an unique, newly assembled, sample of Portuguese 
firms. 
 Using the CCFS methodology to assess the mean level of financial constraints by 
subsamples of firms, we find that CCFS are larger for firms that do not innovate (but are 
potential innovators), for those that do not invest in R&D and for firms that do not receive 
subsidies. This indicates that R&D investment may be financially constrained and subsidies 
may help in reducing financial constraints. On the other hand, by analysing the impact of a 
self-assessed measure of constraints upon R&D investment, we show that only when the 
endogeneity problem associated with this variable is taken into account, do financial 
constraints significantly decrease the amounts invested in R&D. Furthermore, also resorting 
to the same direct measure, innovation (in a broad sense) is only found to be significantly 
hampered by financial constraints once we allow for a joint specification of errors of both 
equations. However, when we focus on the effect of subsidies upon the reported levels of 
financial constraints, we do not find evidence supporting the constraints alleviating effect of 
subsidies. On the contrary, our evidence raises serious concerns regarding the extent to which 
subsidies reduce financial constraints. 
 Overall, even though financial constraints analysis usually relies on rather fragile 
relationships to identify and measure constraints, by adopting different strategies to assess the 
impact of financial constraints upon the innovation process, we are able to provide 
compelling evidence that constraints to R&D investment and innovation are binding. 
Nevertheless, we raise a number of questions regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of 
policy actions to reduce such constraints—despite they seem to increase innovation activity 
and, most notoriously, R&D investment. Although such relationship needs further testing, 
this work opens ground for academic debate on the topic and points towards a reconsideration 
of corresponding future policy actions. 
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Appendix  
Table VIII.A1. Different specifications of Model A 
 Specifications 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 

, 0.101** 0.126*** 0.100** 0.117*** 
 (0.050) (0.043) (0.050) (0.043) 
∆, 0.030*** 0.024** 0.030*** 0.024** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
, 0.033*** 0.015* 0.038*** 0.018** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
, -0.128*** -0.138*** -0.132*** -0.143*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
∆, -0.183*** -0.154*** -0.186*** -0.154*** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) 
∆!M?, -0.058***  -0.060***  
 (0.016)  (0.016)  
,  0.035**  0.035** 
  (0.014)  (0.014) 
∆,  -0.082  -0.090 
  (0.279)  (0.280) 

,   -0.108*** -0.097*** 
   (0.034) (0.034) 
     
Observations 3,320 3,320 3,320 3,320 
Number of firms 1,458 1,458 1,458 1,458 
Hansen p-value 0.142 0.697 0.162 0.650 
R-squared 0.181 0.164 0.185 0.167 
Notes: Regression of different specifications for the estimation of CCFS upon the full sample. 
Column (1) reports the results using Almeida et al. (2004) specification. In column (2) the variation 
of short-term debt (∆!M?,) is replaced by the sum of net debt and equity issuances (,) and 
changes in interest paid (∆,). Column (3) adds financial investments to the baseline 
specification of column (1), while column (4) reports the results from the specification used 
throughout the Chapter—equation (A1). See Section 3.1 for further explanation. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively. Further test statistics and confidence intervals available from the authors on request. 
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Table VIII.A2. Investment in R&D: CIS waves 
VARIABLES Wave dummies  By wave  
 (1) (2) CIS2 (3) CIS3 (4) CIS4 
FC -0.937*** -2.789** -0.708*** -0.436 
 (0.329) (1.244) (0.29) (0.579) 
SIZE 0.981*** 1.634*** 1.054*** 1.072*** 
 (0.072) (0.153) (0.141) (0.073) 
AGE 0.326*** 0.683** 0.15 0.312* 
 (0.104) (0.328) (0.186) (0.195) 
EXP -0.006 0.095 -0.146 0.197 
 (0.132) (0.431) (0.246) (0.188) 
Y_IN 1.165*** 1.409* 0.697*** 2.713*** 
 (0.266) (0.903) (0.273) (0.497) 
∆1 -0.709*** a -2.499* 0.139 
 (0.26)  (1.603) (0.640) 
RD_WORK 4.952*** 26.712 2.335* 6.259*** 
 (1.388) (22.231) (1.524) (1.250) 
SUB 0.693*** a 0.281 1.52*** 
 (0.188)  (0.228) (0.300) 
COOP 0.336** 1.173** 0.294 1.424*** 
 (0.204) (0.622) (0.243) (0.388) 
WAVE2 1.128***    
 (0.463)    
WAVE3 0.988**    
 (0.453)    
/ 0.553* 4.957*** -0.205 2.505*** 
 (0.383) (1.416) (0.324) (0.655) 
     
Observations 1,270 176 307 767 
Chi-squared 339.5 0.949 (R2) 0.980 (R2) 0.970 (R2) 
Notes: Estimates for Model B. In these estimations we compute the mean of balance sheet variables for each 
corresponding CIS wave period Bootstrapped standard errors (999 replications) in parenthesis. ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. All regressions include industry 
dummies. The estimates of the selection variable RD, the dummy variable that represents firms' decision to 
invest, as well as further test statistics, are available from the authors on request. In all estimations we use 
the procedure 3.2) of Section 3.2 to take into account FC endogeneity. Statistically significant /G coefficients 
indicate the presence of selection. 
a
 Dropped for collinearity reasons. 
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Table VIII.A3. Innovation: CIS waves 
 CIS2 CIS3 CIS4 
VARIABLES Probit Ordered Probit Probit Ordered Probit Probit Ordered Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 

2		\		FC -2.858*** -1.205*** -1.217*** -0.722*** -0.898*** -0.566*** 
 (0.326) (0.225) (0.301) (0.098) (0.307) (0.191) 
RD_I 0.267*** 0.272*** 0.239*** 0.172*** 0.176*** 0.208*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.039) (0.017) (0.038) 
SIZE 0.174** 0.229** -0.140* -0.058 0.024 0.047 
 (0.075) (0.105) (0.078) (0.093) (0.035) (0.050) 
AGE -0.011 -0.078 -0.098 0.046 0.050 0.105 
 (0.114) (0.146) (0.105) (0.132) (0.068) (0.081) 
SUB 4.883*** 7.064*** 0.609** 0.505* 0.085 0.107 
 (0.301) (0.227) (0.294) (0.287) (0.236) (0.387) 
COOP -0.420 0.066 0.710 -0.411 0.797*** 1.108*** 
 (0.257) (0.344) (0.451) (0.272) (0.228) (0.357) 
B_TRAB 0.160 0.109 -0.408* -0.248* 0.185 -0.240 
 (0.203) (0.285) (0.230) (0.150) (0.157) (0.201) 
B_TECH 0.271 0.591* 0.401** 0.030 -0.035 0.162 
 (0.413) (0.337) (0.194) (0.149) (0.152) (0.190) 
B_MARK -0.830** -0.202 -0.161 -0.051 -0.270** 0.016 
 (0.403) (0.494) (0.150) (0.136) (0.123) (0.151) 
∆1 -6.242 -3.545 5.436 14.255* 0.880 2.528 
 (4.685) (5.696) (4.853) (7.667) (2.317) (2.394) 
RD_WORK -335.582 -336.592 1.281 0.459 0.527 0.794** 
 (509.347) (503.060) (0.846) (1.175) (0.344) (0.379) 
MKTS 0.320 0.253 0.485* -0.344 0.161 0.068 
 (0.252) (0.277) (0.268) (0.229) (0.175) (0.181) 
       
< 0.545** 0.348* 0.545** 0.348* 0.545** 0.348* 
 (0.261) (0.209) (0.261) (0.209) (0.261) (0.209) 
       
Observations 897 897 585 585 1,848 1,848 
Chi-squared 2126 4870 3225 323.6 619.1 657.5 
Notes: Estimates for equation (C2). In these estimations we compute the mean of balance sheet variables for 
each corresponding CIS wave period. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. All regressions include industry dummies. Further test 
statistics are available from the authors on request.  
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Table VIII.A4. Innovation: Product vs Process 
 Product Process 
VARIABLES Probit Ordered Probit Probit Ordered Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 

2		\		FC -0.974*** -0.517*** -0.919*** -0.395** 
 (0.163) (0.141) (0.203) (0.178) 
RD_I 0.103*** 0.123*** 0.135*** 0.146*** 
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.009) (0.016) 
SIZE -0.037 -0.064 0.037 0.121* 
 (0.026) (0.053) (0.029) (0.071) 
AGE -0.011 0.168** -0.040 0.143* 
 (0.043) (0.074) (0.049) (0.080) 
SUB 0.354*** 0.100 0.107 -0.002 
 (0.097) (0.191) (0.122) (0.211) 
COOP 0.345*** 0.424*** 0.481*** 0.708*** 
 (0.089) (0.146) (0.102) (0.182) 
B_TRAB -0.060 -0.201 0.070 0.255 
 (0.102) (0.197) (0.112) (0.232) 
B_TECH -0.040 -0.044 0.284** 0.298 
 (0.102) (0.209) (0.115) (0.240) 
B_MARK 0.093 0.162 0.005 0.060 
 (0.079) (0.157) (0.090) (0.210) 
∆1 1.892* 0.312 -2.677** -3.379* 
 (1.092) (1.117) (1.109) (1.875) 
RD_WORK -0.113 0.037 -0.308** -0.183 
 (0.115) (0.280) (0.126) (0.335) 
MKTS -0.080 -0.352 -0.097 -0.114 
 (0.122) (0.217) (0.119) (0.236) 
     
< 0.723*** 0.897** 0.645*** 0.522* 
 (0.160) (0.409) (0.185) (0.311) 
     
Observations 3,206 3,206 3,206 3,206 
Chi-squared 1227 360.2 1221 356.3 
Notes: Estimates for equation (C2) using either product (columns 1-2) or process (columns 
3-4) innovation as dependent variable. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. All regressions 
include industry dummies. Further test statistics are available from the authors on request. 
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Table VIII.A5. Frequencies of FC and SUB: Lagged values 
  >?KL	 Total   >?K Total 
 
K 0 1  
KL	 0 1 
Frequency  214 53 267   213 65 278 
 0     0    
SUB %  80.15 19.85 100.00   76.62 23.38 100.00 
FC %  48.09 39.26 46.03   63.96 62.50 63.62 
Total%  36.90 9.14 46.03   48.74 14.87 63.62 
Frequency  56 24 80   35 9 44 
 1     1    
SUB %  70.00 30.00 100.00   79.55 20.45 100.00 
FC %  12.58 17.78 13.79   10.51 8.65 10.07 
Total%  9.66 4.14 13.79   8.01 2.06 10.07 
Frequency  73 31 104   41 10 51 
 2     2    
SUB %  70.19 29.81 100.00   80.39 19.61 100.00 
FC %  16.40 22.96 17.93   12.31 9.62 11.67 
Total%  12.59 5.34 17.93   9.38 2.29 11.67 
Frequency  102 27 129   44 20 64 
 3     3    
SUB %  79.07 20.93 100.00   68.75 31.25 100.00 
FC %  22.92 20.00 22.24   13.21 19.23 14.65 
Total%  17.59 4.66 22.24   10.07 4.58 14.65 
Frequency  231 82 313   120 39 159 
 YES     YES    
SUB %  73.80 26.20 100.00   75.47 24.53 100.00 
FC %  51.91 60.74 53.97   36.04 37.50 36.38 
Total%  39.83 14.14 53.97   27.46 8.92 36.38 
Frequency  455 135 580   333 104 437 
 Total     Total    
SUB %  76.72 23.28 100.00   76.20 23.80 100.00 
FC %  100.00 100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00 100.00 
Total%  76.72 23.28 100.00   76.20 23.80 100.00 
Notes: Frequencies of financial constraints (rows) and subsidies (columns). SUB % (FC %) are relative 
frequencies within rows (columns) of each cell. For the ordinal FC variable, higher values correspond to 
higher reported constraints (zero for absence of constraints). We compare current (w) values of FC and 
SUB with the corresponding CIS wave lagged values (w-1). 
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Table VIII.A6. Subsidies: The impact of financial constraints 
   FC treated as endogenous 
 
2 
2 FC 
2 FC 
CIS wave lag (1) NO (2) YES (3) NO (4) NO (5) YES (6) YES 
FC 0.107 0.095 -0.302 0.021 0.548 0.209 
 (0.083) (0.148) (0.569) (0.251) (1.251) (0.429) 
SIZE 0.069** 0.183** 0.053 0.062* 0.203** 0.189** 
 (0.033) (0.078) (0.040) (0.037) (0.081) (0.085) 
AGE 0.078 0.023 0.064 0.056 0.041 0.035 
 (0.049) (0.111) (0.054) (0.055) (0.110) (0.111) 
FOR_K -0.013 -0.157* -0.042 -0.008 -0.164 -0.169* 
 (0.053) (0.090) (0.077) (0.055) (0.112) (0.099) 
RD_WORK 0.177*** 0.171** 0.157*** 0.167*** 0.196** 0.152* 
 (0.048) (0.079) (0.050) (0.049) (0.094) (0.089) 
COOP 0.969*** 0.495*** 0.995*** 0.987*** 0.444* 0.497*** 
 (0.088) (0.171) (0.091) (0.091) (0.232) (0.169) 
EXP 0.171** 0.062 0.179** 0.178** 0.097 0.117 
 (0.073) (0.122) (0.076) (0.077) (0.137) (0.154) 
SUB%I 6.941*** 1.457*** 6.773*** 6.795*** 1.334* 1.413** 
 (0.558) (0.485) (0.603) (0.559) (0.755) (0.571) 
SUB%R -0.007*** 0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007*** 0.008** 0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
MKTS -0.906*** -0.147 -0.937*** -0.926*** -0.119 -0.126 
 (0.290) (0.498) (0.296) (0.299) (0.512) (0.510) 
PATENT 0.084 0.269 0.086 0.075 0.293 0.264 
 (0.055) (0.185) (0.062) (0.058) (0.192) (0.188) 
INTANG 0.177 -0.370 0.152 0.133 -0.340 -0.284 
 (0.391) (0.829) (0.424) (0.414) (0.862) (0.807) 
       
A   0.195 0.016 -0.231 -0.231 
   (0.274) (0.353) (0.680) (0.680) 
       
Observations 3,208 556 3,180 3,180 549 549 
Log-likelihood -1701 -377.3 -1346 -2108 -339.8 -510.3 
Notes: Columns (1-2) report estimates from an probit regression, columns (3) and (5) those from an 
instrumental variables probit and columns (4) and (6) report the results for a simultaneous equations 
specification in line with equation (D1). Columns (1-3) and (5) use the financial constraints collapsed 
variable 
2. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. All regressions include industry dummies.  
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Table VIII.A7. Spearman's rank correlation matrix: Models A and B 
VARIABLES              
MODEL A ∆, 
, ∆, , , ∆, , ∆, 
, 
 >? 34  ! 
∆, 1.0000              

, 0.0620 1.0000             
∆, 0.1435* 0.1900* 1.0000            
, 0.0300 -0.0312 0.0473 1.0000           
, -0.0001 0.1987* 0.2170* 0.0449 1.0000          
∆, -0.2171* 0.0080 -0.0108 -0.0110 -0.3578* 1.0000         
, 0.1021* -0.1067* 0.2313* 0.0027 0.2261* -0.1203* 1.0000        
∆, -0.0035 -0.0689* 0.0791* -0.0267 -0.0470 0.0101 0.2056* 1.0000       

, 0.0023 -0.0828* -0.0481 0.4019* -0.0157 -0.0125 -0.0155 -0.0377 1.0000      
FC -0.0037 -0.0890* 0.0353 -0.0413 0.2043* -0.0862* 0.0614 -0.0557 0.0151 1.0000     
SUB -0.0074 0.0571 0.0540 0.1222* 0.1096* -0.0256 0.0412 -0.0198 0.0457 0.0703* 1.0000    
INNOV -0.0063 0.0811* 0.0812* 0.2069* 0.1321* -0.0321 0.0417 -0.0129 0.0939* 0.0359 0.3024* 1.0000   
RD -0.0025 0.1017* 0.0598 0.2558* 0.1230* -0.0472 0.0344 -0.0441 0.1345* 0.0758* 0.2675* 0.6426* 1.0000 
              
MODEL B RD_I FC SIZE AGE EXP Y_IN ∆1 RD_WK SUB COOP    
RD_I 1.0000              
FC -0.0764 1.0000             
SIZE 0.4384* -0.1282* 1.0000            
AGE 0.0260 0.0230 0.1493* 1.0000           
EXP 0.1465* -0.0254 0.2506* 0.0872 1.0000          
Y_IN 0.1492* 0.0550 0.0716 0.0213 0.1774* 1.0000         
∆1 -0.0240 -0.0590 0.0528 0.1248* 0.0580 -0.0512 1.0000        
RD_WORK 0.1377* -0.0211 0.1360* 0.0840 0.2034* 0.1733* 0.0133 1.0000       
SUB 0.2116* 0.0399 0.1371* 0.0446 0.1082 0.1261* -0.0049 0.1640* 1.0000      
COOP 0.1800* 0.0119 0.1906* 0.0204 0.0290 0.1191* 0.0054 0.1582* 0.2491* 1.0000     
Notes: Rank correlation coefficients were calculated using Sidak's adjustment. * denotes statistical significance at the .01 level.   
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Table VIII.A8. Spearman's rank correlation matrix: Models C.and D 
VARIABLES                 
MODEL C INNOV FC RD_I SIZE AGE SUB COOP B_TRB B_TEC B_MK ∆1 RD_WK MKTS   
INNOV 1.0000                
FC 0.0739 1.0000               
RD_I 0.7713* 0.0711 1.0000              
SIZE 0.1717* -0.0446 0.2451* 1.0000             
AGE 0.0174 0.0363 0.0225 0.1343* 1.0000            
SUB 0.3551* 0.0723 0.4299* 0.1542* 0.0374 1.0000           
COOP 0.4233* 0.0606 0.4561* 0.1881* 0.0171 0.3746* 1.0000          
B_TRAB 0.1117* 0.5557* 0.0874* -0.0488 0.0261 0.0677 0.0850* 1.0000         
B_TECH 0.1272* 0.5489* 0.0965* -0.0364 0.0215 0.0654 0.0776* 0.8064* 1.0000        
B_MARK 0.0572 0.4963* 0.0125 -0.0502 0.0130 0.0280 0.0376 0.6756* 0.6842* 1.0000       
∆1 0.1994* 0.0131 0.2397* 0.1612* 0.0735 0.2105* 0.2216* 0.0168 0.0410 0.0056 1.0000      
RD_WORK -0.1054* -0.0352 -0.0789* -0.0298 0.0945* -0.0416 -0.0455 -0.0602 -0.0549 -0.0184 -0.0338 1.0000     
MKTS 0.0449 -0.0214 0.0490 -0.0694 0.0503 0.0474 0.0363 -0.0177 -0.0293 -0.0467 0.0735 -0.0031  1.00   
                
MODEL D FC SUB SIZE AGE PUB_K FOR_K ∆Y CS CF LEV ISS ∆NWC R_FinI EXP MKTS 
FC 1.0000                
SUB 0.0729 1.0000               
SIZE -0.0403 0.1534* 1.0000              
AGE 0.0363 0.0386 0.1325* 1.0000             
PUB_K -0.0285 0.0760 0.1719* -0.1143* 1.0000            
FOR_K -0.0898* 0.0104 0.1839* 0.0177 0.0195 1.0000           
∆1 -0.0336 -0.0412 -0.0290 0.0965* -0.0032 -0.0316 1.0000          
CS -0.0622 -0.0545 -0.1410* -0.0053 -0.0881* 0.0221 0.0069 1.0000         
CF -0.0785* 0.0931* 0.0073 -0.0673 -0.0756 0.0721 -0.0532 0.2049* 1.0000        
LEV 0.0947* -0.0969* -0.0907* -0.2132* -0.0273 -0.0770 -0.0505 -0.1682* -0.4140* 1.0000       
ISS -0.0924* -0.0479 0.0232 0.0497 0.0155 0.0556 0.2448* -0.0334 -0.0156 0.0148 1.0000      
∆ 0.1025* 0.0747 0.0337 0.0265 -0.0099 -0.0063 0.0710 -0.0636 0.0336 0.0212 0.1684* 1.0000     
R_FIN -0.0532 0.0445 0.2101* 0.2374* 0.0662 -0.0183 0.0118 -0.0632 -0.0373 -0.1040* 0.0419 0.0186  1.0000   
EXP -0.0140 0.1131* 0.2612* 0.0709 -0.0807* 0.2051* 0.0368 -0.0241 0.0855* -0.1392* 0.0307 0.0366  -0.0349 1.0000  
MKTS -0.0227 0.0477 -0.0733 0.0480 0.0199 0.0633 -0.0034 0.0286 0.0940* -0.1318* -0.0181 -0.0131  -0.0288 0.1384* 1.0000 
                
Notes: Rank correlation coefficients were calculated using Sidak's adjustment. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The research work that lead to the elaboration of the present thesis, has provided a number of 
new insights regarding the ability of firms to finance their investment and growth. The 
implications of the findings described in the previous Chapters can be grouped into three 
main areas—empirical findings, policy implications and research implications. While our 
investigation contributes to a better knowledge of the financial problems affecting firms, we 
provide further guidance for policymaking actions. Additionally, this work depicts a series of 
complications related with the study of firms’ financial constraints and unveils a number of 
research questions that require further investigation in the near future. 
 From the discussion throughout the thesis we can extract a number of relevant 
findings, which we now highlight. First, from the discussion in Chapter II, it is very difficult 
to identify if, and to what extent, are firms financially constrained. The findings described in 
Chapter V support this view. As an example, the direct use of the SA index of Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010) is shown to provide a flawed measure of financial constraints. 
 Second, both indirect (Chapters V-VII) and subjective self-assessed (Chapter VIII) 
measures of constraints provide compelling evidence that Portuguese firms are, in general, 
financially constrained. 
 Third, while in Chapter V we point that smaller firms are in general more financially 
constrained, Chapter VI unveils that the relationships between constraints and both size and 
age is non-monotonic and not robust to economic sector disaggregation. 
 Fourth, also from the findings of Chapter VI, we can conclude that service firms are 
more financially constrained than manufacturing ones, even though differences are larger 
within than between sectors—due to a considerable heterogeneity between industries. 
 Fifth, the results in Chapter VII indicate that the European financial and monetary 
integration process that came along with the introduction of the common currency, eased 
firms’ financial constraints. This effect was most noticed in highly open firms. Accordingly, 
such findings had to the argument that integration, by means of access to foreign financial 
markets and lower domestic loan prices (for the Portuguese case), effectively alleviates 
financial constraints. 
 Sixth, also from Chapter VII, we argue that exporting firms face lower financial 
constraints, while we cast some doubts on the argument that only unconstrained firms self-
select into exporting. The latter conclusion is driven by the finding that firms also exhibit a 
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significant level of constraints before they start to export, which is then reduced after they 
engage in exporting activity. 
 Seventh, the use of both indirect and direct measures of constraints in Chapter VIII 
shows that financial constraints have a perverse effect upon the innovation process. 
Specifically, we point that firms that invest in R&D and those that innovate are not as 
affected by constraints. Additionally, we provide compelling evidence that financial 
constraints significantly reduce the amounts invested in R&D, as well as they severely reduce 
the probability that a firm innovates. 
 Eighthly, even though innovation subsidies are generally regarded as having an 
additionality effect upon R&D investment and a positive impact upon innovation, in Chapter 
VIII we raise some doubts on their role in alleviating firms’ financial constraints. In 
particular, we question the extent to which these subsidies are allocated to those firms in need 
(constrained) and whether they effectively mitigate financial constraints. 
 These conclusions are particularly true with respect to the Portuguese economy, even 
though most of them may be extended to, at least, other European Economies (see Cabral, 
2007). 
 The findings of this work have serious policy implications that are worthwhile 
mentioning. First, the existence of financial constraints indicates that suitable policies should 
be designed in order to tackle this problem. Additionally, even though it is generally agreed 
that smaller and\or younger firms face higher constraints, policymaking should accommodate 
the fact that the relationship between size, age and financial constraints is non-monotonic and 
not robust to sector disaggregation. Notwithstanding, such policies should be particularly 
aimed at those firms that: a) operate in industries where the level of constraints is higher and 
have a preponderate role in the economy (e.g. the education industry); b) have a key task in 
the processes of Economic Growth and Economic Evolution, such as firms that desire to 
export and\or those willing to innovate. Furthermore, the use of subsidies as a remedy for 
financial constraints is questionable. Therefore, policymakers should make an effort to either 
improve the allocation of subsidies to financially constrained firms and\or design alternative 
instruments that can effectively alleviate constraints. 
 In addition to the policy implications aforementioned, this work also unveils a number 
of research questions that certainly deserve our attention in the near future. We summarize 
them as follows. 
 With respect to theoretical modelling and given the discussion in Chapter I, there is 
still room to improve the functional form of the borrowing constraints function, specifically 
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incorporating the findings of an increasingly large empirical literature—Chapter III. As an 
example, the analysis of firm dynamics within a Schumpeterian framework that stresses the 
role of financial constraints is certainly justified. 
 To what concerns empirical research, as it was shown in Chapter II, a “perfect” 
measure of constraints is yet to be found. Accordingly, it is of outmost importance that future 
research focuses on developing a consistent—or at least more reliable—measure of financial 
constraints.  
 The recent financial crisis has stimulated research on the effects of financial crisis and 
firm constraints—Chapter III. Even though we have analysed the role of the monetary 
expansion brought by the introduction of the common currency (Chapter VII), with respect to 
the Portuguese Economy there is a lack of research aimed at explaining the effects of crisis 
upon firms’ financial constraints. It is therefore desirable that one analyses the extent to 
which financial crisis lead to: a) a “flight to quality”, prevailing the better firms; b) or if 
instead they disproportionally affect firms with better future prospects via financial 
constraints. Once available, data on the recent financial crisis will certainly help in clarifying 
this point. 
 Even though associated with innovation (Chapter VIII), the entrepreneur is a key 
driver of Economic Evolution (Schumpeter, 1939). Albeit the existence of a large body of 
literature on the subject (Chapter III), it often disregards (because of selection bias) potential 
entrepreneurs that face a financial barrier to entry. Therefore, it is possible that the 
importance of this barrier is underestimated. Accordingly, efforts to unveil the magnitude of 
such barrier are certainly warranted.  
 On the other side of the coin, the factors driving firm survival have also been 
extensively analysed. However, even though one expects that financial constraints increase 
the risk of exiting the market (see Chapter III), the extent to which they have a distinct effect 
upon different types of exit (e.g. mergers, company buyouts or bankruptcy) is still an open 
question. 
 Furthermore, our data reveals that, contrary to the empirical literature (Chapter III), 
the relationship between age and financial constraints is not as clear—specifically it is found 
to be non-monotonic (Chapter VI). Therefore, a closer look at this relationship is desirable. 
 Finally, the role of public financial support to alleviate financial constraints (namely 
subsidies) still requires further investigation. Specifically, the extent to which subsidies are 
allocated correctly on one hand, and whether they effectively reduce such constraints on the 
other, is still very unclear. In addition to a welfare analysis of the impact of these public 
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incentives, alternative remedies to financial constraints should also be explored and put 
forward. 
 
 On the whole, although there is still much to be said with respect to financial 
constraints, this thesis shows that they are an important factor that shapes firms’ behaviour. 
Therefore, the existence of financial constraints may be grounds for policy intervention. 
Nevertheless, the corresponding action should take into account that the severity of such 
constraints depends on a number of distinct firm characteristics, as well as it should be 
undertaken using adequate policy instruments. 
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